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

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


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Joseph Clark

The American Blacks: A Passion for Politics

Eddie N. Williams, president of the Joint Center for Political Studies, a "think tank" dealing with special concerns of black America, speaks of a "growing passion for politics never before witnessed in the black community on a national scale." Black leaders such as Chicago's Mayor Harold Washington and presidential aspirant Jesse Jackson, he says, tapped into that force: "It created them, they did not create it."

William Lucy, the black secretary-treasurer of the largest AFL–CIO affiliate, AFSCME, and veteran civil rights leader John Lewis of Atlanta both used the phrase "natural progression" to describe the way the civil rights movement has taken to political action. Eddie Williams recalls that Martin Luther King had urged his followers to reinforce racial compassion with old-fashioned American political quid pro quo.

Whomever you talk with in the black community, leader or rank-and-filer, agrees that the big catalyst spurring American blacks to political action is Ronald Reagan. "We've had conservative Republican presidents before, Nixon and Ford," union leader Lucy observes, "but at least they maintained what had been developed for the poor over many years. Reagan has simply been callous about the needs of the poor, and not just the blacks but also Hispanics and whites." Lucy described how the Reagan budget cuts hurt local governments, and it was in many such constituencies that blacks won electoral victories.

Undoubtedly, the Jackson campaign has further spurred grass-roots political action among blacks and helped to bring about the recent spurt in voter registration. But this is not as new a phenomenon as many think. Dr. Milton Morris, research director at the Joint Center, recalls that the previous high point of black electoral participation was in 1964. Goldwater then was considered a champion of white supremacists, Johnson a champion of equal rights. Dr. Morris sees the present upsurge as "long in the making." He cites three factors: first, the perception by blacks that without political clout they cannot influence political developments; second, demographic changes, a growing active, political concentration of blacks in areas where they constitute the majority or swing vote; and third, the shift of the political climate to the right, which presents a threat to hard-won civil rights gains.

From the researchers at the Joint Center as well as from those at the Atlanta-based Voter Education Project (VEP), you get far more stress on the role of black organizations in getting out the vote than on the impact of the Jackson campaign, though they don't underestimate the latter. Thomas Cavanagh, a research associate at the Joint Center, feels that after the death of Martin Luther King, you had a "spectrum of black leadership that is less charismatic than institutionalized, working through such organizations as the NAACP, the National Urban League, the Children's Defense Fund, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Operation Big Vote," as well as organizations of black elected officials such the Congressional Black Caucus. But again, no matter who is talking, there is clear recognition that the Jackson campaign has altered the politics of this country. Cavanagh says about 90 percent of the blacks have been voting Democratic, and this can go up to 95 percent. The increase of black registration has been even more dramatic in the North than the South. In 1982 black turnout surged by 7.2 percent, compared to 3 percent for whites in the North and West.

A net gain of up to 2 million black voters by November "would be a realistic possibility," says

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Tom Cavanagh. And Dr. Brian Sherman, research director of the Voter Education Project, cites a 407,000 increase in the number of black registered voters in 7 of the 11 Southern states between 1982 and the present. Alabama went up 11 percent; Georgia 9.7 percent; Florida 3.4 percent; Louisiana 14.4 percent; South Carolina 3.1 percent; Texas 31 percent; Virginia 14.6 percent. Much of this increase is especially noteworthy because states such as Alabama and South Carolina recently purged their rolls, making it harder to reregister voters.

What effect has increased black voter participation had? Cavanagh points to the increase of black elected officials from 1,469 in 1970 to 5,606 in 1983. During that period the number of black members of Congress increased from 10 to 21; black state representatives more than doubled; city council members quadrupled. Even more striking, black mayors increased from 48 to 247 since 1970; there are currently 19 black mayors in cities with a population of 100,000 or more, and four of the mayors in the country's six biggest cities are black.

There are 11 states with a total of 134 electoral votes where the unregistered potential black vote exceeds Reagan's 1980 margin of victory, Cavanagh shows. Furthermore, in "tossup" states, "the black percentage of the voting-age population is higher than the median victory margin." He finds that "a Democratic presidential victory in 1984 is inconceivable without a high black turnout. . . ."

WHAT IN MOST RESPECTS has been a thrilling, positive development has a negative aspect that must not be blinked. For some, that aspect seems more important than the unprecedented participation of blacks in a political campaign. The *New Republic* (April 30) says the Jackson candidacy "is becoming an instrument for the destruction of the very dream that created the movement . . . the dream of an America free of every form of racial division, racial hatred, and racial injustice." Before arguing that such pessimistic conclusions are not warranted, a brief account of the divisive racist development is necessary.

First, there was the "Hymie" insult by Jackson, for which he apologized. Then, Jackson's "explanation" in *Newsweek*, worse than the original slur. He described his experiences on "Jew Street" in Chicago and proceeded to compound the stereotyping of Jews that has plagued them for more than a thousand years. Worst of all was Jackson's failure to disassociate himself fully from Louis Farrakhan, leader of the Nation of Islam, a Black Muslim sect. Farrakhan had threatened Milton Coleman, the black reporter who broke the "Hymie" story, warning him that "One day soon we will punish you with death." And on top of that Farrakhan said: "Here come the Jews, don't like Farrakhan, so they call me Hitler. Well, that's a good name. Hitler was a very great man. He wasn't great for me as a black person, but he was a great German." It was by no means sufficient for Jackson to say he didn't agree with Farrakhan's despicable statement.

Bad enough. But does this mean that the achievements of the Jackson campaign in arousing black participation have been canceled out? The electoral victories of American blacks have been too solid, the long, hard fight for the vote too significant, the registration campaigns too far-reaching to be canceled by the failures of a single individual, "charismatic" though he may be. That historic effort by American blacks and their white liberal allies has made too deep an impact on the nation, and on the blacks themselves, to be wiped out so easily. What happened in Los Angeles, Birmingham, Chicago, Philadelphia, and 24 other cities with populations over 50,000 that elected black mayors, and the many hundreds of smaller communities, South and North, where blacks won a measure of political power, is a response to something *far more fundamental* than the oratory of Jesse Jackson.

HERE'S A VOLUME with yellowing pages entitled "Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders." The Commission's report, issued early in 1968, sought out the roots of the riots that raged in black communities in summer 1967. There were 83 deaths and 1,897 injuries. Fire and looting took a toll in the millions of dollars. The Commission warned, "In the summer of 1967, we have seen in our cities a chain reaction of racial violence. If we are heedless, we shall none of us escape its consequences."

The Commission had a conclusion that can bear far more notice today than ever before:

> Our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.
>
> What white Americans have never fully understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply implicated in the ghetto. White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and white society condones it.

The ingredients were outlined in the Commission report:

- Pervasive discrimination in employment, education, and housing.
- Black in-migration and white exodus, which have

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produced massive concentrations of impoverished blacks in our major cities.

• In the black ghettos, segregation and poverty converge on the young to destroy opportunity and enforce failure.

These conditions were aggravated by frustrated hopes and a climate that tends to encourage violence. Many young people turned away from the King emphasis on nonviolence. But the amazing thing is that the civil rights movement, based on a rejection of violence and a turn toward political action, rescued the nation from racial conflict and despair. How sharp a turn this was can be seen in the differing attitudes of young blacks in Chicago during the summer of 1966 and the spring of 1983. In 1966 these young blacks, many of them school dropouts, were among the rioters. But in 1983 they were enthusiastic campaigners for Chicago's first black mayor. One had to be in Chicago during the Harold Washington campaign to see how this turn toward politics galvanized the very people who had been at the heart of the 1966 and 1967 disorders.

There were results not only in the electoral victories. There were civil rights victories in housing, employment, and education. Affirmative Action played a vital role toward eliminating job discrimination. Even the most recalcitrant index of all had changed slowly going into the 1970s—progress toward narrowing the gap between the incomes of blacks and whites.

ALL THIS CHANGED in the 1980s as the Reagan administration's creed of social Darwinism became the symbol of a new rightward trend. Even the 1965 Voting Rights Act was placed in jeopardy by the incoming Reagan administration. It was up for renewal in 1982 and the president's favorite senators, Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Jesse Helms of North Carolina, were striving to emasculate it. For a long time there was a deafening silence from the White House. But the reaction of both the country at large and the black community enabled the Democrats to force a renewal of the Act and even its strengthening by making results, not intentions, a criterion for voting rights. Still, there were Reagan's proposals to give tax breaks to segregated private schools and Justice Department intervention against busing and Affirmative Action guidelines. These came together with the Reagan budget of tax breaks for the rich alongside cuts in Food Stamps, Aid to Dependent Children, and school lunches. There was also the historic discovery by the Reagan administration that ketchup was a good enough substitute for vegetables in the diet of poor children.

Tom Cavanagh describes what followed: "Instead of taking their frustration into the streets, as was predicted in some quarters, blacks have thus far expressed their grievances largely through the ballot box—with dramatic results."

ATLANTA's City Councilman John Lewis exemplifies the historic changes in the black civil rights movement of this country. This veteran is still only 44 years old. Chairman of SNCC from 1963 to 1966 when it came close to open espousal of separatism, Lewis was a hero of the 1965 March from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama. His skull was fractured by white racists; he nearly died in Selma. But the idea of a "never win" movement had no appeal to Lewis. He went on to become head of the Voter Education Project from 1970 to 1977.

Black participation in the 1984 campaign, Lewis says, "is an extension of the civil rights movement." Division and separatism, he says, don't serve the interests of America's blacks; he sees the 1984 campaign "advancing interracial democracy in the South" and elsewhere. He thinks it's a serious underestimation of the long fight for voting rights and the extensive history of voter registration to focus attention only on the Jackson campaign. Like practically every other black leader, Lewis credits the Jackson candidacy for the impetus it gave to political action.

Like most of the black trade unionists and the Atlanta civil rights leaders, Mayor Young and others, Lewis deplores the racial and ethnic slurs introduced in the Jackson campaign. But this will be overcome, in his view. Lewis also sees a unification of the Mondale and Jackson forces come the

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Democratic convention in San Francisco. Like most black leaders, while deploring the negative episodes of that campaign, he will not level public criticism against Jackson. He puts his emphasis on the positive. He sees the growing registration of black voters, alongside similar developments among Hispanic Americans and the poor of all races, as changing the political course of the nation. Union leader William Lucy puts this in practical political terms—there is a revival of the Roosevelt coalition based on an alliance of labor, blacks, ethnic Americans, and women. □

Murray Hausknecht

Special Interests and the City on a Hill

"Political parties," Gary Hart told the Alabama Legislature during the primary season, "must free themselves from the grasp of the special interests and once again address the country's national interests." There is no doubt that he struck a sympathetic chord and that everyone knew the identity of the villainous force threatening the "national interest." Hart was not alone in his worries. After the New York primaries James Reston noted Walter Mondale's "long, careful and expensive effort to win support of the unions" and expressed his doubts about whether the voters would ultimately think, as Thomas Jefferson did, "about 'the coming generations' or whether they would regard their own selfish interests and think merely about themselves."

Unions, or "Big Labor" as they are known to conservative speech-writers, are perfect targets for hostility. Only about 20 percent of the work force is unionized, and for a significant part of this group union membership is not a salient dimension of their identity. Nor will it seem mean-spirited to many people who usually become conscious of unions in negative contexts. To say "Teamsters," for example, conjures up images of racketeering and "unsavory connections with the Mafia." When not being titillated by stories of "corrupt union bosses," the public is most aware of unions when they are on strike. With the successful organization of public employees in recent years many strikes not only upset daily routines, they also conspicuously violate the more sacred "public interest."

By their very nature unions, and in particular American unions with their historic emphasis on "business unionism," often appear in the public consciousness as defenders of naked self-interest. When "demands" for higher wages, fewer hours, and better fringe benefits are successfully negotiated, there is no way to blur the impression that only one group will profit—especially when the company announces its increased costs will be passed on to the customer.

Unions, like other modern organizations, tend to be large-scale structures that fall heir to the ills of bureaucracy, and they are easily lumped with Big Business and Big Government. The stereotype of the union is assimilated into a vision of the world founded on deeper levels of American beliefs and mythology.

An enduring component of the American political imagination is the image of "the interests," the omnipotent forces arrayed against "the people." Richard Hofstadter, in *The Age of Reform* (Knopf, 1956, p. 65), quotes William Jennings Bryan thundering, " 'On the one side stand the corporate interests of the United States, moneyed interests, aggregated wealth and capital, imperious, arrogant, compassionless. . . . On the other side stand an unnumbered throng, those who gave the Democratic Party a name and for whom it assumed to speak.' " The "interests" of the populist perspective are lurid powers not bound by the rules of the political game; they do not hesitate to corrupt politicians and overstep the law in other ways.

It is a vision of the political landscape that is surely not wholly incorrect. Our history shows that

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wealthy and powerful groups have not always stayed within the bounds of legality and common morality. But the vision also possesses a large measure of irrationality; it is intimately connected to a paranoid style of American politics that sees political action in black and white terms and history as determined by conspiratorial forces:

> "There are but two sides in the conflict that is being waged in this country today," declared a Populist manifesto. "On the one side are the allied hosts of monopolies, the money power, great trusts and railroad corporations, who seek the enactment of laws to benefit them and impoverish the people. On the other are the farmers, laborers, merchants, and all other people who produce wealth and bear the burdens of taxation. . . . Between them there is no middle ground." [*The Age of Reform*, p. 64.]

Those who respond positively to Gary Hart and Ronald Reagan would have no difficulty seeing "Big Labor" among the "allied hosts."

THE EFFECTIVENESS of Bryan's oratory was related to the evangelical tradition he and other populists drew upon. The Cross of Gold speech casts political conflict into a context of a struggle between Good and Evil. If the force you contend with is, to quote a later politician, part of an "evil empire," then entering the world of politics is crossing into a sinister place in which eternal suspicion is the price of survival. Those who have adopted politics as a vocation are all untrustworthy and corrupt. Any politician who openly solicits support, and unreservedly welcomes it, only confirms the validity of the original animus against all politicians. Candidates unsuccessful in pursuit of the same "special interests" compensate by claiming to have had no traffic with this moral sinkhole.

Bryan's imagery is part of a cultural tradition going back to the beginnings of American history. When the Puritans approached the shores of Massachusetts in 1630 their leader, John Winthrop, reminded them that they were bound together in a covenant among themselves and with the Lord of Israel to establish a model society for all humankind. "By creating an organic community, Winthrop said, those frail humans could live up to the terms of their divine commission: 'we must be knitt together in this worke as one man . . . our community as members of the same body.'" (Loren Baritz, *The City on a Hill.*) The theme of Americans "knitt together . . . as members of the same body" continues to echo through American history.

Winthrop's "city on a hill" is also the earliest version of a dream that is reincarnated in the American mythology of the virtues and lost glories of small-town America; a dream that haunted the founding of successive 19th-century utopian communities and the communes of the 1960s. It is the original American vision of a kind of community where all social action, to quote Max Weber, "is based on a subjective feeling of the actors . . . that they belong together." It colors practically all aspects of politics from campaign oratory to Reston's worry that voters will forget future generations. Dan Rather, moderating a debate among the primary candidates, provides another example. In a portentous style suitable to the occasion he asked, "To unite a people, to unite a country, the essence of leadership, part of it at least, is to get individuals to sacrifice for the common good. Let's talk about sacrifice . . . what would be the principal sacrifice you would ask of individual Americans if elected . . . ?" For Rather, as for Reston, a leader who requires "sacrifice for the common good" is needed to restore the unity of the body politic.

The desire for such a political community is a species of nostalgia. Even by the end of the 18th century there were many who recognized that America was already a society in which communal goals were subordinated to group and individual interests. The political consequences were clearly stated by James Madison in *Federalist Number 10* when he warned of parties "united or actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." He was equally forthright in locating the source of the passions and interests in "the various and unequal distribution of property." In that unsentimental view, the problem of "the interests" had little to do with selfishness as a moral evil; rather, the problem was how to contain an inevitable conflict of interests to protect the class structure.

If Winthrop's vision, which also assumed that existing inequalities had to be preserved, demands action based upon subjective feelings that people belong together, Madison's vision demands an orientation typical of modern capitalist societies—in Weber's terms, an orientation that "rests on a rationally motivated adjustment of interests."

IN MODERN SOCIETIES it is extremely difficult to order life so that communal ends can be the primary ends of action. Indeed, American culture assumes that people will not only pursue their own ends but that they *ought* to do so; it is one of the meanings we assign to "individualism." The existence of the labor movement is in part a denial of this kind of individualism; it is a recognition that the survival of individual workers and their families

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depends upon the collective strength of their unions. Those who are hostile to the unions, like Hart's reputed following of young professionals, are affirming their commitment to the traditional American creed of individualism. On this level, opposition to "special interests" is simply a matter of . . . self-interest.

But this pragmatic basis of antiunion sentiment rests on other powerful, nonrational feelings that reinforce practical interest. The impersonal, calculating, rational orientation to the world characteristic of modern society encourages a longing for the benefits of the communal society (no matter how imaginary those may be) and an active search for those rewards or, at least, an escape from the alienating rigors of modern life. (It works the other way too: when those whose only experience has been the traditional community see that the rewards of modernity are possible for the likes of them, they eagerly reach for the rewards.)

People need to affirm the possibilities of achieving a communal life, and the ritual denunciations of labor provide one such opportunity. Unions, because they represent the interests of one group and are perceived as large, impersonal, powerful forces akin to corporations, become a convenient symbol of that alienating part of modern life with which we are uneasy and whose existence we wish to deny. When it is allied to practical self-interest, the cry of "special interests" becomes a powerful slogan.

The effectiveness of the slogan depends, as do all successful ideological catchwords, on a distortion of reality by the blurring of real differences among individuals and groups. The United States is, as it always has been, a class society, and those who work in its factories and fill the slots in its service economy can only attain some of the promises of America as "God's country" by organizing to protect and further their interests. To see the organization of those without property as similar to the coming together of the wealthy and the powerful is to misunderstand the world in which we live. The weakening of the labor movement will not serve "the national interest," "the common good," or "the coming generations." It will serve only those whose wealth, power, and privilege rest on the existing structure of inequality. Perhaps America will become a "city on a hill" when *those* special interests are finally overcome. □

Ezekiel J. Emanuel

The Ethics of Splicing Life

The nuclear weapons debate reminds us once again of how well-intentioned scientific advances may grant human beings such vast powers that they endanger our fundamental political and social values. The specter of such power has haunted the development of recombinant DNA research since its inception in the early 1970s. Aware of this danger, President Carter set up the Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research. *Splicing Life: The Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings* is the Commission's published report.*

The Commission begins that report by denying the often-made claim that genetic engineering is immoral because it would grant humans godlike powers. All science, the Commission contends, grants the "scientist vast powers of action," which make "human beings, in some sense, co-creators with the Supreme Creator." Genetic engineering may be godlike, but it is not uniquely so; it is like any number of creative activities of God in which humans may ethically partake because they are made in His image. Ultimately, "the use of genetic splicing technology is not claimed to be wrong as such but wrong because of its potential consequences."

* The report was published in November 1982 by the U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. The Commission's chair was Morris Abram, its executive director Alexander Capron.

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THE COMMISSION EXAMINES many potentially dangerous consequences of this technology, including whether genetic engineering will —

(1) interfere harmfully with evolution;

(2) destroy parents' rights and sense of responsibility to their children;

(3) change people's sense of being human beings and the way they think of themselves;

(4) permit misuses by people with evil intentions;

(5) create conflicts between commercial interests and academic research projects.

The analysis of each potential danger follows a pattern of responsible, skeptical inquiry. A few arguments are offered delineating the risks, countered by arguments that place the risk in perspective and minimize its significance. The deliberations conclude with a reminder of how uncertain all such evaluations are.

In considering the risk of destroying parental responsibility, the Commission notes that "if genetic engineering makes use of reproductive technologies such as artificial insemination and *in vitro* fertilization, it will increase the strains on . . . traditional views of family and kinship." But the "increased ability to act for the well-being of the child would come [as] an expansion of parental responsibility." However, "here too there may be as much uncertainty about whether such changes would be beneficial or harmful."

The Commission repeats this formula in discussing the potential effects of genetic engineering on personal identity. On the one hand, "the manipulation of genes . . . that contribute significantly to personality or intelligence—if it ever becomes possible—could have considerable impact on the way people think of themselves." On the other hand, we cannot forget that "people can already be changed profoundly through psychosurgery, behavior modification, or the therapeutic use of psychoactive drugs." Therefore, "uncertainty about possible shifts in some of people's most basic concepts brings with it evaluative and ethical uncertainty."

At the end of the chapter on social and ethical issues the Commission tallies up all the uncertain risks and benefits, finding "the occurrence of specific desirable or undesirable consequences impossible to predict." Then, with a twist of logic that denies the very uncertainty we have been so persistently reminded of, the next sentence continues:

> The Commission could find no ground for concluding that any current or planned forms of genetic engineering, whether using human or nonhuman material, are intrinsically wrong or irreligious per se. The Commission does not see in the rapid development of gene splicing [a] "fundamental danger" to world safety or to human values. . . .

Because the Commission was so intent on using a utilitarian calculus of benefits and risks, it ignored or overlooked the fundamental danger of recombinant genetic technology, a danger that was raised by the General Secretariats of the three main religious councils of America in a letter to President Carter in the summer of 1980. They asked, "Who shall determine how human good is best served when new life forms are being engineered? . . . Control of such life forms by any individual or group poses a potential threat to all humanity."

To assess properly the social and ethical implications of this technology, we must conduct a thought experiment, imagining how the ultimate capabilities of this technology will affect individual lives, social relations, and political affairs.

LET US IMAGINE that scientists will be able to harvest human eggs; insert any gene into the egg; fertilize the egg *in vitro*; reimplant the egg into the mother to develop into a full-term baby with the artificially inserted gene fully functional. (Similar experiments have been successful with both fruit flies and mice.)

Let us further imagine that scientists could insert into the egg any gene or gene combination in the human genome, from those genes that regulate muscle development and skin color to those that bear on the development of the higher human powers, such as intelligence, mathematical ability, and musical skill. Finally, let us imagine that this technological wizardry is used only with the noblest of intentions, the good of humanity. What will be the effect?

Gene splicing could easily be used to increase the average intellectual or mathematical capacity, or to make children more musically skillful. This could greatly improve the results of our educational system. We now are expending tens of billions of dollars and millions of work hours precisely to cultivate and improve these talents. And the result of our haphazard primary and secondary education is a very modest success at best and, according to many, a dismal failure. Wouldn't genetic splicing technology be a godsend if it could grant us a scientifically precise method for endowing each individual with genes that would raise the "range of potential" for these valuable attributes? How much more capable our children would be if they had the capacity for higher intelligence, greater mathematical ability, and finer musical skills *before* they entered school.

Other noble uses can be imagined for recombi-

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nant genetic technology, such as the creation of a more just and moral society. According to influential liberal philosophers, the arbitrary distribution of natural talents that determines the distribution of goods in our society is, if not unjust, then less moral than it might ideally be. In *A Theory of Justice*, John Rawls elaborates this position:

> . . . distributive shares are decided by the outcome of the natural lottery; and this outcome is arbitrary from a moral perspective. There is no more reason to permit the distribution of income and wealth to be settled by the distribution of natural assets than by historical and social fortune. . . . It is impossible in practice to secure equal chances of achievement and culture for those similarly endowed, and therefore we may want to adopt a principle which recognizes this fact and also mitigates the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery itself. . . . the advantages of persons with greater natural endowments are to be limited to those that further the good of the poorer sector of society.

Genetic splicing might provide a way to equalize the natural endowments of members of a society, and thus create a more moral society. For a philosopher who has contemplated as drastic a step as abolishing the family to achieve this end, genetic engineering might provide a simple and foolproof method for regulating the distribution of natural assets. Indeed, we would not need any elaborate system of social institutions to "mitigate the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery," or to insure that the use of natural talents properly benefits the poor. Altering genes would equalize this lottery itself, making the consequent distribution of income and wealth less arbitrary and more just. Wouldn't it be immoral not to use this technology, when we have it, to mitigate "the arbitrary effects of the natural lottery"?

But we cannot ignore the fact that using the powers of genetic engineering to these noble ends would mean some people exercising great power over other people. To begin altering the genes that influence such attributes as intelligence, musical ability, or even physical prowess, even just to "enhance" the range of potentials, is to manipulate persons. These attributes define individuals in their uniqueness—they are constitutive of persons. To alter them, no matter how noble the intended goal, is still to engineer humans genetically to an end that they themselves have not chosen. Indeed, altering the brain-wiring of people to increase, say, their mathematical talents changes their thought processes, understanding, and insights. Altering the brain-wiring *is* altering the person.

The power for genetic engineering of human beings is not commensurable with the use of psychotropic drugs or any other medical therapy that might alter people's personalities. For human engineering will change a person before that individual has demonstrated a problem, fault, defect, or disability. And since the alteration is encoded in the individual's genes and influences development before birth, it can never be consented to, reversed, or somehow modified. Putting such powers in the possession of human beings changes the ethical issue.

WE CANNOT DISCOVER whether genetic engineering is right or wrong by a calculus of its potential consequences. The social and ethical dangers are not a result of potentially dangerous consequences but *inherent* in the very use of the technology. No matter how noble the intentions or good the consequences, using such power deprives men and women of their autonomy and freedom. If some people could exercise this power over others' genes, all liberal principles would become vacuous. What would it mean that humans had free will? Or self-determination? Or were responsible for their own persons? Maybe C. S. Lewis summarized the issue best in *The Abolition of Man*:

> Man's conquest of Nature, if the dreams of some scientific planners are realized, means rule of a few hundreds of men over billions upon billions of men. There neither is nor can be any simple increase of power on man's side. Each new power won *by* man is power *over* man as well.

The Commission argues that "the best safeguards against such abuses are a continued support of democratic institutions and a commitment to individual rights." But can we be confident that our liberal values are so entrenched as to preclude these manipulations of individuals? Will not possessing the power to change a person in ways we consider good erode our commitment to such values, or distort the fundamental conceptions that inform them?

In the final paragraphs of the chapter on social and ethical issues, the Commission reveals why it believes genetic engineering will not and cannot be halted, even if it carries with it significant dangers:

> At this point in the development of genetic engineering no reasons have been found for abandoning the entire enterprise—indeed, it would probably be naive to assume that it could be. Given the great scientific, medical, and commercial interest in this technology, it is doubtful that efforts to foreclose important lines of investigation would succeed. If,

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> for example, the United States were to attempt such a step, researchers and investment capital would probably shift to other countries where such prohibitions did not exist. To expect humanity to turn its back on what may be one of the greatest technological revolutions may itself betray a failure to recognize the limits of individual and social self-restraint.

These fatalistic and frightening words seem to imply that whatever the morality—or immorality—of genetic engineering in humans, it will proceed anyway. The great, overriding "interests" tangibly measured in new knowledge and in cures for human diseases, and the billions of dollars involved, overwhelm any ethical dangers and objections. We are entranced by the prospect of saving hundreds of thousands of people who, the World Health Organization estimates, die from hemoglobin diseases each year; entranced by the profits to be gained from commercialization of this genetic technology, and by the sheer awesomeness of such a technical achievement.

IN THE FACE OF SUCH ATTRACTIONS, the Commission seems to think we cannot control ourselves. While we worry about the dangers, discuss the ethics, appoint committees to explore the risks of genetic splicing technology, we zealously go on researching and planning for its use. Indeed, that such a prestigious Commission never specifies what type of future uses of genetic engineering technology might be unethical or socially harmful, and never defines what reasons might be "found for abandoning the entire enterprise," reemphasizes the very shallowness of our commitment to ethics and liberal principles.

By denying that recombinant genetic technology is wrong or unethical, and by finding the development of this technology safe, the Commission has insured that gene-splicing in humans will occur. Indeed, not long after the release of *Splicing Life* Bernard Davis, a molecular biologist at Harvard Medical School, predicted in *Science* magazine that "cure by implantation of genes into somatic cells now seems only a few years off."

Yet, there is still some time, maybe ten years, before we possess the full technical power to manipulate any gene in the human genome. There is also the prospect of a new national bioethics commission. This may give us the time and the forum in which to realize and define the dangers of genetic engineering and, one hopes, discover some social self-control. □

And the Rich Get. . . .

In a front-page story on April 4, the *New York Times* reported that:

> The Congressional Budget Office, analyzing the cumulative effect of budget and tax changes adopted since 1981 [finds] that low-income families had lost the most money and high-income families had gained the most. . . .
>
> For example . . . households with annual incomes of $10,000 have *lost*, on the average, $90 a year. Households with incomes of $40,000 to $80,000 have gained an average of $2,900 a year and families with more than $80,000 of income have gained, on the average, $8,270 a year.

Quoting directly from the CBO study, "The combined impact of the tax and benefit changes since 1981 is a net loss in income for those in the lowest category, and an increase for the other four groups."

How does it work out?

A household with an annual income of $10,000 or less gains $20 in tax cuts, but it *loses* $250 in cash benefits and $160 in noncash benefits (Food Stamps, Medicaid, Medicare, housing subsidies), for a total *loss* of $390. The household with an income of $80,000 or more gains $8,390 in tax cuts, loses $90 in cash benefits and $40 in noncash benefits, for a total *gain* of $8,260. The *Times* report adds that "Families that pay little or nothing in taxes . . . get little or no benefit." Further, the *Times* describes the Congressional Budget Office as a "nonpartisan agency respected on Capitol Hill for its independence and technical expertise."

But not respected everywhere. That same evening, in his press conference on April 4, President Reagan derided the study as false and misleading. Look, he said, a family that has to pay $20 in taxes saves $5, and pays only $15. But a family that saves $1,500 in taxes still has to pay a high tax! Same percentage. Everything fair and square. Any ordinary intelligence can see what's wrong with that "equation" but, then, our president, you might say, has an extraordinary intelligence. All very simple: Them as has, gets!

— E. G. □

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"Special Interests" & American Politics

On March 8, Irving Howe had a piece on the New York Times *Op-Ed page entitled " 'Special Interest' Cant." Michael Kinsley, an editor of the* New Republic, *then wrote Howe a letter commenting on it. Since the discussion seems of general interest, it appears below: first Howe's Op-Ed piece, then Kinsley's comment and, after that, Howe's reply.*— Eds.

"Special Interest" Cant

A new cant phrase—"special interest"—has entered our political language. Politicians gravely declare themselves against it; television commentators toss the phrase about as if its meaning were transparent; and in this moment of spiritless conservatism there seems to be general agreement that the Republic will be endangered if "special interests" aren't curbed.

Lately, the phrase has been put to a special use. It has become a code word for attacking unions, often by political figures intent upon picking up conservative votes within or near the more-or-less liberal arena of the Democratic party.

When not sheer demagogy, the talk about "special interests" is mostly nonsense. It is also, for a while, politically effective. It conveys the impression of something small-minded, narrow-spirited—say, little groups trying to cover up pollution, or find dubious tax shelters, or keep children from getting needed medicines. But when the term is applied to unions, whose members and families may total 40 million people, then one can detect a malicious intent. For the organized workers of America constitute a large segment of the American people. They are not something apart or "special": they are integral to our life.

Hundreds of thousands of these people have suffered badly during the recent recession, and for workers in Detroit, Youngstown, and Gary, Ind., that recession is by no means over. Their unions have come under sharper attack than at any time since the late 1920s. If the organized American workers do form a "special interest," it is largely in the sense that they have taken a special beating during the Reagan years.

That's why it seems opportunistic and peculiarly nasty for politicians, some even boasting liberal backgrounds, to snipe at "special interests" when everyone knows they really mean labor. Not only is this to join the right-wing attack on the interests of millions of Americans, it is also to forget that whatever portion of social decency we have achieved these past 50 years—those measures of the "welfare state" that have eased the lives of both the poor and the middle class—is in good part due to the efforts of the labor movement.

To say this is not at all to endorse the unions uncritically. I have my disagreements with the AFL–CIO leadership on foreign policy, and, besides, no institution should be endorsed uncritically. It is only, for people on the liberal side, to recognize who their allies are and to refrain from tripping them up when they are already bruised.

There is a long tradition in this country to which the rhetoric of "special interests" is related. It is the tradition of an elite gentry, a self-ordained patrician class, which supposes itself to be above

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the battle over "mere" material needs. This political tradition claims to care only about high-minded, moral concerns: it presents itself as an advocate of "higher" values.

I think such claims are often delusional. Politics may sometimes be about the "larger" themes of national survival and moral style, but more often it's about the mundane division of power, income, and wealth. In so diversified a country as the United States that is unavoidable.

What the "welfare state" has done for us is to enable previously mute and oppressed social groups to speak up, at long last, on behalf of their needs and wants. That is good, intrinsically, and, more often than not, it helps the rest of us. When an increasing number of constituencies learn to articulate their demands, the result can sometimes be a confusion of voices and a scramble of appetites. But in the long run, it represents a triumph for democracy.

Next time you hear a candidate or commentator declaim against "special interests," challenge him to say what he really has in mind—if, that is, he has anything in mind.

IRVING HOWE

"We're All Part of a Special-Interest Conspiracy Against the General Interest"

Dear Irving,

Your piece on "special interests" as a political term of art was especially interesting but (in my opinion) not quite fair to people like Gary Hart who are using it this election year. As you say, "special interests" can be a code word for mean-spirited worker bashing or for patrician political elitism. The medical term, I believe, is "Elliot Richardson's Disease." But "special interests" also refers to a real problem of American democracy, which you are wrong to dismiss.

The problem is not these evil things called "special interests" that are "apart from" the rest of society, and you're right that it's demagoguery to suggest as much. The problem is that we're all part of a special-interest conspiracy against the general interest. It's like gridlock in Manhattan on a Wednesday afternoon. If everyone insists on beating the light by a few seconds, nobody gets anywhere. The courageous political leader is the one who doesn't attack special interests as a great Other, but persuades people that we'll all be better off if we relent a bit in our specific demands on the system.

Unfortunately, the role of some unions in today's economy is a good example of the special-interest problem. When steel workers win protection from foreign competition, higher steel prices cost jobs for auto workers, and so on. Furthermore, today's steel worker (if he's lucky enough to still be employed) is not like the garment worker of 50 years ago: he earns far more than the average American wage. Yes, this is thanks to unionism. But nevertheless, the people who pay the cost of government policies that maintain current wage levels in the steel industry (through lost jobs or merely through higher prices for steel products) are, on average, poorer than steel workers. These policies are regressive, not progressive. Combined with similar favors for other organized groups, such "special interest" policies disserve the interests of workers in general—especially would-be workers without jobs.

Unions have been slow to reexamine their role. In the current *Dissent*, Jim Sleeper mocks the neoliberal enthusiasm for People Express, the cheap nonunion airline where workers own stock in the company. He compares it unfavorably to the new arrangement at Eastern, negotiated by the unions, where the workers have a bigger slice of the pie and a role in management of the company. Great. But this wonderful new arrangement

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wouldn't exist if People Express hadn't pushed Eastern to the brink. If the unions had had their way, air travel would still be regulated, there would be no People Express and no new union role in Eastern. There would be fewer (though better-paying) jobs in the airline industry. Furthermore, a lot of working-class people who can now afford to fly would still be taking the bus or staying at home. Is that a trivial consideration? I don't think so. Potential occupants of cheap airline seats are a good example of an interest that is genuine but not "special"—that is, not organized—and therefore often unserved by present political arrangements.

There has got to be an alternative to Reaganism other than a reflexive embrace of every traditional Democratic way of acting and thinking. Surely, this sentiment is not just reaction in disguise. It seems more reactionary to me when Walter Mondale goes around picking off the interest groups one-by-one, playing on their fear of change by assuring them that all present arrangements will be protected. That is a recipe for disaster, both electoral and economic. I share some of the nervousness about Hart's rootless self-invention, and his heart with an "e." But Mondale really is the candidate of "special interests"—in the sense that he sees all of us with our various badges on, rather than as fellow citizens wanting basically the same things—and that worries me more.

Now a word, if I may, about yuppies. Who is a well-paid, youngish journalist to lecture workers, even steel workers, about greed? Is there any real difference between the foregoing "neoliberal" homily and Richardson's Disease? Aren't the neoconservatives, ironically, right in their sighting of a "new class"—except that they failed to anticipate how gracefully these nominally liberal young professionals would ally themselves with the old order? I detect a resentment of roughly this flavor in reading and talking to some people of the left about the Democratic primary campaign. It's not completely baseless. But it's unfair and futile to impugn the motives of anyone who criticizes, say, unions or entitlement programs. Unfair, because such criticism really can be based on concern for workers and for the poor. Futile, because even a "rainbow coalition" of classic Democratic-party interest groups cannot achieve a governing majority of this country anymore. Reach out to yuppies. They don't bite.

MICHAEL KINSLEY
The New Republic
Washington, D.C.

"Unions Aren't and Shouldn't Be Above Criticism — It All Depends How and When You Criticize"

Dear Michael,

I appreciate the friendly spirit in which you write. A few words in reply:

There are special interests—and special interests. When Franklin Roosevelt used the term, he focused on small groups of the reactionary rich, mean-spirited and anti-social (Dallas before *Dallas*). But when the term is used, as it was by Gary Hart, slyly to attack trade unions, then you're talking about a large and significant segment of the American people. To a measurable extent, these *are* the American people—not all of them, of course, but many. And to "zap" their unions in the way Hart went about it was to borrow a little from Reagan's arsenal.

The needs of working people ought not to be set off as something apart from the needs of the American people as a whole. When unions help to raise levels of income and thereby of buying power, that helps millions of middle-class people who sell to, deal with, and service the working class.

Isn't there, however, a discernible general or national interest transcending the interests of all discrete social groups? On some matters (clean air, safety rules at work, national security, and so on)

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there no doubt is. But the neoliberals have been a bit too enchanted with the notion of a general interest transcending the limited interests of various social groups. Neoliberals tend to speak of special interests as if there were no crucial moral and social distinctions to be made among them; as if it weren't clearly in the common good to further some and oppose others.

As long as we live in a (sort of) welfare state, there will be conflicts among special interests. When you write, Michael, that "we'll all be better off if we relent a bit in our specific demands on the system," I'd modify that, in light of recent findings about the way the distribution of income has been skewed toward the rich under Reagan, that "we'll all be better off if the rich and powerful in America are made to relent in their steady accumulation of tax privileges, etc."

Unions aren't and shouldn't be above criticism. It all depends on how and when you criticize. During the Vietnam war I was a sharp critic of the AFL–CIO for its prowar position. In those years the unions were relatively strong and, in my view, too closely intertwined with Lyndon Johnson's policies. One could attack the unions' mistaken positions on foreign policy without endangering the gains they had won for their members.

Right now, I'd hesitate to criticize the unions. Not refrain, but hesitate. Many unions are in grave difficulties; they have suffered heavy blows during the Reagan years; large portions of the public have succumbed to a sleazy antiunion sentiment. My own first impulse is therefore to express *solidarity* with the unions.

Suppose we have a Democratic president after the election. Suppose he pursues an inadequate policy on domestic matters, failing, say, to press for full employment. And suppose the unions fall in line behind this inadequacy. In that situation—the general atmosphere improved, the threat to unionism diminished—I'd think it entirely appropriate to criticize the unions.

Let's recognize that there's an important difference in experience between us. I grew up with the feeling that, mistaken and sometimes even corrupt as one or another union may be, the principle of unionism is . . . well, almost sacred. It is, after all, the unions that brought a measure of dignity to the lives of millions of workers, and the unions that deserve a large share of credit for whatever social reforms we've had these past few decades.

Now I suspect this feeling about unions isn't one you fully share. I think I understand why. I'd guess that for you the first major brush with the idea of unionism came during George Meany's support of the Vietnam war. It seems a pity if that keeps young people of liberal inclination from recognizing they share important common goals with the unions. But there it is; and we must nevertheless look for some (perhaps limited) political linkage.

What seems to me disturbing in your approach to these matters becomes clear in your comments on People Express and the crisis in steel. Consider the logic of your remarks about People Express. Being nonunion (and often very inefficient), that airline offers lower prices from which many, including the poor, benefit.

Don't you see that this isn't very far from the traditional antiunion argument? Suppose that the UAW were wiped off the map, wages of auto workers went down, prices also . . . car buyers would benefit. Yes, but what are the *other* consequences—the overall workers' standard of living, their ability to buy cars also, their capacity to defend their rights?

The only culprit you mention with regard to steel is the union, but I'm sure you recognize that the steel corporations have been especially inept, narrow-minded, selfish. When one begins to look into the steel crisis, one sees a multiplicity of factors: the unions *did* make wage concessions, only, in some instances, to see plants closed anyway; competition from abroad is enabled by governmental subsidies (Brazil, Korea), and no reasonable wage concessions by the union here could in themselves cope with this problem; any serious attempt to cope with the havoc wrought in the steel-producing areas requires socioeconomic planning such as this Administration rejects and (here I agree with you) Mondale hasn't given serious public consideration to.

Now, in these desperate circumstances, can one simply blame the steel union for falling back on "protectionism" at a time when both corporate America and the Reagan administration show little if any concern for its unemployed members? It's not that the more thoughtful people in and around the steel union don't know "protectionism" to be inadequate or at best a stop-gap—they have good plans for reviving and converting the industry—but they also recognize that the one thing they might get through Congress is some sort of "protection-

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ist" bill. I think it would be better if we were to point to the impossible position into which the steel workers have been driven rather than to take a poke at their union.

Yes, the yuppies are needed in any labor-liberal alliance. What troubled me about Hart's campaign was not that he attacked some of Mondale's ideas. What troubled me was that, through sly codes about "special interests," he tried to undermine Mondale's major constituency—the unions. He was, in effect, setting the yuppies against the workers, or at least against their unions. To do that he had to appeal, tacitly at least, to antilabor prejudice. And he was doing this at a time when the yuppies are relatively well-off and large numbers of workers remain jobless. A true liberal would have chosen to continue an earlier tradition of persuading the yuppies to extend themselves politically and emotionally to the workers, the poor, and the unemployed.

Anyway, let me propose a little deal: I'll spread the word that yuppies don't bite if you persuade some of the neoliberal chaps around Gary Hart to read a good history of American labor. □

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Nicaragua

Can It Find Its Own Way?

Placing Central American struggles on the line of East-West conflict is not simply a compass error, to be corrected by a truer North-South heading. It is a basic mistake. It means to ignore the simultaneous ferment of three processes that have proceeded elsewhere in gradual stages: nation-building, modernization, and class conflict. The paramount problems of Central America are those of the Third World: political dependency, cultural backwardness, and social disarticulation. The need to overcome them jointly and quickly makes the state a crucial agency of development.

Third World states are invested by social movements—the rainbow of the poor and the displaced, more a mass of "people" than a class or coalition—to which, in turn, they give expression. Many of these states are activist, quite autonomous vis-à-vis the societies they run. They seek greater independence, the upgrading of technical and cultural resources, and the integration of disparate social and ethnic groups. In this world, discourse on liberation is not necessarily discourse on liberty.

The initial thrusts and the switch points along the tracks are what counts for these locomotives of development. If the backwardness is extreme and there has been a revolutionary break with traditional autocracy, the trend is toward a hyperactive and overbearing state that reconstructs society from the top down. This is communism: a doctrinaire, monolithic, and all-pervasive state system, moving toward a state technocracy when dynamic, toward an ideocratic dictatorship if hidebound. When the middle class retains a measure of influence and the international context is more or less benign, the state evolves toward a contractual model, more flexible and open within and without. This is the national-populist pattern. Sometimes, where there has been no revolutionary break with the past, traditional despots become conservative modernizers, or a fitful liberalism is overthrown by authoritarian bureaucrats. Those are peripheral capitalist states.

In none of these cases shall we find the kind of competitive politics that prevails in the industrial democracies. Third World democracies are both rare and unstable. Most forward thrusts in development have hitherto resulted in greater state authoritarianism. The map of the Third World is peppered, from left to right, with Communist, communitarian-socialist, national-populist, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and conservative-modernizing states. There are occasional pockets of democracy and some traditionalist curios. Over this whole gamut is cast the shadow of the contest between two empires—a fact that helps befog most of the issues. For there are no inevitable connections between regime and power bloc—only "elective affinities" at best. Paradoxical alliances, non- and re-alignments abound. That the point needs to be stressed bespeaks the drabness of political thought today.

The Sandinista revolution combines strands of national populism, communism, and communitarian socialism. The legend of Sandino and the forces that overthrew Somoza express the first component. The rapid ascent of the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional—Sandinista National Liberation Front)

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as a "vanguard party" and its entrenchment within the state apparatus are clear indications of the second. The split within the Catholic church and the echoes of a primitive, *integriste* Christianity illustrate the third. These three form a fluid conglomerate. Whether the resulting combination is hard (dictatorial) or soft (contractual) depends as much on geopolitical factors and international politics as on the internal settling of accounts. Pulling in the direction of a contractual solution are efforts at mediation by European social democrats and Contadora diplomacy; pushing in the direction of dictatorship is the intransigence of the Reagan administration.

THE PLANE going from Mexico City to Managua soars over volcanoes. Below, the landscape of Guatemala and El Salvador seems primeval. Those societies have received a disproportionate share of the world's attention and the wrong kind of aid, more destructive than productive by far. The distortion is immense. The United States' obsession with stemming the tide of revolution "in its backyard" has resulted in an unnecessary prolongation of human suffering in such countries as El Salvador and Guatemala. It has helped harden the Nicaraguan revolution, has warped the gradual progress toward democracy in Honduras,[1] and it has injected militarism into formerly unarmed Costa Rica.[2]

Because the U.S. intervenes, others follow—not just states but civil groups as well (the press, writers, intellectuals, and the churches). These gyrations have drawn in more and more participants and observers. I met them as fellow passengers: a U.N. official, Swiss *brigadistas* off on a final bout of cotton-picking in the area of Chinandega,[3] a Boston journalist, members of a Canadian Lutheran group that provides aid for agricultural projects.

San Salvador is the first stop. As the plane descends above the sea, one can see scattered swimming pools, as if this were a tourist resort. But a silence of death surrounds the airport. The plane sits under the sun. Nobody gets out. Nobody comes in. After 20 minutes the engines are fired and the ghost port fades away.

From San Salvador to Managua the flight is just a hop over the Gulf of Fonseca. U.S.-sponsored mining of Nicaraguan ports was undertaken from this area. From the air, though, every object fits into a childhood picture book: plumed volcanoes, plump clouds, small villages, meadows, cattle. As we approached Managua, passengers were addressed as "*compañeros.*" A bemused Gregor Samsa of revolution, I fastened my seat belt.

My acquaintance with the country had been indirect: articles and books, also dim images of a brief stopover in 1963, when the Somozas were well entrenched. The characters that had then impressed me seemed to have wobbled out of a painting by Botero: generals, overweight priests, chaotic ladies.

I arrived in a country four and a half years into a revolution that is entering its phase of institutionalization and now proceeds, with ambivalence, toward elections. It is also a country under siege. Nicaragua is in a distinct time zone: the time of speedy progress, the timelessness of abeyance, the countdown toward destruction, and they all mix and intersect. A feeling of exalted frailty is the result.

The visitor must negotiate four checkpoints before he can enter the city. The booth where passports are examined is a replica of control posts into East Berlin, as is the requirement of exchanging a fixed sum of dollars at an artificially low rate. When, in the airport, I requested to talk with the downtown tourist office, I was handed a red phone with a sticker that still read *Volkspolizei.*

An air of religiosity surrounds the young

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[1] After decades of military rule, Honduras sought a democratic alternative with the presidential election of 1981. Since then, however, the country has become the base of U.S. military strategy in the area. The sweeping militarization that has ensued threatens to destroy the weak democratic institutions.

[2] Costa Rica also has become a base for many of the U.S. initiatives to isolate Nicaragua. The virtual bankruptcy of the economy has induced the government of President Monge to tighten the alliance with the United States, at the expense of traditional nonalignment, in the hope of a financial bailout.

[3] In the U.S. and Western Europe, there are national networks of solidarity with Nicaragua that link parties on the left, unions, student and church organizations to sponsor sociopolitical tours for such groups as educators, social workers, union members, and doctors. One of the first projects undertaken by these networks was the recruitment and coordination of young volunteers for coffee and cotton "brigades" to help with the harvest of cash crops.

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officials, many of them women. By the highway outside, hundreds of people wait for scarce buses, or go on foot. Heat, dust, crowds: one could as well be driving along the Nile. The oases are hotel lobbies and government bureaus.

Managua

MORE THAN ANY OTHER, Managua is a city of the mind. It does not consist of real blocks and true buildings. It is made of memories and premonitions. The city is only convincing on a map, and a map is hard to find. The visitor walks on half-erased streets that lead nowhere, past skeletons of what once were buildings, crossing empty lots still strewn with rubble from the great quake of '72. He is in pursuit of addresses like these:

> From the Church of San Miguel, 1 block down, 1 block toward the mountain, and 2 blocks down.
>
> No. 4 kilometer marker, South Highway, in front of the ruin of the restaurant Retreat.

Vegetation provides some continuity in the landscape, but not enough. Only a few modern buildings stand tall in desolation. Army convoys and teams of road workers are common sights. Bulldozers bear the inscription: *"Propiedad del pueblo."* Tree shade is scarce in Managua, and when one finds it, one is likely to meet other refugees from the sun—usually children and couples, or street vendors. There one might be approached for money—by people who tend to be apologetic, as if begging were no longer, as in Mexico, an accepted institution.

There are trenches everywhere. It is startling at first to see teen-agers toting submachine guns—girls and boys in the militia, hardly more than fifteen. But one gets used to them: they laugh, and blend in with everyone else like regular schoolchildren. In New York subways, the unarmed Guardian Angels had a whiff of storm-trooping about them. In Nicaragua that is not the case: everybody is armed but does not look officious.

Political wall paintings are neat, by Latin standards. Graffiti are abundant. They can be found in the neighborhoods, and seem to be the work of local CDSs (Sandinist Defense Committees). They are emphatic, sometimes nasty. There are abstract slogans: "Sandino is alive," or "Death to the Contras." The tone changes when the onlooker is warned against keeping "bad company." It gets worse when one reads *"Vigila o te vigilamos"* ("Watch or be watched") on a wall; worse yet when *"Aquí vive un contra"* (Here lives a counterrevolutionary) is tagged to someone's door. I saw *"Burgués!"* (Bourgeois!) written in red on the door of a taxi driver's house—a shack in a slum. I talked to the man and his wife inside the house, and was served with a litany of complaints (a ration of four bars of soap a month, one chicken per week, very little sugar, and so on). They had to find their basic supplies in the black market, at exorbitant prices. Because they were not Sandinistas they were suspect, and because they were suspect their expired ration card was renewed two months after their neighbors had gotten theirs. Occasionally one stumbles on the seamier side of popular fervor.

Many more hours in the *barrios* would persuade me that the pattern of control is inconsistent. Only some of these committees are watchdogs like the Cuban CDRs (Committees for the Defense of the Revolution). In some neighborhoods of Managua they don't exist at all; in others they are innocuous, in charge of such services as vaccination. Some committees act spontaneously, others follow the FSLN line. People of different persuasions coexist in them. Here as elsewhere the Nicaraguans' individualistic, almost anarchic streak asserts itself. Top-down control exists, but it is rudimentary.

Land and Labor

FOREIGN RESIDENTS, many of them involved in the technical aspects of social change, are usually a source of balanced information. Most are young, work-oriented, and love the country. It is hard for them to summarize their experience. They prefer discrete day-to-day problems to grand vistas: the dilemmas of labor shortages, agrarian reform and cash crops, the recent invention of a pest trap for the cotton fields that cuts down the use of chemicals and saves money and is, above all, extremely inge-

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nious. I respect their insistence on looking at things from the bottom up.

Afternoon discussions linger into evening; rum helps them along to the end of the night. With the help of some of my new acquaintances I tried to get a picture of the agrarian reform under way: it creates small independent farmers who work for themselves, which is fine; but it also withholds labor from the coffee and cotton harvests, which is bad. The proposed solutions are not quite satisfactory. Reliance on volunteers easily turns into its opposite: a system of draft labor. High school students must spend time at harvest work. Middle-class youths resist this, and their apprehensions are made worse by the war risks in the countryside, as a result of Contra actions. There is also a technical problem: coffee-picking by the inexperienced can jeopardize next year's harvest. As for cotton, the cleanliness and quality of the picking is decisive for the price. Thus reliance on volunteer labor results in a drop of production. The problem is so very serious because Nicaragua will continue to rely on export crops in order to earn hard currency.[4]

Mechanization is no solution for harvesting coffee, but it is for cotton. Unfortunately, it requires importing machinery, which is expensive to buy and maintain, as well as the use of defoliants. The quality of machine-picked cotton is low, and the method creates new dependency on mechanical parts and skills and on chemicals. For these crops, there seems to be no substitute for live farmhands. To make work in the fields a condition for receiving land under the agrarian reform would smack too much of an ancient *corvée,* and it would be so interpreted by the International Labor Organization. In the past, migrant laborers used to come from El Salvador for the Nicaraguan harvest, but the flow has stopped, because of the tensions between the two countries. And the government makes much of this. The vigil against counterrevolution distorts, it claims, the allocation of resources.

This mobilization of Nicaraguans for farm work can be viewed as a method of draft labor. But there is also another, real explanation for this measure. People surely have good reason to work on their own plots, if they have received title to them—or to move to the cities, if they haven't. In the cities they hope for a better living, or for the same living with less work. Thus shortages in the countryside go hand in hand with urban unemployment. About 178,000 people are unemployed, out of a labor force of nearly a million. The long-term solution hinges on higher wages in the rural areas and on regional economic coordination—which presupposes peace. Meanwhile, continued instability in the region thwarts the resolution of economic problems. The annual GNP of Nicaragua is equivalent to the price tag of a single warship patrolling its coasts.

[4] The export sector accounts for roughly 35 percent of GNP.

A Sense of Crisis

ONE OF THE FIRST THINGS I learned during my visit is that the notion of regional crisis is not an abstract concept. It is foremost a crisis of domination. As things stand now in the Central American countries, the ruling groups consist of agrarian and commercial oligarchies, business circles tied to multinational corporations, and revolutionary elites. In El Salvador and Guatemala the capacity of the ruling groups to maintain social consensus and to deliver a form of economic development in which ordinary folk can share seems hopelessly exhausted. There, the crisis is explosive. In Honduras and Costa Rica, parliamentary change and moderate reform remain viable. In Nicaragua the revolutionary leadership rides on a political alliance of multiclass mass movements. As time goes by, the moderate center tends to leave the alliance and the ruling elite seems increasingly to heed demands for "popular hegemony," without, however, sailing at full steam toward a single "proletarian" party system. Pragmatic accommodation is still possible.

In terms of regional and international politics, the real issue is not the Cuban-Soviet puppeteering of the Sandinistas, but tolerance of a more or less socialist regime, unique and nonaligned. The diplomatic solution proposed by the Contadora countries counts precisely on that. The bargain proposed is simple: to rule out the possibility of Nicaragua becoming a

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Soviet base in exchange for the right of the Sandinist regime to survive within its borders. The Contadora group, and France, Spain, and European social democrats think this would protect the legitimate interests of the United States. The Sandinistas, and from all evidence the Soviets, would prefer that outcome to a repetition of the fate of Cuba in the '60s. But Washington balks at the prospect, for it would limit its ability to overthrow regimes it does not like and to intervene at whim in conflicts like El Salvador's. The tragedy is that, in pursuit of these maximalist goals, Washington risks precisely what it feigns to fear. Reagan's policy of harassment follows the old French verse to the letter:

> Cet animal est très méchant,
> Quand on l'attaque, il se défend.

The Reagan administration is not exclusively responsible for the inclination of the Nicaraguan revolution toward the Soviet camp. Blame should also be put on hard-liners in Managua. But American policies are responsible for pushing the Sandinistas to extremes, after their initial arrogance was tempered by the magnitude of the economic crisis and the insufficiency of Western *and* Soviet aid.[5]

All that can be expected from current policies is a catastrophic symbiosis between extremists on both sides, at the expense of everybody else. The political challenge for the region lies in composing these various forces: making defeat less painful for the recalcitrant, encouraging the reformers, and inducing the revolutionaries toward pragmatism and moderation. But where there is appropriate vision (among the Europeans and in the Contadora group) there is no power, and where there is power (in Washington) the vision is myopic.

On a visit like mine, even eating was political. Dinner at some restaurants reminded me of meals in Buenos Aires. The quality of the meat is comparable, and the fish is delicious. But here such food is beyond the reach of modest incomes. The popular diet is based on *gallo pinto*—rice and beans. One hears that Somoza was a partner in this or that establishment, as he was in every lucrative enterprise in Nicaragua. Now the state has taken over that share, after the confiscation of Somoza's properties. Restaurants have multiplied in Managua since the revolution. The private sector, which complains of strangulation, may shy away from firm investments,[6] but private accumulation continues to progress, and the income gap has probably not narrowed. On this topic, both revolutionary officials and the besieged bourgeois prefer to remain vague.

The Web of Politics

The tug-of-war between the revolutionary leadership and the opposition is shrill and prone to scandal. At stake is—beyond the obvious disparity of political resources between the FSLN and the other parties—their legitimacy in each other's eyes. In a system of competitive politics, conflict may enhance the system as a whole, keeping it flexible. Basic rules help to contain the contest. Outside lies a no-man's-land recognized as a dangerous mine field. In Nicaragua, however, political differences are aired precisely in this mine field.

The Sandinistas have erred in predictable ways: they have been charged with revolutionary arrogance, bureaucratic indifference, and managerial ineptness. The worry behind these charges is about centralized political control. The opposition objects to encroachments on their freedom of action and organization: to censorship of the press, the ban on their public meetings, preferential treatment of state over private enterprise. The complaints are valid, but those who make them refuse to recognize that many Sandinista actions are responses to genuine threats of destabilization. The protests mask the inherent weakness and fragmentation of the opposition.

Many of the slogans bandied by the opposition, such as "freedom of speech," are of course attractive in principle. But too often these slogans are put forward as rhetorical abstractions, without much concrete relation to what is happening in Nicaragua, and in some instances such slogans are truly hypocritical; they sound liberal but really serve the cause of

[5] Nicaragua needs $500 million annually to cover its foreign-trade deficit.

[6] The flight of capital going abroad since the revolutionary victory has been serious—nearing, according to some informants, $4 billion.

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a bloody reaction. Similarly, the messianic streak in socialist ideology—uniquely mixed, in Nicaragua, with nationalism and Christianity—blinds the revolutionaries to real problems. A repetition of clichés is no substitute for real discussion.

The terms of the discussion are tough, even dramatic. On the one hand, revolutionaries argue that the failure to exercise power in a decisive manner may throw the country back into the hands of the reaction. On the other, critics are more than justified in casting serious doubts on the chances that freedom may blossom out of a successful revolution in a backward society. The debate cannot be settled by abstractions. A crucial question is whether the task of overcoming the old order is so rough as to make subsequent reconciliation and the functioning of an open society impossible. In other words, whether the change is sweeping enough to improve the lot of the downtrodden and slow enough not to panic members of the middle class, many of whom possess indispensable skills and resources.

It is difficult to organize an effective play of checks and balances in a frame of mind fearing that the discussion of crucial public matters might produce false rumors and threaten the security of the state. The logic of the revolutionary process, the presence of external threats, the growing vested interest in a strong defense establishment, the weakness of the contenders, and the plebiscitary tendency of "popular hegemony" militate against a system of checks and balances. Neither the civic virtue of the Sandinista leaders nor protestations of foul play by their opponents can mitigate the excessive accumulation of power. On one side, the temptation is to exclude; on the other, to secede. Meanwhile, everyone cries wolf.

The social and political system—if one can speak of a system at all—is far from set. There is as yet no overall imperative coordination of society, economy, and politics. It may be that the process of state-building will outrun everything else, but at the moment there are no more than sketches of economic, administrative, and constitutional models. To speak of closure makes little sense; of Soviet-style "totalitarianism" even less. Harassment and censorship exist, but the country remains porous. Hopeful eyes and broad smiles prevail over signs of fear or dismay. Only some of the building blocks for the Cuban way are there, not the entire framework. Barring prolonged stress or a regional war, it is likely that a more complex and subtle system of participation/control will maintain the revolutionaries in power. In the longer run, the present fluid situation might settle into a more familiar Latin American pattern—a mixture of populism and corporatism under strong state tutelage, that is, an updated and "progressive" version of Mexican sham democracy.

The difference from Mexico is not the proportion and balance between the public and the private spheres but the organizing logic. Even in its most progressive phase, the Mexican revolution was not seeking to do away with capitalism but to moderate and modernize it, creating the basis for national control of the economy. The Sandinista revolution has already gone further. Revolutionary state autonomy is greater as a result of a more intimate alliance with subordinate groups. Doctrinal cohesion at the posts of command is stronger. But vulnerability to foreign intervention is also greater.

The clear danger from the United States has had paradoxical effects. It makes the revolutionary leadership more intransigent at times and willing to make concessions at other times. The more radical elements wish to do away with capitalism altogether. But an irrevocable threshold has not been crossed. The substance of the "mixed economy" and the direction of society will depend not on rhetoric but on a series of concrete deals between the state, foreign capital, and some elements of the local bourgeoisie. This option, however, is only workable within a framework of regional détente and political negotiations. In a context of military confrontation, the only alternatives will be "war socialism" or collapse. (In political history, who wins what and when is seldom obvious. If a U.S. invasion forced the Sandinistas back into the hills, would it be described as an American victory five, ten, or twenty years later?)

On the forthcoming elections, the first point made by Sandinista leaders is one about hegemony. The FSLN controls effective power, by which is meant the state apparatus and the

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organized means of violence; it also enjoys popular support. This amalgam of masses, organization, and guns stems from the insurrection that overthrew Somoza. It is the nonnegotiable power base of *sandinismo*. The collusion of state, party, and armed force is of course the single most formidable totalitarian building block to which critics object. In this respect, the Sandinista regime is the structural opposite of Allende's government in Chile.

Within the general framework of hegemony, the Sandinistas have opened the political process to elections. Their main contenders—there are ten parties in all—represent various fractions of the professional and entrepreneurial classes that stayed in Nicaragua. Revolutionary *abertura* ("opening") means a series of protracted negotiations over participation in the government. Several of the Sandinista leaders I talked to seemed proud of this revolutionary novelty, namely, a willingness to submit themselves to "bourgeois-democratic" processes of legitimation. They are confident that they will win, which should come as no surprise with the head start they have given themselves. (The story would be different if full facilities were given to the opposition.)

The Sandinistas' dilemma is the opposite of that confronted by right-wing power-holders during the *abertura* of an authoritarian regime: not how to prevent others from winning, but how to avoid an orchestrated victory that could cripple their opponents. A representative of the FSLN to the Council of State told me, only half joking, that the Sandinistas may have to lend the other parties some votes, to prevent their disappearance after the elections. The remark confirms the persistence of vertical control and suggests an emerging pattern of manipulated democracy.

The opposition is divided, relatively weak, and without political experience. Some of the opposition leaders I interviewed were articulate but basked in a borrowed, Americanized discourse. Whatever one thinks of the newly acquired Sandinista taste for sham democracy, the lack of challenging interlocutors represents a problem for any future system. The social and economic weight of the business elements seems much greater than their political skill. They have allowed themselves to be outmaneuvered in the government and they are now camping outside in a limited space. If this weakness is not remedied in the open political arena, more of them will follow the path of those who left the country, while the remaining ones might attempt to regain influence vertically, through bureaucratic alliances.

The Nicaraguan bourgeoisie was accommodating to Somoza until around 1974. After the earthquake of 1972, the relationship changed rapidly. The earthquake was as much an economic and political shake-up as a seismic movement. Somoza used relief aid as a direct tool of capital accumulation for himself and his retinue. His regime rapidly devolved into an unabashed kleptocracy, in confrontation with other privileged groups.[7] The latter began to oppose the dictator, joined the fight against him, and expected to become the new ruling elite. Thus the middle-class opposition triggered the crisis of the Somoza regime and took the lead in the first stage of the revolution. Their calculations, however, were frustrated by the cruel obstinacy of the tyrant and by the correlative growth of the Sandinista Front. The result was a bitter surprise for them: not reform of the old bandit state but its destruction; not the streamlining of a liberal economy but the irruption of a grass-roots revolution. A spokesman for these groups angrily told me how he had been trained to govern, only to have his birthright taken away by the "march of the riff-raff."

Dilemmas of Revolution

THE SANDINISTAS MAINTAIN that Nicaragua is in a process of transition to socialism. What type of transition and what sort of socialism are questions to which as yet no one has clear answers. There is considerable divergence among the *comandantes* on both the goal and pace. Not surprisingly, the more flexible are those who are faced with the day-to-day con-

[7] In the '50s and '60s, economic growth benefited not only Somoza's retinue but at least three other powerful economic groups: the Banco Nicaragüense, Calley Dagnall, and the Nicaraguan Banco de América. The broadened range of Somoza's activities in the '70s threatened to break the balance among them.

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straints of policy. Until now, *sandinismo* has displayed a style, not a model, of change. (And the distinction considerably deflates the claims of both supporters and detractors of *sandinismo* by making them more anecdotal than structural.) On the agenda are several problems that must be solved. One concerns the political constitution, another the nature of the state, the third the pattern of accumulation.

Constitutional examples fall roughly into three types: the liberal constitutions of other Latin American republics, the Mexican constitution, and the constitutions of the Soviet Union and other East European states. The shape of the Nicaraguan constitution will be determined by the Constituent Assembly to be elected in November. At this point, we can only venture a guess that the system will be presidential, with strong executive powers. The matter is presented in different discourses. One is for the masses; another, internal one circulates in the corridors of government. Those circles readily acknowledge that the ongoing democratization process is sparked largely by pressures from disenchanted European and regional supporters.[8] In the longer run, the possibility of an alliance between business groups and the technical intelligentsia in the state sector cannot be excluded. Such an alliance would constitute the core of a "bureaucratic bourgeoisie."

Every year that passes, the economic plan takes longer to draft. In discussions about economic development, there is official recognition that the social, economic, and political costs of autarchy are intolerable. Earlier projects of wholesale nationalization have been abandoned. A statute that defines property has not yet been issued. This leaves the future largely uncharted, at the mercy of ad hoc measures and crisscrossing pressures.

A perusal of various projects at the Ministries of Justice and Labor revealed substantial overlaps in legislation and the absence of an overall legal framework—nothing, for instance, on administrative law. The present reorganization of the banking system seeks to put some order into an area that is so crucial for economic development. Meanwhile, as many as 20 different state organizations all are in charge of housing and construction, without much coordination. Every bureaucratic tangle seems to produce a new vice-minister or undersecretary.

The disruptions of revolution are felt in many areas. Work discipline is slack: increased participation has eroded old patterns of compliance in the workplace, and productivity has declined in the economy as a whole. As other revolutions learned before, the economy cannot run for long on the slogan of "solidarity." It faces the need to earn hard currency, even to import food (rice and beans come through the Central American Common Market). While agrarian reform has been successful in distributing land to poor peasants, rural productivity suffers from lack of expertise and disarray among the new owners. The state intervenes, and the state is often clumsy. Shortages are noticeable, and rationing generates complaints. (A hotel worker was grateful for my gift of toothpaste. A regular tube costs 300 cordobas on the black market, while the monthly rental of a shack is 400 cordobas, utilities included. Such simple goods have become objects of worship and tokens of special favor.)

Speculation is rampant and made worse by an arbitrary rate of exchange. Dollars are traded in the black market at 5 times the legal commercial rate and at 14 times the official rate. The movement of people to the cities continues unabated, with serious consequences for the allocation of labor resources. Unemployment, profiteering, penny capitalism, and begging are common sights on the streets.

The overall picture is one of a disrupted market subject to intervention by the state at key points. Reliance on professionals must and will increase and thus, egalitarianism notwithstanding, new forms of inequality will be born. Since this trend is, in my view, inevitable, the real question is whether the revolutionaries will pragmatically encourage the businessmen to cooperate in reconstruction—thus making good on the promise of a mixed economy—or whether, still obfuscated by doctrine, they will stumble into an equally inegalitarian command

[8] See the papers presented at the Policy Workshop held at The Hague, Institute of Social Studies, June 6–25, 1983, and those presented at the Conference on Democracy and the Third World, Amsterdam, Transnational Institute, January 1984.

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economy that the state could not properly oversee. This would mean, at best, an *Absolutismus gemildert durch Schlamperei* (absolutism tempered by sloppiness)—at worst, the meticulous administration of misery.

The debate around democratization brings into focus other structural dilemmas of Nicaragua's society. At present, the state is headed by a revolutionary triumvirate that, with the National Directorate of the FSLN behind it, runs the country. The Council of State and the judiciary are the other two, weaker, branches of government. The Council shares legislative powers with the junta. In it are represented not only the political parties but also unions, interest groups, and mass organizations. Thus the system of political representation is a mixture of liberal, corporatist, and populist elements.

In practice, the system has worked to strengthen the power of the revolutionary leadership and to limit the articulation of various interests through other political parties. It restricts the parties' room for maneuver—hemming them in from above, from below, and on all sides. The arrangement is embellished by the notion of "substantive democracy"—presumably embodied in neighborhood committees, local task groups, rallies, and face-to-face confrontations with the leadership (the weekly "Face the People" encounters between the *comandantes* and assorted citizens).[9]

The new electoral law sanctioned in March leaves representation entirely in the hands of political parties, whose representatives will occupy the seats in the future Assembly. This means that, at least before a new constitution is drafted, the political system will revert to a more classical mold. The new law could be a step toward uncoupling the state from civil society.

The opposition has insistently demanded the depoliticization of the state apparatus, now largely penetrated by the FSLN. This demand touches the nerve of Sandinista power and claims to legitimacy, and it triggers vehement refusals. A strong defensive buildup has been an article of faith from the beginning. Today, the insignia on army trucks and airplanes still do not read "Nicaraguan" but "Sandinist Popular Army" and "Sandinist Air Force."[10]

The separation of a neutral state and an apolitical army from a plurality of parties is of course one basis of liberal democracy in the industrial societies. In Latin America, however, events usually follow a different scenario. A popular party that threatens vested interests is voted into government. Its measures alienate powerful groups. Even when conspiracy is not immediately rampant, the minority parties succeed in blocking the initiatives of the government. The ensuing crisis of governance often results in a coup from the hitherto "professional" military. Bloody reaction and revenge swiftly follow. If this be the sorry state of liberal democracy in so much of Latin America, to clamor for its prompt restoration in a revolutionized tropical republic smacks of naiveté, or worse. But to use this recognition as a way of justifying a dictatorship in the name of progress is a dangerous and difficult political position. Sober realism requires a readiness to accept the likelihood that political options are few; that all are bad; and that some are worse.

Between the march toward a stolid "state socialism" and dreams of a liberal regime, there are still prospects for a model of the middle range, featuring state intervention in a mixed economy, and reconciliation with the economic and political opposition. Politics would remain under the shadow of a majority party jealous to preserve the integrity of the armed forces and the state apparatus, but without turning them into tools for conquering civil society. It would still be a sham democracy, but one with some chance of improving over time. If the Sandinistas have reason to fear that relaxation of strategic controls might put them at the mercy of a coup Chilean style, there is also reason to believe that a compulsive and inefficient regulation of social life would end in another type of *coup de force*, perhaps in Polish fashion (party dictatorship devolving into military authoritarianism). Only the progressive but genuine democratization of soci-

[9] Grass-roots democracy is more than an empty slogan. The FSLN has been challenged by the very unions it has organized, as shown by the recent strike in the largest sugar mill. In the countryside, the situation is even more anarchic.

[10] Incidentally, the "air force" is puny, composed of a few helicopters, trainers, and little Cessna planes. The MIGs—which Nicaraguans are said to have learned to fly in Bulgaria—have not materialized.

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ety can avoid those pitfalls. Intelligent steps in that direction include heeding—besting Marxist-Leninist obstinacy—at least some of the proposals of the opposition. They include the replacement of partisan by more inclusive national symbols in the schools and in the barracks; the effective separation of powers; and the army's abstention from police and political functions.

A realistic notion of democracy is grounded in the long and incomplete historical struggle to accomplish three related tasks: to check arbitrary rulers, to replace them by more just ones, and to obtain a share for the underlying population in the making of rules. Peripheral capitalism Latin American style has been unable to generate and sustain these processes. "Really existing socialism" Soviet style—developmental or advanced—has fared even worse. One falls back on a melancholy lesson: "No bourgeoisie, no democracy." And this precisely was the promise of the Sandinista revolution: the removal of tyranny, the increase in popular participation, and the use of the state as an engine for the people's welfare, while keeping up the bourgeois input and political pluralism. The odds against this combination were always great, and they have increased. It is remarkable that they have not buried the promise altogether. Apart from the burdens of leftist sectarianism, such prospects dwindle when war looms large. The illusion of military expediency and mechanical solidarity—including sloganeering—prevails over the much more interesting challenges of economic management, political compromise, and civil conviviality.

By bias and conviction I prefer social to military issues. But the present preparedness intruded. I did not expect to ride on army trucks, to visit barracks, to be shelled in a border town, or to talk to wounded soldiers. Yet all this happened during a short visit. In the midst of a conversation with a Miskito pastor, regarding the political situation on the Atlantic coast of Nicaragua,[11] from which the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched, I thought once more of President Kennedy's disastrous expedition. This time it would be in reverse—launched against the very site from which the Cuban expedition was dispatched. I thought of Nicaragua surrounded by three circles of hell. The first consists of incursion by the Contras. The second is composed of neighboring armies. The third is made up of warships and troops from the United States. Each of them exacts its price from the assailants and the besieged.

Since the counterrevolutionaries have failed in their initial objectives, they have now turned to economic sabotage, with the CIA picking up the slack. The regional armies might be surprised when they turn their guns away from their own countries in turmoil. The U.S., in turn, could face high casualty rates in men and in prestige. The Nicaraguans, for their part, risk the breakdown of the economy, great loss of life, and part of their territory. But waging war is something they know how to do well. Some policy-makers in Washington consider violent intervention a surgical procedure. I suggest that their own behavior is, instead, the flash of a metastasis in years to come. □

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[11] The Atlantic Coast covers 56 percent of Nicaragua's territory and houses only 10 percent of its population. It was a pirate haven, a British protectorate, an Indian kingdom, and an independent reservation until it became part of Nicaragua in 1896. The Americans first arrived with the gold rush, then came to establish rubber, timber, and banana enclaves. Development followed the boom-bust cycle of tropical dependencies. Under Somoza the Coast was in full decline. The Indians were evangelized by Moravian missions. Today there are six ethnic groups that speak six different languages. 70,000 Miskito Indians are the second ethnic group in importance, after the Spanish-speaking mestizos.

Revolution arrived on the Coast like an alien force. It displayed insensitivity and ethnocentric prejudice. The Sandinistas first sponsored, then mistrusted, and finally repressed an Indian leadership that was recruited in Managua. The latter turned the suspicion of the Indians into active hostility against the regime. In the end it joined the Contras in Honduras and Costa Rica. The Sandinistas responded with the forcible resettlement of the Miskitos. The result is lamentable: 20,000 Indians have fled Nicaragua, 2,000 of these have been armed by the Contras and the CIA, many families are split, and a simmering resentment prevails even among those living in model resettlement villages such as Tasba Pri. Despite the Sandinistas' *mea culpa*, reconciliation will take time and depend on the pacification of the Rio Coco region, along the border with Honduras.

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Harold Meyerson

Labor's Risky Plunge into Politics

From Top-Down to Bottom-Up

In July 1983 Marty Manley, one of a number of able young staffers laid off by the decimated International Association of Machinists, traveled to Washington to meet with Paul Jensen, labor liaison of the Mondale campaign. Manley had come to propose that the campaign adopt a variant of the IAM's On-the-Job Canvass, a program in which Machinist shop stewards polled their members in the workplaces and used their responses to develop a range of programs in the shops. In the San Jose local in which the IAM's associate political director, Marjorie Phyfe, had put such a program in place, and where Manley had then carried it through, the voluntary political contributions from the 2,200 members had risen in a year's time from $600 to $28,000. Given the centrality of labor to the Mondale campaign, Manley argued, this was a program with all kinds of potential for building grass-roots support exactly where Mondale needed it.

"It was a question of how much the campaign wanted an issue-oriented labor movement," says Manley, who today runs the AFL–CIO political program in San Jose and the Silicon Valley. "We were interested," Paul Jensen recollects, "but we just weren't able to pick it up." Besides, July was one of Jensen's busiest months: his primary assignment was to pick up the AFL–CIO endorsement, and the campaign had just decided to advance the date of that endorsement from December to October—a move that had to be voted on at the AFL–CIO Executive Council meeting on August 9. Jensen—and Mondale—had only a few weeks left to concentrate on the presidents, vice-presidents, and political directors of 33 international unions. This was no time to be mobilizing shop stewards.

The decision was characteristic of the Mondale campaign; its assumption has been that you nail down the endorsement and then the issues and members will fall into place. In this instance, it was an approach that the leadership of labor had adopted as well. "When Kennedy dropped out," one president of a major international recalls, "everyone said, 'It's Mondale,' without bothering to discover the attitudes of the members." To be sure, many of the major internationals consulted their leadership down to the local-president level; some polled the rank and file, though in the spring and summer of 1983 this amounted to little more than testing name recognition. Some of the smaller internationals—and a few of the larger—had no discernible endorsement process at all. ("My president will talk to Lane," was how one vice-president of a maritime international described his union's procedure to me.) Still, whatever qualms some of the more liberal union leaders may have had about the process or even about its ultimate beneficiary were more than offset by the virtually universal belief in the need for an early, unified labor endorsement. "As far back as January 1983," that president of a major international asserts, "Lane came to the presidents of those unions that had historically been the most active politically and asked us to hold our ducks in a row. And we did."

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Fortunately for Mondale, there were some in labor who, even while acquiescing in the need for a top-down endorsement the first time around, never entertained that campaign's prevailing illusion that such endorsements would deliver the membership. Unbeknown to the campaign—indeed, unbeknown to Manley—a number of progressive political directors, most notably Jan Pierce of the Communications Workers, had refused to let the shop steward program die. Their fear was that the gap between leadership and rank and file could not be closed by conventional political union programs. Once the debacle of New Hampshire and its aftermath proved them right, they were able to roll up the vote for Walter Mondale when he needed it most.

What died on primary night in New Hampshire was the top-down laborization of the Democratic party.

A fundamental disparity underlay labor's involvement in the 1984 campaign. In direct contrast to its other leaps into presidential politics, most notably the 1944 efforts of the CIO PAC, labor in the Kirkland era felt compelled to assert its strength in the presidential arena at a time when its strength was eroding everywhere else—*because* its strength was eroding everywhere else. In recent years virtually every weapon in labor's arsenal has been effectively neutralized: strikes are broken, collective bargaining becomes corporate blackmail, courts empower companies to break contracts as they see fit. In 1982 unions won only 43 percent of representation elections, the lowest figure since the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, and the percentage of unionized workers stood at its lowest level since the rise of the CIO. Of the avenues open to labor, only politics remained—and there too the difficulties mounted.

By the late 1970s it had become clear that labor and its agenda were in danger of becoming marginalized even within its own political party. During the Carter presidency, unions saw their full-employment bill gutted, labor-law reform defeated, and a recession deliberately put in place by a Democratic administration. During the first year of the Reagan presidency, a Democratic Congress acquiesced in a substantial dismantling of the welfare state. The more conservative internationals had complained since the McGovern campaign of the declining role of party regulars in the presidential selection process. By the conclusion of the Carter presidency, that feeling had spread to the more progressive internationals as well, even though they had allied themselves with the New Politics liberals against the Meany wing of labor in the '68, '72, and '76 campaigns.

The one arena in which labor's influence continued to grow during this period was the institutional Democratic party, in part because the party was decaying at an even faster rate than labor. To both Kirkland and Charles Manatt, the incoming Democratic Committee chairman, the rehabilitation of the institutional party was central to the Democratic comeback. As they saw it, the increasing prominence of media-manipulated primaries in the nomination process had given the party one politically marginal nominee (McGovern) and another politically unreliable one (Carter). Neither would have been nominated had party regulars played a greater role in the process. The task was to change the rules so as to enable the regulars to do just that. To that end, Manatt offered labor unprecedented representation on the National Committee (35 members of AFL–CIO unions, 9 of the National Education Association) and its Commission on Rules. Labor provided unprecedented financial support for the committee (about $2.5 million in 1983, one-third of the DNC budget). For labor, the DNC was to be the Archimedean point from which it would begin once more to move the world its way.

Many of the more progressive unions, particularly the UAW, whose president, then Douglas Fraser, co-chaired the Hunt Commission on rules, entertained a more Europeanized model of party structure. Their goal was to restrict the prenomination franchise to party members, a transformation that could be accomplished de jure by having 30 state legislatures rewrite the laws or de facto by switching from primaries to caucuses. De facto prevailed: of the first 35 states to vote this year, fully 25 voted in caucuses. The UAW also had a long-

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standing concern over the lack of accountability of the Democratic Congressional Delegation to the party platform. What better way to promote their accountability than make them automatic convention delegates? For good as well as bad reasons, popular control over the nomination process began to wane.

By the fall of 1983, the combination of the rules changes, the withdrawal of Ted Kennedy, the AFL–CIO endorsement, and the ascendancy of Mondale presented labor with the prospect not of marginalization but domination of the presidential nominating convention. In early winter '84, labor began to swamp the Mondale delegate-selection caucuses. Where the slates were brokered at the top, Mondale's managers managed to hold labor's percentage down—69 of the 209 Mondale delegates from Congressional Districts in California are from unions—but in states where the delegates were chosen in caucus, the figures soared. Of the 119 Mondale Congressional District delegates in Pennsylvania, 68 came from unions; in New Hampshire it was 11 out of 12. In Massachusetts, where other active Mondale forces included NOW and the nuclear freeze, unions turned out enough people at the caucuses to secure an average of 4 seats in most of the 6 delegate districts. "They had an extraordinary concentration on delegates early in the game," says the usually politic Paul Jensen, to whom Mondale had entrusted the task of brokering labor's delegates. "After New Hampshire, it subsided."

Let us pause for a moment to consider what might have been. Had Mondale won New Hampshire and swept Super Tuesday, this summer's Democratic Convention in San Francisco would have resembled in institutional composition a convention of a European Social Democratic or Labor party. And yet, it could hardly have *sounded* like a European convention. This would have been a labor party without ideology, without a distinct labor program, and, if the campaign labor was running for Mondale before the Gary Hart challenge is any indication, without an activated rank and file. It would, in short, have marked a new stage in "American exceptionalism": the unconscious labor party—a formulation so contradictory that it never came to pass.

By no means did labor confine itself to the delegate hunt, even during the New Hampshire period. Under assignment from the national AFL–CIO, operatives of three dozen internationals traveled to Iowa, New Hampshire, and other early key states such as Illinois. Consolidated phone banks were established, so that for the first time not just the members of the more active internationals but all AFL–CIO members were called; letters went out from internationals and locals, and from the local, state, and national federations. By any quantitative measure it was a triumph, "a hundred times what we've had before," in the assessment of Nancy Shier, AFSCME's Illinois political director. In New Hampshire, for instance, over 20,000 AFL–CIO members were called—over half the state's membership. Of these, 4,000 identified themselves as Mondale supporters, 9,000 as undecided. On the eve of the primary, the labor operatives decided to do a Get Out The Vote drive among these 13,000 unionists.

The following day, by a margin of roughly 7:6, New Hampshire labor voted for Hart.

What happened in New Hampshire, and in Massachusetts and Rhode Island, was that the election had become the one kind of contest labor was least equipped to win: a referendum on itself. ("The Democratic party that was once the party of workers on the assembly line," Gary Hart said in early February, "is in danger of becoming the party of organized labor leaders in Washington.") Suddenly, all the problems labor had entered the presidential contest to alleviate—its growing ideological and cultural marginality—were factors imperiling the outcome of that contest.

Labor would have been the likely subject of attack in any event, but Mondale's campaign cast labor in the worst light imaginable. Devoid of a theme until Gary Hart gave him one, Mondale's chief message was his own anointment. Labor can run an effective campaign on specific economic issues (and it shortly was to do it), but in the absence of issues, the focus of attention was riveted entirely on its *role* in Mondale's rise—and hence, on its institutional character, on the image of its leadership.

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"Which candidate is closest to big labor?" the *Boston Globe* pollsters wanted to know shortly before Super Tuesday. (Why do we never hear about small labor?) Which one, a network asked, was "closest to labor and other special interests?" (Labor and other special interests all occupy the same political niche to facilitate candidate proximity.) "Hell," commented NEA political staffer Skip Roberts at this juncture, "we can't even win a referendum on ourselves with our own members."

Inadvertently, most of the literature labor produced in the period before New Hampshire had the effect of deemphasizing the issues and spotlighting the institution. Where issues were stressed, they were frequently those of interest only to members as unionists—Mondale on education in AFT and NEA publications. But the most distinctive thing one could say about Mondale was that he had the AFL–CIO endorsement. "The way I used to sell it," says AFSCME's Nancy Shier, "was: 'Labor is on the line. The labor movement is under attack and has decided to fight back on the political front.' And I hardly talked at all about Mondale. This went over with the leadership, but it doesn't work with the rank and file. They're not institutionally oriented the same way."

This was a lesson learned belatedly by the Massachusetts AFL–CIO. The leaflet produced a few days before Super Tuesday by the leadership of the State Federation ("an old-line Irish leadership that hasn't gone out of the office in the last 20 years," in the words of one international staffer who had worked with them on an earlier campaign) can serve as a textbook on how not to reach the rank and file:

> Each of us in the Labor Movement must make it known that we in Massachusetts speak with one united voice [the leaflet began]. Our nation was founded on the concept that United We Stand, Divided We Fall. We must let the leaders of our government know that the Labor Movement in Massachusetts is alive and well and dedicated to preserving hard-won gains inherited from those who have gone before us. I know we can count on you to see that Massachusetts Labor once again shows its solidarity with a vote for Mondale.

So one voted for Mondale to demonstrate solidarity with labor. But what is "labor" to the rank and file, what is its institutional face? "Labor is seen as the AFL–CIO," says one Massachusetts union leader. "The AFL–CIO is seen as Lane Kirkland—as big, selfish, and, by some, as reactionary on foreign policy."

Suppose, though, a local's leadership is seen as the antithesis of everything the national AFL–CIO connotes (often unjustly: in fairness, Kirkland has helped move the AFL–CIO much closer to the newer social movements than Meany would ever have considered). For the past year, Local 285 of the Service Employees' International Union (SEIU), a Boston-based statewide local of nurses, technicians, and clerical workers, has been led by Nancy Mills, an articulate 33-year-old "movement" veteran heading an all-woman slate of local officers who ran on a platform of feminism and democracy. Does that improve the image of labor, at least with the rank and file of 285? "When our rank and file think of 'labor leadership,' " says Mills, "they think of Kirkland and Meany, not of us. We try to connect our members to the labor movement; they say, 'Oh, we're part of those guys with the big cigars?' And the political program that our members think the endorsement is based on is narrow labor issues—situs picketing, labor-law reform. Our members think we've become a special interest."

Perhaps the clearest expression of the gap that had opened between the leadership and the rank and file was that nowhere in Massachusetts were there any unpaid labor volunteers for Mondale. The several hundred phone bankers around the state received hourly minimum-wage checks from the AFL–CIO; so did the phone bankers in Alabama and several other early states. Indeed, until the national AFL–CIO overruled it and sent Marjorie Phyfe into Massachusetts with three weeks left before the primary, the State Federation had intended simply to contract out the labor phone bank to a private consulting firm, at a cost of $71,000. The consultants' task, presumably, was to plead for votes by appealing to members' sense of solidarity with a movement so in touch with its members that it could not induce any of them to phone on its behalf.

On Super Tuesday election night, Massachusetts AFL–CIO President Arthur Osborne discovered the limits of a solidarity campaign in the

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Massachusetts of 1984. With Hart's vote rolling in (he carried Massachusetts labor by a margin of 4:3 over Mondale), Osborne did a post mortem on the campaign: "We tried to bring the campaign from the leadership to the rank and file," he said. "We should have brought it up from the rank and file to the unions."

Over the next three weeks, labor was to turn the campaign around precisely by deinstitutionalizing it. There was finally something else to say to members besides variations on the solidarity theme. "We didn't have anything to say to the members that worked," says Nancy Shier, "until we started campaigning against Hart."

In the four weeks between Super Tuesday and the Pennsylvania primary, labor earned the right to every delegate slot it has negotiated from the Mondale campaign, and then some. It must be understood that with the single and decisive exception of labor, the much vaunted Mondale organization is a myth. It consists of politicians who have endorsed Mondale and all they can deliver, which in this largely post-patronage age is little indeed. The volunteers who staff the offices for a normal campaign simply don't show up at a Mondale headquarters: this is a campaign, for instance, without a single student coordinator anywhere in the nation. Labor *was* the Mondale field campaign: whatever phoning, leafletting and getting out the vote went on for the campaign was done by labor.

Labor also had something to say. Not only was Gary Hart antipathetic to labor leadership, but there was a unifying thread that ran through a wide range of his votes: that workers had to bear the burden of an economy in transition and disarray. Thus auto and steel unions stressed Hart's opposition to "domestic content" legislation and extensions of trade-adjustment assistance; teachers and the building trades stressed his support for requiring the unemployed to take the first available minimum-wage job or lose their unemployment insurance. ("The trades really ran with that one," says Dick Wilson of the national AFL–CIO COPE (Committee on Political Education). "At one caucus in Oklahoma, there were 200 plumbers!") The garment unions publicized Hart's support for the subminimum wage; and nearly every union mentioned his support for the deregulation of natural gas and the $10 per barrel tax on imported oil, his opposition to the Chrysler bail-out and to extending the jurisdiction of OSHA, the Occupational Safety and Health Act. (In some of these matters, Walter Mondale had only recently himself arrived on the side of good—natural gas deregulation, after all, was a legacy of the Carter administration—and with his conversion proclaimed on several million pieces of literature, the unions were able to anchor him more firmly in their camp.) A number of internationals whose members held liberal positions on a range of social issues—the Service Employees, for instance—contrasted Mondale's support for the freeze with Hart's inclination toward the build-down. In sum, for the first time in the campaign, labor was able to focus on the conditions and concerns of its members rather than the state of their unions.

Now they were also able to move the campaign one step away from the bureaucracy. In a program devised by Jan Pierce, political director of the Communications Workers of America in the northeast, shop stewards were briefed on the positions of the candidates and encouraged in the week before the vote to talk one-on-one with each of the registered Democrats they represented in their worksite. The national AFL–CIO's computer broke out shop-by-shop a list of the Democrats; the steward received a card on each, noted that person's preference, tried to persuade the undecided, and did a get-out-the-vote campaign with the Mondale supporters.

Pierce had planned to implement this program in New Hampshire, but it fell victim there to logistics and overconfidence. Instead, Pierce was able only to set in motion a pilot program at a Nashua Western Electric plant, where Mondale fought Hart to a draw. A more decisive test came in the northernmost corner of the state in the paper-mill town of Berlin. AFSCME political operative Ed Draves had been briefed on the program, then missed the meeting in Manchester—across the White Mountains, three-and-a half hours' drive in

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mid-winter—at which the program was canceled. Thinking it was still on, he trained the shop stewards from the Paper Workers, a conservative international whose leadership had inclined toward John Glenn. In the week between Iowa and New Hampshire, while Hart was gaining at Mondale's expense throughout the state, Berlin's shop stewards went through the mills talking with the workers. The NBC Berlin Election Day Exit Poll showed Mondale and Hart running even until 3:30 PM, when the mills let out. Mondale then started drawing two votes to every one for Hart. He pulled down 1,293 votes in Berlin, and Hart 821.

"There's been a lot of talk about special interests, big labor, a top-down endorsement," says Draves. "The one-on-one program is the reverse. Instead of the member getting a letter from Lane Kirkland or the state AFL–CIO, he's being contacted by the guy who represents the union on the lowest level—usually a young guy. The young shop stewards are the best face labor can have with our members."

The full impact of the Young Shop Stewards—henceforth Yussies, to conform to this year's parlance—was not felt for a while. The morning after New Hampshire, Jerry Clark, AFSCME's national political director, called COPE's Dick Wilson to apprise him of the single piece of good news to come out of that state. In a large state, however, it is a program that takes several weeks to set up. The program did not receive its next test until New York, where Pierce and Draves, both New Yorkers, were able to promote it in a number of internationals. Its fullest test did not come until the following week in Pennsylvania. By then the AFL–CIO was pushing it heavily; Wilson and Draves presented the program at the state AFL–CIO convention, and a number of internationals, crucially AFSCME and the Steelworkers, used it extensively. No one argues that Mondale would not have carried New York or Pennsylvania had the program not run; no one argues that it did not help where it was used. "We'd done phone banks and mailings and something was still missing," says AFSCME Pennsylvania operative Rick Bloomingdale. "The shop stewards were the missing piece."

The achievement of both Mondale and labor between New Hampshire and Pennsylvania was to have redefined the terms of the election. The number of voters focusing on labor as an institution declined. As the campaign progressed, to a degree unprecedented in a Democratic presidential contest, people were voting their class.

The dividing lines between Mondale Democrats and Hart Democrats are lines of class, and where those divisions break down, where there are cross-overs, it is at least in part a function of the level of class organization, that is, the strength or weakness of unions in a given state. For instance:

- Of the 10 states to have held primaries in February, March, or April, 6 have work forces with a higher percentage of blue-collar workers than the national average. Of these, Mondale carried 4—Alabama, Georgia, Illinois, Pennsylvania—and lost 2—New Hampshire, which has the lowest level of unionization of any state outside the Sunbelt or the Farmbelt; and Rhode Island, which Mondale wrote off in the frantic weeks between New Hampshire and Super Tuesday before even starting a campaign there and where labor, though not small, is weak and atrophied.
- Among those 10 states, 5 have work forces with a higher percentage of workers in professional or managerial positions than the national average. Of these, Hart carried 4—Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, New Hampshire—losing to Mondale only in New York, which has much the highest rate of white-collar unionization in the country.
- Mondale has carried all of the states among those with higher than average unemployment; Hart took all those with unemployment figures lower than the average (except Georgia, where Mondale was aided by the Carter connection).
- In every one of those 10 states, Mondale has done better among voters from union households than among voters from nonunion households; conversely, in every one of those states, Hart has done better with voters from nonunion households than with those from union households.

The divisions between the Mondale and

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Hart constituencies have been widely noted, but these discussions have been limited by the impoverished vocabulary of mainstream American political discourse: "class," as a word and a concept, does not seem to exist. "It is a cultural clash that is going on in the Democratic Party," Elizabeth Drew has written in the *New Yorker*, "and the chasm, once opened, may be hard to bridge." True and perceptive as far as it goes, which is not far enough. The clash of cultures is rooted in conflicts of class.

The remarkable presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson notwithstanding, the story of the 1984 Democratic presidential contest is the unprecedented polarization of such a contest along the lines of class. To be sure, new-class/old-class tensions have suffused Democratic party politics for nearly two decades. Some "Marxist" apologists for George Meany used to contend that the dividing lines between the antiwar forces and the party regulars were those of class. Labor, however, was split in those battles, with some unions and unionists backing Kennedy against Humphrey, others bolting to support McGovern four years later. Labor and working-class voters were all over the map in 1976; remember that Henry Jackson lost Pennsylvania to Jimmy Carter.

Moreover, the divisions that then existed between the two camps were not fundamentally economic. As labor historian J. David Greenstone has noted, "the McGovern nomination was the intraparty triumph of a culturally (though not economically) hostile group of middle-class ideological liberals . . . , ancient intraparty enemies of Meany and his allies." The cultural hostility has abated somewhat in recent years, particularly as unions have become more heavily female and minority in composition. Labor has endorsed the freeze, marched alongside NOW for ERA ratification, even supported gay rights (although the rapprochement is basically one-sided: few Yuppies marched with PATCO or boycotted Continental Airlines). Indeed, if the clash were simply cultural, as William Schneider recently wrote in the *New Republic*, "the end of the Vietnam War should have allowed these two factions to become reconciled." But the economy intervened.

In fact, deindustrialization and Reaganomics are splitting the Democrats apart on economics as surely as Vietnam did on foreign policy. Stephen J. Rose has recently updated to 1983 his 1978 chart depicting social stratification in the United States. Extrapolating per capita income as if everyone for purposes of comparison were in a family of four, he discovered that 55 percent of Americans, in 1978, had incomes that placed them between the high and low budget lines. (For a family of four, in 1983, the low budget line was $17,000; the high was $41,000.) In 1983, that figure had dwindled to 42 percent. Those with incomes above the high budget line rose from 15 to 18 percent of the population; those whose incomes fell beneath the low budget line rose from 30 percent to 40 percent (and among them, those in poverty rose from 11.5 percent to 15 percent). In 1978, people in professional and managerial positions earned 37 percent more than blue-collar workers; in 1982, that figure had risen to 45 percent more.

In the job market, these figures reflect the disappearance of decent-paying unionized jobs in manufacturing and construction in the wake of deindustrialization and recession. From 1976 through 1983, the three great industrial unions—Auto Workers, Steelworkers, Machinists—lost a total of 1.3 million members. The bargaining position of the remaining industrial workers has been undermined accordingly. The wages of unionized workers, concentrated in these declining industries, rose a mere 2.6 percent in 1982, compared to an average rise of 5.8 percent for nonunion workers.

In American politics, these figures signify the grave weakening of the very center of the Democratic party, the polarization of its constituents into two increasingly conscious wings: blue-collar and service-sector workers and the poor in need of an interventionist state, and members of the professional and managerial strata who are opposed to greater state intervention on behalf of deindustrialization's casualties. For despite their professions of egalitarianism in administering cutbacks, the fiscal and industrial policies of such new class champions as Gary Hart and Jerry Brown fall most onerously on the working class.

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The days in which the Democratic party could harmoniously reconcile its class differences are gone, then, but neither is the party about to split apart. The two wings of the party are likely to grow more distinct, coming perhaps to resemble the British Labour party and the British Liberal party yoked together by a nonparliamentary system and a reactionary opposition party neither could join. New class flirtations with John Anderson-style third parties will doubtless continue, but the permanent threat of Reaganaut rule is likely to prove, as it has this year, a powerful incentive for the Yuppies to stay within the Democratic party and contest over it with labor. In short, the Democratic party seems in for a prolonged siege of intraparty class war, and the debate that will take place at this summer's convention over "domestic content" legislation will be but the first in a series of contests over the specific tilt of state intervention.

Unfortunately, labor's weaknesses ensure that this debate will be waged in a highly unsatisfactory manner. For only a strong labor movement can create a political movement for full employment, and its absence further polarizes current political discourse. Without a credible movement for guaranteed full employment, auto and steel workers will perforce oppose the conversion to a high-tech economy. Without such a movement, Walter Mondale can do little more than advance protectionist policies. Indeed, the political impossibility of discussing a "safe" transition to a high-tech economy accounts for the peculiar centrality of the Chrysler bail-out in the imagery of the Mondale campaign.

Walter Mondale has emerged preeminently as the candidate of the Rust Bowl. He does much better among blue-collar unionists than among white- and pink-collar unionists. Ironically, it was preponderantly the white- and pink-collar unions that were Mondale's biggest champions in the endorsement process: outside the AFL–CIO it was the NEA; within it AFSCME, the Communications Workers, and the United Food and Commercial Workers. Among the older industrial unions, only the Auto Workers promoted Mondale so fervently. Yet it is the blue-collar workers who are voting most heavily in the Mondale column.

In Illinois, for instance, NBC exit polls showed 46 percent of the blue-collar union-household voters for Mondale, compared to 26 percent for Hart and 22 percent for Jackson. However, Mondale, Hart, and Jackson split the white-collar union households of Illinois evenly, each pulling 32 percent of that vote. In Pennsylvania, Mondale took 58 percent of the blue-collar union-household vote to 33 percent for Hart; Mondale polled 44 percent of the white-collar union-household vote to 35 percent for Hart. An NBC phone poll of unionists in Iowa showed 65 percent for Mondale and 9 percent for Hart, compared to 46 percent support for Mondale and 15 percent support for Hart in the overall caucuses. When NBC broke down their phone poll union-by-union, however, they found UAW support for Mondale at 74 percent and for Hart at 3 percent, where NEA support for Mondale stood at 49 percent and for Hart at 15 percent.

Accordingly, Mondale's greatest areas of strength are the blue-collar worlds of industrial America. His strength in Western Pennsylvania was awesome; in Massachusetts, he carried only the old textile-mill towns of New Bedford and Fall River. The county to have given him his highest percentage so far is Greenlee County, Arizona, whose only inhabitants are the miners and their families living in the company towns of Phelps Dodge, against which they have been striking for over a year. They have had a tough time of it: Phelps Dodge has kept the mines running with strikebreakers; they have tried to evict the strikers from their homes and run them out of town. Greenlee County is geographically isolated and sparsely populated; none of the presidential campaigns had any activity or material there, and the miners' unions—in this case, chiefly the Steelworkers and the Machinists—had too many other problems to organize turnouts for the caucuses. But Greenlee County is the kind of terrain where there are no neutrals. These are third- and fourth-generation miners, largely Latino, who know, as the IAM's Tony Medina puts it, that they "owe everything to the union." On caucus day, Greenlee County gave Mondale 84 percent of its vote.

But the culture of the blue-collar unionist is not in the ascendancy anywhere in the United

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States. Indeed, the shift in union membership is away from blue-collar work: 48.8 percent of all unionists were enrolled in manufacturing-sector unions in 1956, while 37.3 percent of unionists belonged to such unions in 1978, and the figure is doubtless lower today. Distinct working-class voting is waning, too. There has been a steady erosion of the differential between the union vote for the Democratic presidential nominee and the total vote. In 1956 and 1960 the union vote was 15 percent higher than the overall vote; in 1964 it was 12 percent higher; in 1968, 13 percent; in 1976, 12 percent; in 1980, 9 percent.

So the class war, though labor entered the presidential arena to alleviate its ravages, promises to be an enduring feature of the struggle in that arena. And the question before labor, if it is to prevail in that struggle, is how it can build even a faint approximation of the spirit of Greenlee County among a membership that is by no means so isolated, that is decreasingly blue-collar, and increasingly indifferent to the ideology and traditions of unionism. It is a question to which there are no easy answers. Union political directors are virtually unanimous as to the difficulties of reaching white-collar unionists politically. "Half of them couldn't tell you which union they belong to," says AFSCME's Jerry Clark. "Blue-collar workers are more union conscious and more politically active than white-collar workers within AFSCME." The limits of white-collar politicization are amply evident in the NEA's campaign for Mondale this year. Alone among the major internationals, the NEA has refrained from contrasting the candidates' positions on broad economic issues. Despite the officialdom's and the staff's desire to do more, they are still constrained by their membership to discussions of Mondale's positions on education: anything else, they believe, would alienate their members. Even in a consciously progressive white-collar local like SEIU 285, Nancy Mills and the rest of the leadership are repeatedly adjured by the membership not to involve the union in issues of housing, reproductive rights, or general welfare. Only in making common cause with the community to save a Sickle Cell Anemia program has the membership sanctioned broader activism but, as Mills points out, "that appealed to their sense of professionalism, too."

The service sector has its difficulties, too. For Bill Olwell, political director of the United Food and Commercial Workers, the problem is integrating the membership not into the union but into the civic culture. The UFCW reflects the merger of three unions—the Packinghouse Workers, the Meatcutters, and the Retail Clerks; the problems are found among the clerks, who have an "alarmingly low" rate of voter registration and minimal responsiveness to the union's political programs. "Many of our clerks see their jobs as temporary," says Olwell. "They're working their way through college, or whatever. The kind of support we need for collective bargaining and our ongoing operations, we can get. But politics is tougher." In neither wing of the growth sectors of the economy, then, and in neither wing of the growth sectors of American unions (the UFCW grew by 63,000 members last year), have political union programs made a deep impact. Both professional and service workers remain largely estranged from the culture and politics of unionism.

There are exceptions to this, of course, but they may do little more than confirm the rule. In New York, Mondale's white-collar unionist vote matched his blue-collar unionist vote: both came in at 44 percent. This reflects the nearly total unionization of public employees in that state; but it also reflects the extremely strong support for Mondale among AFT members, whom cutbacks have reduced almost entirely to union veterans ("I don't think we have anyone with less than 14 years seniority," says the AFT's Rachelle Horowitz), and who are deeply embedded in the organized contentiousness of New York civic culture. There is no question that an organized white-collar/professional stratum is more inclined to a working-class orientation than an unorganized white-collar/professional stratum: everywhere, Mondale has done markedly better with white-collar union households than with nonunion households. But the limits of white-collar solidarity are pronounced. Even the Swedish TCO, into which almost all of Sweden's white-

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collar workers are organized, gives 60 percent of its votes to bourgeois parties.

The basic challenges that unions confront—to increase and mobilize their members, to restore ideological legitimacy both with the members and the general public—necessitate a greater openness to both members and the public. Contemplating the marginalization of unions in New England, on the eve of Super Tuesday, Peter diCicco, vice-president of the International Union of Electrical Workers, entertained the notion of open membership. "Why does the union limit itself to people covered by our contracts?" he asked. "If you want unions to be politically effective, then all who agree with its aims should be able to join, making voluntary contributions."

Unions can still mount campaigns in a number of ways in which they might emerge as champions of a public far broader than their own membership. It is the unions, after all, that are advancing the cause of comparable worth through the courts, a campaign that stands to benefit nonunionized women workers as well as those who are unionized. And some of the most successful union organizing drives of recent years have mobilized community support by virtue of the unions' championing a range of social causes and constituencies. The recently successful unionization of Yale's clerical workers, for instance, was a model both of union building in a nonfactory setting and of union-solidarity building in the broader community. Fully 500 of the local's 2,600 members served with specific assignments on the organizing committee. ("It was awfully labor-intensive," says organizer John Wilhelm, "but it made it impossible for the university to paint the union as an outside agent.") Moreover, the union went to both the New Haven and Yale communities, demonstrating statistically that the wages of women and minority workers were kept arbitrarily low. "There are few more deeply held beliefs in New England today than that women deserve equal pay for equal work," says Wilhelm. Confirmation of the wisdom of this approach came when two-thirds of the student body at Yale Law School signed a petition announcing their refusal to cross a picket line if the workers struck. "You can win if you involve the workers all the way along and bring in the community," Wilhelm concludes. "But no one will support you just because you're a union."

If it has accomplished nothing else, this year's Democratic presidential race has driven that lesson home to at least some of the leadership of labor. Labor cannot prevail bureaucratically, through changes in the rules; the tasks remain membership mobilization and politicization, and the forging of stronger bonds with the broader society. Within the incremental frame of reference that prevails in day-to-day politics, those tasks are being taken more seriously. As I write, the shop-steward program is put in place for Ohio and Maryland primaries, and the AFL–CIO plans to use it extensively this summer to register voters.

It is never a bad time to mobilize shop stewards. □

PS — *May 14* • Since this article was completed, Mondale has lost Indiana and Ohio by a narrow margin, heavily unionized, smokestack states that he might have been expected to win. Voting along income lines declined in these states, but voting along union/nonunion lines declined only slightly. According to ABC, Ohio union-household voters went 47 percent for Mondale, 32 percent for Hart; nonunion-household voters went 46 percent for Hart, 30 percent for Mondale.

Labor and Mondale were lulled by Mondale's lead into waging casual campaigns, failing to stress economic issues even as Hart hammered away at Mondale's acceptance of union funds. For when it comes to public acceptance of unions, Ohio and Indiana are not Pennsylvania or New York. They have larger rural and conservative populations, and they permit crossover voting.

Exit polls showed a more favorable disposition toward unions among Mondale's Ohio voters than among his Pennsylvania voters, but a decidedly less favorable disposition among all others. These states, then, are polarized along union/nonunion lines. Ohio, after all, gave us not only the sit-in but also Robert Taft. In sum, the strength and legitimacy of unions remain crucial factors in this year's voting. □

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William Kornblum

Lumping the Poor

What *Is* the "Underclass"?

They are recidivist criminals, juvenile muggers, heroin addicts, adult winos in stumbling bottle gangs, welfare-dependent mothers of teen-age welfare mothers, homeless ex-mental patients, prostitutes and their pimps. Marx would have counted them among the lumpenproletariat, a class of dropouts from the capitalist stratification system. He also considered them dangerous because of their propensity to sell their criminal skills to the forces of reaction. Today the marginal poor who crowd urban slums and squalid "hollers" of rural America are likely to be thought of as our "underclass," even when they are not criminals or social deviants. And while President Reagan makes a distinction between "deserving" and "undeserving" poor, his attacks on welfare-state institutions make it clear that to be poor in America today is almost to be undeserving by definition.

A long-term effect of the depressed 1980s is that the ranks of the criminals and deviants will be enlarged by hundreds of thousands of young Americans who could have become productive citizens. It is impossible to have unemployment rates of 50 percent among teen-age Americans in low-income, minority communities without pushing thousands of young people into lives of hustling and crime, which many are likely never to leave.

So it comes as no surprise that youth gangs are on the rise again in urban America. Roving bands ("crews") of teen-agers terrorize thousands during a hit-and-run rampage in Central Park. The elderly poor in sweltering Saint Louis die in tenement rooms rather than leave their unattended possessions to marauding teen-agers and young adult criminals. The specter of unsocialized teen-age masses and their depressed "welfare-dependent" mothers dominates popular versions of what the underclass is, but the facts are always more complicated. Thus a New York judge tells a *Times* reporter after the 1983 summer mayhem in Central Park that "at least two of the five arrested suspects, maybe three, were definitely clean-cut, high school or college kids, not kids who have been described as underclass, feral creatures."

The concept of the "underclass" tends to lump together too many disparate types of people. Once they are so lumped, their numbers are inflated. As Elliot Liebow showed so vividly in *Tally's Corner*, the stigma attached to habitual criminals also spreads to unemployed, "street-corner" men. To some writers on the right, the concept of the underclass carries the added implication that social policies directed at improving the conditions of the poor are necessarily doomed. Underclass people are said to be trapped in a "culture of poverty." They can no longer be taught to work hard for future goals. Edward Banfield and George Gilder, among others, view the long-term poor as superfluous, shiftless people, born into an economy that no longer needs their unskilled energies.

It is a tragedy of our time that the microelectronic revolution and a sharp decline in traditional blue-collar employment do threaten to make the unskilled young superfluous. As a result of structural changes in the economy, Michael Harrington notes in a recent review of Ken Auletta's very helpful book, *The Underclass*, "It may even be that a growth of the underclass lies ahead." Of course, Harrington

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and Auletta recognize that the poor are a much larger and more diverse class than those troubled souls counted as the "underclass." Out of the approximately 60 million Americans who would be considered poor by most middle-class standards, the U.S. Bureau of the Census estimates that in 1980 some 32 million persons actually qualified as impoverished by federal standards. And of this number perhaps 9 million would be considered part of the "underclass" because of chronic unemployment, long-term welfare dependency, criminal careers, and deinstitutionalized patient status. Were this number of troubled people spread evenly through the population, it is likely that by now we would have more humane and effective ways of reducing its size. But, of course, it is concentrated in large urban centers or scattered in pockets of suburban misery and Appalachian backroads.

The key question, it seems to me, about the approximately 9 million Americans counted in the underclass is the degree to which its diverse population actually forms a cohesive social group with its own institutions and its own "culture of poverty." A second question, related to how one regards the first, is: what are the appropriate policies a wise state would adopt toward this population? How can we prevent greater numbers of the more numerous poor from falling into the lifeways of the 9 million? Rather than deal with these questions in abstract terms, allow me to introduce a few young Americans from poor neighborhoods whom I have come to know in the course of research on youth, employment, and the problems of class stratification among the poor. They are all candidates for the "underclass" label.

• VINCENT P. is a 14-year-old black who lives in the poorest section of Cleveland's East Side. Short and somewhat underweight, Vincent is easily overlooked in a crowd of exuberant, chattering teen-agers. He speaks in monosyllables and evades eye contact. Although he is in the eighth grade, appropriate for his age, his school performance has slipped from quite good in the earlier grades to well below average in the past year. His reading and math scores are now below grade level.

In talking with Vincent, we hit on a subject that immediately sparks his interest—work and his experiences attempting to make money. "I love trucks and driving," he says. "When I get older, I want to drive a big steel-hauling rig like you see coming out of the mills." Vincent continues to describe how his one close friend, Eugene, and he often take long walks into the industrial areas of Cleveland where they discuss the big machinery and the work men do with these machines. "I used to work on a truck with my father," Vincent continues. "We'd drive all the way to Georgia and load up the truck with watermelons and then we'd sell 'em all in two or three days right here. Sometimes we'd load up with junk and things out in the country and sell it to the used-furniture stores. I love driving trucks and loading 'em up with stuff." As he talks, a sadness overtakes him. In painful fragments he goes on to describe how his father was shot to death in a senseless family dispute when he was 13 years old. Since then his mother has remarried. The stepfather is kind and helps him as best he can, but Vincent misses his father and that truck.

The pain Vincent is experiencing is clearly affecting his schoolwork, but he is such a quiet and easily forgotten child that no one outside his immediate family pays much attention to him. He would like to grow up to be a long-distance truck driver or a "steel-mill man like my uncles were before their mill shut down." But most of the time, at the age of 14, Vincent feels like "just another little nigger, out here scuffling around."

• RUDOLF L. lives in the same neighborhood as Vincent. At 17, he has been out of school for over a year. His reasons for leaving school are typical of a large number of dropouts who simply achieve so far below grade level that they feel it is useless to continue. Now Rudolf spends his time playing basketball in school yards. When he is not shooting desultory baskets, Rudolf "hangs out" with a few other boys his age. They smoke some pot and drink as much wine or beer as they can. In this way they are emulating the older, unemployed men who also hang out in front of the recreation center. Rudolf is quite certain that he "ain't goin'

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nowhere 'cept from the playground to the steps in front of the rec' center" over the next few years. He has never had a real job. Whatever money he has comes from petty hustles, favors for older men, and small pot deals.

At the time these case studies were being gathered, a full 80 percent of Cleveland's poor black adolescents (age 16–19) were enrolled in school, while only 52 percent of the city's poor white youth were enrolled for the entire year. These figures are only slightly different from overall national proportions showing that among adolescents from poverty households, white school enrollment is far lower than black enrollment. This may surprise some readers. The different enrollment rates are a good reflection of the realities of the labor market for white and black adolescents. (Hispanic patterns are generally more like those of blacks, except in the Southwest.) Poor white adolescents are much more likely than blacks to leave school because they have, or believe they have, a labor-market alternative to school attendance.

Among blacks, the exhortations from parents and community leaders to stay in school are part of the reason for higher attendance rates, but the strongest reason is that black youth who live in poverty generally have few legitimate alternatives to school. When children like Rudolf do drop out, therefore, they are often troubled, low achievers who have little chance of developing constructive lives when left alone in the streets. Higher black school enrollment rates mean, conversely, that there are large numbers of students in the schools who are achieving far below grade level and whose spotty attendance makes them effective dropouts. But this population at least is available for training and other forms of help—if and when these are ever made available.

• Rose F. is a young woman of 18 who lives in a large apartment building just outside Cleveland's Hough community. Her building is entirely populated by young people who have been in trouble and were placed there by the Ohio Youth Commission because there are simply not enough supervised residential facilities to accommodate needy teen-agers. Here is an excerpt from Rose's description of her life so far:

> Things were okay at home until I turned 13. Then I moved out and quit school. My stepfather and I couldn't get along anymore. I kept moving in and out until I was 15. My mother didn't mind because I always let her know where I was and went by to see her when my stepfather was at work. I didn't have to worry about supporting myself then. When I was 14 I got put on probation for not going to school. When I was 15 my mother died. My stepfather sent my sister and me down South to live with my real father. I didn't like my father, so I came back to Cleveland to stay with a friend. I was getting a Social Security check from my mother, so I had money.
>
> The girl I was staying with worked the streets. She was only 16. I didn't have to but I started working with her. It was scary, but it was a living. I grew up very fast in the streets. I shot dope but never got hooked. At 16 I was pregnant and left my man. I went to ——, a runaway shelter. The people were real nice. They tried to help, but I was used to being on my own. So I went back to my man and worked the streets until I was seven months along. I also shot dope while I was pregnant.
>
> That winter my girlfriend and I split from my man's place. I stayed with my stepfather until the baby was born. The dope only made the baby small. We moved from place to place after that. Then my stepfather put me in a detention home and tried to take my baby. I stayed there ten days and then went to a child-care center for three weeks until I turned 17. The court placed me in custody of the county. My social worker took me down and got me on welfare. I just wasn't used to getting money only once a month so I still went out on the street. . . . My son has never had a stable home and he'll be two next month.

Rose is a prime candidate for being lumped in the underclass. At 18 she is already a drug addict, prostitute, and welfare mother. Her apartment is a "dumping area" for teen-agers and young adults who have no access to other, more regular, facilities. The Jobs Corps Centers are full; the city's two small runaway shelters can only accommodate emergency cases; the detention center is overcrowded; the

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group homes are completely booked. Soon Rose's building becomes a center for drug traffic and is closed as a result of community protest. On the street again, Rose and her baby move from one "friend" to another.

• GIRLS who have lost their mothers owing to illness, to homicide, or prison are apt to spend their lives in and out of public institutions. But all poor, adolescent females fare worse than poor males in the labor market, especially during the teen-age years. Labor-force participation rates (including all types of employment) among youth from poverty areas are half as high for black adolescent females as they are for black males (age 16–19) and only about one-third as high as the rate for white males from poverty backgrounds. Thus Rudolf knows at some intuitive level that he must get into trouble before he even has a chance of getting some help out of his dead end. Young women from poor families sense in the same way that having babies may be a way out of a tough girlhood.

At age 16 approximately 12 percent of females from poverty households have children. At age 17 the proportion increases to about 24 percent; at age 18 it leaps to 35 percent; and by age 19 the majority, about 52 percent, of young women from poor households have babies of their own. Contrary to common stereotypes, there are no significant racial differences among poor, young women in rates of childbearing. The differences occur in marriage rates. White teen-agers more frequently marry (with extremely high probabilities of separation and eventual divorce), while black and Hispanic women are more likely to remain single parents and, therefore, to appear in the illegitimacy statistics. Differential marriage rates, on the other hand, have always been more parsimoniously explained by racially unequal distributions of work and income rather than by cultural differences.

Opportunities to work and learn, especially when these are effectively combined, are the only practical means to decrease early childbearing and welfare dependency. The conservatives are at their most obvious worst on these issues: to punish the teen-agers and their parents by attacks on social welfare programs has them, in effect, punishing the babies; to press for antiabortion measures and the elimination of birth control clinics and day-care centers has them, in effect, promoting more babies. In the face of these contradictions, they tend to retreat to exhortations to "morality" or rationalizations for further neglect.

• DARRYL C. is a young prince of Harlem's drug economy. At the age of 19 he has become rich. In the frenetic world of the city's after-hours clubs, Darryl sports silk shirts, diamond rings, a mink coat, and a Mercedes Benz—among other fancy cars. He is known as one of Harlem's "super kids," a successful dealer in cocaine and heroin for nine years, and now the owner of two fully renovated brownstones. Since uptown Manhattan remains one of the world's major wholesale and retail centers for drugs, and as a result of laws that establish maximum penalties for adults convicted of selling cocaine and heroin, juvenile involvement in the drug world creates bizarre patterns of entrepreneurism. Darryl became heavily involved in drug-dealing at the age of nine and soon thereafter was in charge of a "crew" of children who sold joints at the schools. As he explains it, entering this "field" was as natural to him as hoeing beans had he been born in rural Mississippi.

Darryl's flash creates the dream that other street adolescents could succeed the way he has. He is an example of pure American mythology. But for every young person like him there are thousands who get involved at a much lower level of retailing illegal goods and services. Around Harlem's towering housing projects there are "crews" of tough 12- and 13-year-olds who terrorize their more studious and sheltered peers. The mobile bands have such names as the "Cigar Mob" or the "Dead Boys"; they dream of making it someday, the way Darryl has. Nor is this situation unique to Harlem. Some of the most violently self-destructive young people I have interviewed are from poor white communities that have lost their manufacturing base in the past ten years.

It seems unlikely that any job-creating strategies will induce successful juvenile hustlers like Darryl to trade their "businesses" for minimum-wage jobs or training opportunities.

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There are, however, over 200,000 unemployed school dropouts in New York City alone. Only the smallest fraction of this population makes enough money in illegal hustles so that legitimate employment comes to seem unattractive. The opposite is true. Lack of opportunities in the larger society and lack of appropriate care at critical periods in their adolescence increase the chance that poor youth will end up in the true underclass of wasted, burnt-out cases.

• DARRYL'S CAREER, on the other hand, raises the question as to what we mean by the "underclass," if a segment of its members are earning sums of money that make them affluent by anyone's standards. Ken Auletta also struggles with this problem of definition:

> In my interviews with experts and activists, I encountered a variety of terms—the "dependent poor," the "bottom of the barrel," the "acute poor," the "unreachables," the "dangerous class," the "disadvantaged." The problem with these terms is their inelasticity: the street criminal or hustler may not be poor, the "bottom of the barrel" is a blanket insult, many of the poor are not "unreachable," a mother dependent on welfare is rarely dangerous, and the [term] "disadvantaged" does not distinguish between a cold killer and a frightened teen-age mother. Admittedly, any term that segregates a group of people risks oversimplification. But I came to believe that "underclass" was the most flexible term.

Auletta continues to assert that while hustlers and criminals are often not poor, they should be considered part of the "underclass" because of their "bad habits" or "deviant, antisocial behavior." By this reasoning, however, the underclass might include the entire American underworld, from Mafia privates to computer thieves. And if one conceives of the underclass as including poor people who supplement welfare payments with income through selling drugs, running numbers, or other "hustles" in the so-called underground economy, its size would increase from an estimated 9 million (as claimed by researchers from the Manpower Research and Demonstration Corporation) to an even more inflated 18 to 20 million.

For these reasons I prefer to narrow the definition. Since it seems that we will have the term "underclass" in common parlance, let us restrict it to people who are clearly "below" the poor in that they cannot survive unharmed for any length of time by themselves, because they lack both material resources and the ability to organize their lives. They are the people who are outside both the class system of capitalist production and any local community. An "objective social class," that is, one without class consciousness or institutions, they would include the homeless indigent, severe alcoholics, drug addicts, runaway children, and at-large psychotics who are not stable criminals. Criminals from poverty areas or elsewhere should be thought of as part of the underworld, a shadow society that has its own class system, in which there are those who own or organize the means of production, those who sell their labor, and those who seem to remain small-time crook-entrepreneurs.

By these definitions, Darryl is a successful criminal whose career may even take the classic turn from underworld to legitimate business, while Rose in her apartment "dumping ground" is part of the underclass. This can be said not because she is a welfare mother but because of the drug addiction that she tends to deny and not see as the reason she "hustles tricks" on the street. Rudolf, too, is barely able to take care of himself and is sinking into chronic alcoholism and crime. Young Vincent, by contrast, represents the great majority of poor, ghetto youth who are failing in school and yet, with some help and resources sent their way, have the potential of becoming productive citizens.

My argument that career criminals and the poor in general should not be included in a definition of the underclass is countered by such social scientists as Douglas Glascow, who writes (on p. 7) in his important book, *The Black Underclass*:

> The term underclass has slowly, almost imperceptibly, eased its way into the nation's vocabulary, subtly conveying the message that another problematic group is emerging that needs society's help. While still somewhat unclearly defined, and even thought by some not to be

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deserving of serious attention, a permanently entrapped population of poor persons, unused and unwanted, accumulated in various parts of the country.

For Glascow the "entrapment" of the poor, and especially of poor blacks in "the rotting cores of nearly every major city" distinguishes the underclass from the more mobile "lower class." Indeed, Glascow sees underclass people as "failures or dropouts of the lower class, persons who because of disability, age, race, or ethnicity have been able to obtain only marginal or part-time work for many years, or often no work at all." In *The Other America*, Michael Harrington identified the "entrapped" poor, be they stuck in urban ghettos or in rural "pockets of poverty," as the "poverty culture population," the people for whom survival without the hope of steady work had become a way of life.

These broader conceptions of the underclass group too many persons in what should be at best a carefully restricted category. The 1980 census, for example, reveals that about 47 percent of all black families with children were headed by unmarried or divorced females. And these households were almost twice as likely to exist below federal poverty standards than were two-parent black families. This "feminization" of poverty, and the centralization of so many poor households in central-city, public-housing ghettos creates new ecological obstacles to economic mobility that were not as prevalent in lower-density, industrial-tenement neighborhoods. But to regard the big housing projects as underclass jungles as, for example, Saul Bellow does in *The Dean's December*, is a grave disservice to the majority of parents there who are keeping their children in school and striving to find paths out of the welfare-poverty trap.

The distinction between the poor and the underclass, on the other hand, should not be taken as a denial that conditions of life in urban poverty areas are made much worse by the actions of underclass predators. In black popular culture today the immense problems of maturing in poverty neighborhoods become a dominant theme. "It's like a jungle sometimes," goes the refrain of a popular "rap" record, "It makes me wonder how I keep from going under." But the distinction is continually made between those who are striving to stay afloat and those who already have slipped into the underclass.

Broad definitions of the underclass also become mired in the debate over the "culture of poverty" thesis with its rather negative implications for social policy. Bag women, homeless alcoholics, and narcotics addicts obviously cannot benefit from employment opportunities without prior treatment and rehabilitation, but this is not true for the poor more generally. A full review of the "culture of poverty" thesis is not possible here (see Charles Valentine, *Culture and Poverty*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

While a life of poverty does create deep psychic scars and social isolation, which are difficult to remedy, the overly deterministic "culture of poverty" thesis is too easily used by conservatives as a rationalization for inaction and neglect. Poor families would appear to be beyond redemption after the first generation in poverty if one takes the "poverty culture" thesis seriously. Yet as a teacher in the early days of the Peace Corps I taught physics to West African adolescents whose parents were tribal illiterates. And in the heady days of President Johnson's Great Society programs I learned that many young people, who like their parents were urban illiterates, could make remarkable educational strides under the right conditions. Most educators know this to be true, just as they know there is a portion of the poor who are too troubled to make conventional gains in the best education or training programs. These are individuals who are most "at risk" of joining the underclass as I wish to limit the term.

In this essay I have purposefully chosen to emphasize the problems of young people growing up in poverty. Today's generation of young job-seekers, and especially those from minority communities, are prime candidates for the underclass if their record-high unemployment rates continue over the decade. Social programs to deal with underclass adults necessarily stress treatment and rehabilitation. These

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programs have been cruelly cut by the Reagan administration, but even if they were adequately funded, the key issue would be how to prevent more young people from developing into dependent, helpless underclass adults. Unemployment rates of 50 percent or more among minority youth are a grave threat to an entire generation of young Americans; they produce all sorts of troubles and violence.

Fortunately, the demographics of American age cohorts offers hope that were we to develop a comprehensive array of education, training, counseling and on-the-job opportunities for the youthful poor we could reverse the grim prospects of another generation swelling the ranks of the underclass. The population of adolescents and young adults seeking work will decrease significantly between 1980 and 1990. During the 1960s there was an increase of 45 percent in the number of persons aged 20–24. Between 1970 and 1980, as the last of the "baby boom" generation moved into early labor-force status, persons 20–24 increased by 20 percent while persons aged 25–34 increased by 37 percent. Between 1980 and 1990, however, there will be a decrease estimated at about 15 percent in young adults aged 20–24, and there will be a reduction of approximately 20 percent in teen-agers aged 16–19. These estimates take into account the persistently high birth rates among low-income teen-agers. They strongly suggest that efforts to break the cycle of school failure and prolonged joblessness, because of the demographic changes, have a better chance of success than has been true for the past 20 years.

For all its shortcomings, the Carter administration initiated some of the most important federal youth policies since the Kennedy-Johnson years. From 1978 to 1980 the Department of Labor's Office of Youth Programs, directed by economist Robert Taggart, significantly improved federal supervision of the Summer Youth Employment Program and embarked on an ambitious legislative campaign to raise funding levels for youth training and employment to $5 billion a year. These initiatives under CETA and the Youth Employment Demonstration Projects Act stressed a major role for the federal government, and also for community organizations and private industry, in local job creation. The Reagan administration reversed these initiatives by gutting CETA and terminating the most ambitious youth employment demonstrations. The Reaganauts naturally continued the Summer Youth Employment Program, although at somewhat reduced levels and with far less direct federal monitoring of the quality of summer jobs. Largely because of urging by liberal Democrats and Republicans, the Administration has pushed for a $2.5 billion a year Jobs Training and Partnership program. This Reaganite approach develops the local Private Industry Councils that were started under Carter into the centerpiece of local job creation. The theory applied here is that jobs created through the initiatives of private business, using federal training funds as a form of subsidy, will develop more permanent jobs for low-income youth. But the result so far has been a shortfall (compared to 1980 levels) in most major urban centers of about 15 percent in the number of jobs available for needy youth.

Community organizations in low-income areas now find that they must plead with local Chamber of Commerce leaders in order to sustain a role in developing local employment. This situation has vastly increased the frustration of local activists who see youth problems escalating in their cities yet feel powerless. The experience under Nixon of allowing corporations to take the lead in developing jobs for the chronically unemployed suggests a poor prognosis for the Reagan efforts. The so-called Hard Core employment programs of the late 1960s and early 1970s subsidized jobs for about 70,000 long-term unemployed people in the steel and auto industries and in related supply companies. By the recession of 1974 almost all of these workers were back on the street. They were often more frustrated and embittered than ever, and more likely candidates for the underclass than had they been able to be employed in some kind of work to take them through the recession.

In designing policies, we need to avoid quick-fix schemes that appeal so much to politicians. Let us work to expand cooperative education, community-based job creation, day-care centers, residential job-training centers like the Job Corps, and all the many avenues of inter-

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vention that have had real but limited successes in the past. And in providing opportunities for training in electronics and computers, let us not forget that the future of the poor in America depends on the fate of working-class employment in the public and the private sector. The mass of blacks and Hispanics and poor whites in America's cities are there because of the rapid automation of agriculture earlier in the century and the "pull" of blue-collar employment associated (for them) with 20th-century wars. They are working-class people for the most part, but the longer the society suffers depression in its manufacturing sector and in labor-intensive public-service work, the greater will be the growth of both the underworld and, much as we may dislike the term, the underclass. □

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Irving Howe

Intellectuals, Dissent, & Bureaucrats

Brief Notes on Large Matters

Of definitions of intellectuals there is no end. One major approach places intellectuals according to their social position or occupational role; this has at least the value of reducing our tendency to excessive pride, for it analyzes us in terms no different from those employed for the bourgeoisie, the lumpen proletariat, and other questionable types. A second approach places intellectuals according to their declared ideals, thereby buoying our morale by invoking a tradition of courage and independence.

Intellectuals, says Edward Shils, "employ symbols of general scope and abstract reference, concerning man, society, nature and the cosmos." They form, says Karl Mannheim, "an unanchored, *relatively* classless stratum" floating more or less freely within the spectrum of classes. But Mannheim acknowledges the limitations of this sociological approach: it "might describe correctly certain . . . determinants and components of this unattached social body, but never the essential quality of the whole." Whether the sociological approach can ever describe "the essential quality" of anything is an interesting question.

History seems to work a little better here. Many historians have seen the intellectuals as distant offspring of priestly orders, still caught up with visions of the sacred, though now in secular guise. Albert Salomon ties the modern intelligentsia to the bohemians of the 18th-century coffeehouse, proposing as our archetypal ancestor Denis Diderot: "He lived for a time on the margins of bohemia, in debt to his grocer, engaged in a fantastic charade with monks from whom he received money on the strength of spurious promises to join their orders. He wrote sermons for lazy and incompetent priests and earned his living tutoring on subjects with which he was not acquainted." All of which sounds uncomfortably familiar, except perhaps the ghosting of sermons.

Normative definitions may be more useful; they are certainly more solacing. Ralf Dahrendorf sees the intellectual as the modern "fool" whispering unwelcome truths to the king, barking his unwanted dissent at state, party, class. Sometimes he alone, this poor forlorn "fool," cares about or speaks for freedom. Lewis Coser sees intellectuals as "the men who never seem satisfied with things as they are. . . . They question the truth of the moment in terms of higher truth; they counter appeals to factuality by invoking the 'impractical ought.' They consider themselves special custodians of abstract ideas like reason and justice. . . . "

Inheriting the roles of priest, jester, and prophet, we stand—presumably (some of us)—as critics of the given, devotees of speculation, irritants, gadflies who find our models in Tolstoy's "I Cannot Remain Silent," Zola's "J'accuse," Melville's "No, in Thunder."

From all this we may conclude that there is never likely to be easy accord on how to define intellectuals, though in practice we have little

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Some time ago I was asked to talk at a conference at Indiana University on "The Meaning of [intellectual] Dissent" in both West and East. I couldn't work up a full-scale coherent presentation, so I had to content myself with a series of notes. Since then, the text has been printed in the Proceedings (along with Andrei Sinyavsky's essay, "Dissent as a Personal Experience," reprinted in the Spring 1984 *Dissent*, and others), in the Yearbook of Comparative and General Literature, no. 31 (1982), copyright © 1983 by the Comparative Literature Program, Indiana University, with whose kind permission we reprint a few portions of it. — I. H.

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difficulty in recognizing them (nor do the various secret police); that for intellectuals the struggle for definition takes on, at times, an aggressive and compensatory function; and, given the irony that must sooner or later be recognized as an occupational trait, this struggle for definition can also become a mode of "black humor."

Dissent, Power, and Public Life

WHAT SHOULD BE THE ROLE of the intellectual in the public life of a democratic society? The relation between intellectuals and state power? Two sharply divergent traditions have been at work here, that of detachment and that of commitment, and both have their dignity, truth, and limitations.

In his *Treason of the Intellectuals* Julien Benda put forth some decades ago a classical argument for intellectuals as "a priestly-secular" order:

> They are all those whose activity essentially is not the pursuit of practical aims, all those who seek their joy in the practice of an art or a science or a metaphysical speculation . . . and hence in a certain manner say, "My kingdom is not of this world."

Though rigid in his commitment, Benda was not so rigid as to propose a complete withdrawal from history. Intellectuals, he says, should speak up for innocent victims like Dreyfus, since in doing so they serve as "the officiants of abstract justice and [are] sullied with no passion for a wordly object." What Benda deplored was entering the political arena for "the triumphs of a realist passion, whether of class, race, or nation." This position is clear: do all you can to help a Sakharov, but do not become an adviser to government or propagandist for a party.

I doubt that there has ever been a serious intellectual who has failed to respond, if only inwardly, to this vision of a life devoted to disinterested philosophical and intellectual contemplation; and I say this as one who, a good part of the time, has chosen another path. If, nevertheless, we often feel that we cannot accept the way that Benda urges, we do so—or so we tell ourselves—because there are imperatives of conscience not to be denied. Suppose we must defend not only a great figure like Sakharov but an entire martyred nation like Poland? The world's agony cries out, and there are times when Benda's vision must seem morally pinched.

This clash between detachment and commitment has been an obsessive concern, sometimes a source of torment, for generations of intellectuals, and by its very nature it cannot ever be fully resolved. But if not resolved it has been dissolved in the brilliant pages of Joseph Schumpeter, who sees intellectuals as inescapably caught up in the struggles and confusions of modern society:

> Unlike any other type of society, capitalism . . . inevitably creates, educates, and subsidizes a vested interest in social unrest. . . . On the one hand, freedom of public discussion involving freedom to nibble at the foundations of capitalism is inevitable. . . . On the other hand, the intellectual group cannot help nibbling, since it lives on criticism and its whole position depends on criticism that stings; and criticism of persons and of current events will, in a situation in which nothing is sacrosanct, fatally issue in criticism of classes and institutions.

In providing this mordant description Schumpeter hardly meant to praise intellectuals, though at least until a few decades ago many of them would have accepted his description as both truth and tribute, perhaps mumbling to themselves: Nibblers of the world, unite; you have nothing to lose but your bite.

A central difficulty with Schumpeter's analysis is that it is not sufficiently historical, that is, it fails to account for the ways in which the roles of intellectuals may change, as of course they have, within capitalist society.

The Historic Myth of the Avant-Garde

THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT that for at least the early period of capitalism Schumpeter's portrait of the intellectual as a nibbler at accepted values has its large truth. Indeed, the encompassing myth—by which I mean more than fact and other than lie—of the 19th- and early 20th-century intelligentsia, in Europe and to a lesser extent the United States, has been that

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of a proudly independent critical group submitting all doctrines and values to critical inspection, asserting the legitimacy of the free mind. It is a myth I inherited when I began writing some 35 years ago, and for a time it was accepted as a "given" among those writers we have come to call the New York intellectuals.

It seemed at the time as if the intellectual life—free-wheeling, wide-ranging, speculative—could be regarded as a "permanent revolution" in consciousness, a ceaseless dynamic of change. Neither rest nor retreat! Influenced by figures as diverse as Valéry and Trotsky, Eliot and Edmund Wilson, the New York intellectuals of 35 years ago proposed to link a defense of modernist culture with a politics of anti-Stalinist radicalism. An attractive idea, this linkage helped to energize a good many writers; but it lacked durability and it has long since come to an end.

In Europe this union of *the advanced*—of critical consciousness and political conscience—had flourished only briefly, perhaps in Paris during the late 19th century, perhaps in Berlin during the '20s. And even there, one ought to stress the "perhaps." The very nature of this alliance, insofar as it existed, made probable its rapid collapse, for in its cultural style the European left, usually middlebrow, was often hostile to the avant-garde, while the avant-garde was often apolitical when not reactionary. The two wanted to express disdain for bourgeois liberalism, but for opposite reasons and, as soon became clear, in opposite directions. No, the union between cultural modernism and independent radicalism was neither proper marriage nor secure liaison; it was a meeting between parties hurrying past one another, brief, hectic, messy.

In that meeting, nevertheless, a few of us were conceived. I have, in my own fashion, remained faithful to both parents, though by now they no longer speak to each other, have for some time not been feeling well, and are reported to take no pride in their offspring.

Clearly then, we have passed the moment when a vital dissent might be expected in our culture from the encounter between literary modernism and political radicalism. Nor is there much reason to suppose that such a moment will recur.

The Buried Scandal of Cultural Modernism

In the decades between the Paris Commune and World War II—the decades when bourgeois liberalism in Europe suffered its most severe tests—both right- and left-wing intellectuals (also writers, artists, composers) were gravely mistaken in their easy dismissal of liberalism. More than mistaken: morally at fault. That bourgeois society required scathing criticism I do not doubt. But the writers of those decades failed to estimate the limits of what was historically possible, just as they failed to consider the consequences of their contempt of liberalism.

It is a matter of the greatest urgency to ask ourselves: What was it that drove some of the major writers of our century to one or another form of authoritarianism? The reactionaries, as we may conveniently call them, hoped that an authoritarian state would restore an earlier cultural grandeur, real or imaginary. They knew little about fascism and its costs, any more than the left-wing writers knew about Stalinism and its costs. They were guilty of fecklessness, dilettantism, arrogance.

Bourgeois society in Europe was overripe for social change, and the writers who were repelled by its hypocrisy and corruption were by no means mistaken. But the assumption that change required a trampling of liberal values in the name of "hierarchical order" and/or "proletarian dictatorship" proved a disaster beyond reckoning. I am not saying that the writers of Europe were responsible for the rise of modern totalitarianism; writers never have that degree of power. What I am saying is that they contributed—some a little more, some a little less—to an atmosphere in which the discrediting of bourgeois society became indistinguishable from a contempt for liberal values.

In the joyful brutality of their verbal violence, some of our greatest writers simply failed to realize how large a stake they had in preserving the norms of liberalism. They felt free to sneer at it because they remained within its psychological orbit. Taking for granted its shelter, they could not really imagine its destruction. Dreaming of natural aristocrats and high aristocratic cultures, or a "temporary" dictatorship of a historically ordained "van-

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guard," they helped, in a small way, to ready the path for manic *lumpen* and brutal *apparatchiks*. Here "dissent" degenerated into a mode of fecklessness, and in our century the price of fecklessness runs high.

Intellectuals in a Bureaucratic Society

As if the effort to cope with the rise of the totalitarian movements was not difficult enough, intellectuals in the postwar era began to find that their traditional stance of independence—the proud assertion that their place was on the margin of society so as, all the better, to be its critics—was now endangered by new social developments that neither Marxist nor liberal thought had foreseen. Schumpeter's portrait of the intellectual as the agent of ceaseless unrest, the obsessive "nibbler," turned out to be comically outmoded. Schumpeter had failed to take into account—he who had kept insisting that capitalism "not only never is but never can be stationary"—that in its new bureaucratic stage capitalism would find honored roles and high status for intellectuals. Few intellectuals still thought of themselves as a "permanent opposition" to the world of power; few writers could still say with Flaubert, "bohemia is the fatherland of my breed." Philip Rahv called this a process of *embourgeoisement*, but I suspect it would be more accurate to speak, in an equally inelegant phrase, of the bureaucratic institutionalization of intellectuals.

The kind of society now emerging in the West turned out to need intellectuals—far more so than earlier capitalism ever had. Ideology began to play an unprecedented part. In 1954 I noted, "As social relations become more abstract and elusive, the human object is bound to the state with ideological slogans and abstractions—and for this chore intellectuals are indispensable." But with a crucial proviso: that while the institutional world of government, corporation, and mass culture needs intellectuals *because* they are intellectuals, it does not want them *as* intellectuals. It needs them for their skills, knowledge, inclinations, even passions; without these, they would be of no use whatever; but it does not look kindly upon, indeed it does all that it can to curb, their traditional role of free-wheeling critics.

This once-admired vision of the proudly independent intellectual—I still admire it—drew in America at least as much upon native Emersonian sensibility as upon social radicalism; but by the '50s it was being pronounced outmoded, naive, irresponsible. What followed was the absorption of large numbers of intellectuals into the academy, government bureaucracies, and the industries of pseudoculture—a few decades later also into the corporations, as ideologues, speech-writers, and sloganeers.

In one sense, the intellectuals did gain power: they were now advisers and spokesmen for major institutions; C. Wright Mills's once-famous description of them as "powerless people" now had to be severely qualified. Yet insofar as they still remained, or wished to remain, thinkers and critics, they *lost* power—the only kind of power they had ever really had, which was to assail the insolence of office, to criticize stale ideas, and to keep venturing into new thought. And this power had been possible only, in fact, when they were "powerless people."

A parallel—though far more harsh—version of this process could be observed in the Communist countries. Western liberals and socialists, moved by outbreaks of dissent in those countries, were inclined to focus their attention on the intellectuals who dared to speak out against totalitarian or authoritarian power; but the truth had also to be recognized that many of the *apparatchiks* were intellectuals, or at least semi-intellectuals, people skillful at manipulating ideas and using words.

The bureaucratization of mind was a process apparently inseparable from modernization, and for that reason, among others, the right to dissent, even when confined to small powerless groups, remained especially precious for those of us living in democratic countries. We might be disturbed by the process of bureaucratic erosion; we might sadly observe the extent to which younger academics and writers preferred their comfortable specializations and institutional comforts, as against the free intellectual's role of the critic; but we knew that the margin of freedom that was ours made all the difference in the world.

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Dissent At Home, the Total State Abroad

ALL I HAVE BEEN SAYING thus far has for its tacit premise that Western society could be regarded as more or less self-contained. But for some decades that has of course not been true, and a crucial variable—in the judgment of some, *the* crucial variable—has been the presence and pressure of totalitarian states. A turning point in intellectual history occurred when we recognized that there is more than one enemy of progress and that this enemy can be located by looking in almost any direction. Decades of bitter struggle, exhaustion of whole generations, the spilling of quantities of blood: all were required to learn that tyranny can come from right *and* left, and that the dissenter who cares about freedom must become agile in facing both ways. Still more, this dissenter must now take into account not only how his behavior will affect the life of the country in which he functions, but also how it may affect the fate of that country in relation to its external adversaries.

How hard it has been, during my lifetime, to adjust between competing enemies, to maneuver among bloody opponents! We who wanted to oppose Stalinism at a time when that was extremely unpopular in the American intellectual world also wanted not to become apologists for the status quo. A two-sided politics may be clear enough in principle, but it is often confusing in practice. And sometimes it disables the sophisticated.

All through the last several decades it was no longer enough, even while it remained necessary, to declare oneself a critic of American society. We had to recognize that, together with the wrongs within the gates, there were evils without. To deny that this sometimes inhibited or damaged our dissent would be foolish. When that happened, the enemy beyond the gates really triumphed.

Dissent East, Dissent West

WE COME TO ONE of the most difficult problems in contemporary intellectual life—the necessary divergence of outlook and the frequent misunderstandings between Western intellectuals and the Soviet dissidents who have chosen or been driven into exile.

SOVIET DISSIDENTS often feel something like this:

- Western intellectuals are hopelessly innocent about the deadly purposiveness of the Russian party-state dictatorship; some Western intellectuals still share the illusions of earlier decades. It is hard for all but a few in the West to realize they are facing an imperialistic, dictatorial state quite as ruthless and in some ways more formidable than that of nazism. The West is slack in its responses. And Western intellectuals still play games, holding to an outmoded stance of opposition within societies that suffer mostly from an excess of tolerance, softness, and ease. The single most important task in the world today is to resist Communist power.

- Western intellectuals may respond something like this: For people like Solzhenitsyn to write as if all or most Western intellectuals had been fellow-travelers in past decades is a piece of ignorance or impudence. Some of us were fighting Stalinism at a time when he was still a faithful admirer of the Beloved Leader. A certain degree of historical scruple is necessary if there is to be any serious exchange between us.

IN ANY CASE, simply to issue grand declamations of opposition to communism is not yet to answer the difficult problems we face in the West.

For example: how is it that the mere accumulation of Western military power seems to be of so little help? How are we to develop a politics that might simultaneously enable resistance to Communist power and minimize the danger of a nuclear war? Does not the frequent support by the United States of right-wing authoritarianism in underdeveloped countries rebound to the advantage of the Communists? And are we not morally obliged to speak out against injustices at home even though these do not add up to anything so dreadful as the totalitarian state? What is the point of cheering the right of dissent in the Western democracies if we do not use it forcefully and responsibly?

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Half-In, Half-Out, and All the Way Out

FOR INTELLECTUALS who want to combine serious criticism of their society with defense of its democratic structure, there are two major courses of action. Let us call them Fabian and free-lance, or social democratic and anarchist. In practice, most of us combine the two, but there's a value in isolating the "pure types."

The Fabian attaches himself to a movement of social reform, though he is likely to feel he serves it best as historical mentor. He provides it with intellectual rationale; he ennobles it with claims to historical value; he gives it ideology. If his movement achieves office he may become its leader, like Léon Blum in France, or its spokesman, like Richard Crossman in England. Once he takes on these roles, he ceases, in some strict sense, to be an intellectual, for now he cannot act out of a dispassionate search for truth but must write propaganda, which sooner or later means telling lies. If he is clever, and his party liberal enough to give him some living space, he can try to perform a dual function, as Crossman did: that of being at once an agent of politics, and an intellectual who keeps a distance between his movement and himself. Crossman, while a member of a British Labour cabinet, kept a scandalously frank journal—he intrigued at least as much as his colleagues, he maligned them, he stepped back to see them and himself with some critical objectivity, and he was clearly planning to publish this journal, so as to make the passage from politics to history.

The free-lance or anarchist intellectual will have none of this. All political entanglements he sees as inherently debasing. They prevent him from expressing himself; they force him into a role for which he is ill-equipped, indeed, into a self-violation that easily becomes a pitiable dependence on power. The free-lance offers one product: criticism, and he offers it unceasingly, for it is always needed, though by no means always wanted. He cares not for power but for influence, and less for influence within the larger society than among the community of fellow intellectuals.

I think of two recent examples, both brilliant writers, the late Harold Rosenberg and the late Paul Goodman. Rosenberg was some sort of Luxemburgist Marxist, Goodman some sort of Kropotkinish anarchist. Both despised the constraints of ideological systems *and* the shabbiness of pragmatic politics. Where did this leave them? With the persuasion that no government is likely to be very good, or good for very long; that the greatest service an intellectual can do a democratic government is to irritate and needle it, keep crying that the king has no clothes, the president only a few. It is a deeply American tradition, this crying of "No, in Thunder."

Criticism, however, has its own exhaustions, sterilities, and self-delusions. It may settle into its own familiar, even comfortable rut. It may become quite as conventional as the celebration of conventions. Still, as Harold Rosenberg once memorably put it, "The weapon of criticism is undoubtedly inadequate. Who on that account would choose to surrender it?"

And the paradox of it all is that the very intellectual who eschews power hungers for influence—he is, after all, human. Influence concentrated and focused soon becomes a kind of power. Rosenberg had spent years as a one-man guerrilla band within the intellectual world, and then, almost to his own surprise, became the spokesman for a major art movement, "abstract expressionism." He now had power, limited but real. Goodman may have been against all states, but in 1960 he wrote an influential book, *Growing Up Absurd*, which not only describes how a frivolous commercial society wastes the resources of its youth but also offers some concrete suggestions for social amelioration. Perhaps to his own surprise, he became a guru of the youth rebellion of the '60s in its earlier, fraternal phase. Once he saw that the movement was turning mindless and authoritarian, he had the courage to criticize it publicly and see his influence disappear overnight. He was unhappy about this, but he accepted it. He wanted to be true to himself.

Your Fabian runs the risk of accommodation, slyness, a curling deceit of voice; your free-lance of righteousness, isolation, sterility. It is just when the Fabian's movement starts winning that it needs the free-lance to criticize, and just when the anarchist's ideas take on cogency that he needs the pragmatic skills of the Fabian. □

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Anatoly Marchenko

Live As Others Live

Introduction

Anatoly Marchenko is one of the most extraordinary individuals to have emerged in Soviet society. Both his parents are illiterate railroad workers, and Marchenko himself, who was born in 1938, has only an eighth-grade education. But after spending six years in the labor camps for political prisoners, Marchenko wrote *My Testimony*, the first account of the camps in the post-Stalin period, under Nikita Khrushchev, when the Soviet Union seemed intent on liberalization and political reform.

Marchenko reached Moscow in 1966. The writer Yuli Daniel, who had been convicted in a celebrated case earlier that year, met Marchenko in the Mordovian camps and just before his release in November suggested that Marchenko visit his wife, Larisa Bogoraz, in the capital.

As Marchenko explains in "Live As Others Live,"[1] his stay in Moscow "proved to be decisive for my entire future." He had originally intended to escape the Soviet Union in order to bear witness in the West to the suffering he had seen in the camps. But once in Moscow he met numerous men and women, mostly intellectuals, who were among the initial activists in the country's human rights movement.

His new friends, especially Larisa Bogoraz, who later became his wife, helped him to write *My Testimony*. By the time it reached the West in 1968, where it eventually appeared in 18 languages, Marchenko was serving a new term. The regime, in fact, never forgave him for writing the book. In 1968 he was sentenced to one year for breaking passport regulations, a term that was extended for two additional years on the basis of "anti-Soviet slander" he allegedly uttered to his jailers. In 1975 he was convicted of violating administrative supervision and sentenced to four years of internal exile.[2] Finally, in 1981, the regime grew tired of his stubborn defiance. Convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," he was sentenced to ten years of labor camp plus five years of internal exile, a term it seems hard to imagine he could survive.

Marchenko wrote "Live As Others Live" during his time of exile in the late 1970s. It is part of a longer manuscript that tells about his arrival in Moscow and his first encounter with Soviet intellectuals. The essay, like all his writing, has a remarkably blunt, unpretentious quality that he first honed when he wrote *My Testimony*. It is also an important document, not only for what it tells us about Marchenko and Larisa Bogoraz, but because it provides a unique viewpoint on a momentous shift in Soviet society: when individuals began to overcome their fear and to voice outspoken criticism of their own government.

—Joshua Rubenstein

After leaving the camp in November 1966, I did not intend to find a permanent place to live. I felt I had been granted only a short furlough to prepare for crossing the border. But even if temporary, I still had to cast anchor somewhere, find lodgings, get registered, and then have a careful look around. I also wanted to visit the places I loved for the last time and to see my relatives.

I planned to visit Moscow for only a day or two; I had messages from prisoners to pass on to their relatives. But my visit to the capital dragged on and proved to be decisive for my entire future. From my first encounter in Moscow, from the first day I arrived there, I saw and felt that attention and kindness were lavished on me as on one who had returned from "there." Although the warmth and sympathy

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were sincere, it made me uncomfortable to receive such treatment, not for any personal qualities but simply because I had been released from a political labor camp. And also, of course, because of personal recommendations.

In our country and especially in Moscow, a prison record does not surprise anyone. It is difficult to find a Moscow family from the intelligentsia that was not affected by Stalin's terror. Thanks to Khrushchev, a flood of rehabilitated "enemies of the people" inundated Moscow.[3] For a while this unheard-of humaneness by the Soviet government created an impression that there were no more political trials, no more camps or jails with political prisoners in the Soviet Union.

In Moscow people showed great interest in present-day camps. I saw that this was not simple curiosity. My listeners were ready to do something, to help those who were imprisoned. One acquaintance, for example, A., immediately began corresponding with my friend V., who had been imprisoned for eight years and still had seven to go. She sent him books (at the time you could still mail as many books as you liked to prisoners), she wrote to him about art exhibitions and theater performances in Moscow, sent New Year's presents to his children, traveled to visit his mother. A. and V. remained friends after his release from camp.

If statistics were kept somewhere of parcels sent to the camps, the period beginning in 1966–67 would show a sharp increase; the camps were flooded with books and art reproductions. It is significant that they were sent by complete strangers and not by relatives. The isolation of political prisoners, it turned out, resulted from a lack of information about them and not from society's indifference. Today the government has been compelled to create artificial obstacles to destroy contact between those at liberty and those "in the zone."[4]

My views about the intelligentsia changed completely. My former ideas about them had been typical of a backwoods yokel. I grew up among the children of railway workers. Our parents weren't called mechanics or conductors. There was one name for all railway workers: greasers. Winter and summer, heavy black grease literally dripped from their clothing.

We constantly heard the same warning from our parents: If you don't want to end up a greaser like your father for the rest of your life, then study! For us kids, the life and occupation of our parents was a curse. To live meant to suffer, to work meant to toil.

My parents would point out, as good examples for us, the few people in our town with "clean" professions: teachers, doctors, the stationmaster, the director of the bread factory, the regional party secretary, the state attorney. They were all considered members of the intelligentsia. It's true that teachers and doctors did not live better than we did and many were worse off. But their work was clean and easy. The others I just mentioned represented the height of prosperity and contentment in everyone's eyes.

I entered adult life with a firm prejudice against intellectuals. Generally, people in the intellectual professions were associated with the regime, with the bosses, and who likes bosses? They are the masters who take more from you and give you less. A teacher, a doctor, an engineer, and especially a judge, a prosecutor, and a writer serve them. Besides, in the provinces the managers, intellectuals, and their children socialized among themselves and not with common greasers. At the same time the government incited simple people against the intelligentsia: engineers were saboteurs, doctors were murderers, they were all "enemies of the people." And the "people" willingly accepted this baiting. This alienation between the intelligentsia and the greater part of the population still exists in our country.

Among the political prisoners there were many people with intellectual professions, but I never became friendly enough with them for my childhood prejudice to change significantly. However, once I began thinking about it, I began dividing the concept of "intellectuality" into the culture and education of a person and "intellectual" work, which meant, for me, work that was not physical or greasy. I came to respect true intellectuals since they often displayed the decency and moral principles that you begin to value under cruel camp conditions. I became close friends with a young

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prisoner, Valery Rumyantsev, a former KGB officer.[5] Valery, despite his former, distasteful job, was a genuine intellectual, and I owe him a great deal. Toward the end of my term I became acquainted with the writer Yuli Daniel,[6] and also with Valery Ronkin and Valery Smolkin, both engineers.[7] To my surprise, I did not feel the same alienation with them I had experienced in the outside world. I came to the conclusion this alienation had been mostly imagined and inspired by old prejudices and circumstances.

And then suddenly, once I was free, I plunged into this milieu that had hitherto been strange to me. Despite a still deeply embedded prejudice, I never felt any pretense in my relationship with these people. In the beginning I was wary of them, listening to each of them, waiting for a certain tone; I was afraid I would miss something that would confirm my previous notions about the intelligentsia.

Ten years have passed since my first encounter with Moscow intellectuals. Looking back, I see how lucky I was and how much I have learned from them.

I used to think the Soviet regime had destroyed all that was alive in our country and that it was using the camps to finish off what was left. In my eyes the so-called Soviet people were a submissive flock, with the regime attacking the last remnants of individuality in each one of us. And suddenly I met, not one or two, but a whole class of people whose existence refuted the "triumphs" of the Soviet regime in breeding "the new man, the man of the future."

Although the circle of my acquaintances in Moscow was growing all the time, it naturally was limited to a few dozen, perhaps a hundred people in all. One could say, "But, after all, they are only surviving remnants and, sooner or later, they will find themselves in a camp." In fact, many of my acquaintances in these ten years have passed through prison, camp, and internal exile. Many more have emigrated to the West. But still, I am convinced it is not a tiny group of outstanding personalities but a whole class of people that comprises the opposition to our widespread system of doublethink and to the regime as a whole. In my opinion, this class is the better part of our intelligentsia. True, it is only a fraction of the population but it is continually replenished and revived, filling in the crack between repression and emigration, because hypocrisy and lies contradict human nature and this layer of society has large inner resources.

I think the principal moral achievement of the post-Stalin decades is that people have become more trusting in their relationships, if only among their friends and close acquaintances. No sooner did the regime relax, than decency began to bring people together.

Late in 1966 I happened to come across protest letters on behalf of Sinyavsky and Daniel that later went into *The White Book*.[8] What was it like for me, who had just left a labor camp, to read them? People were openly calling for free speech and creative expression, they were supporting defendants who had dared to publish their work in the West! They signed their own names under these statements and even indicated their professions! Look at that! There are many prisoners behind barbed wire for doing much less.

I got to know several authors of these letters and saw they were ordinary people; they were not trying to be heroes or leaders. Who were they? A history teacher, a physicist, a mathematics lecturer, an artist, an editor, a few men of letters, and scientists, some with those magical titles: Candidate of Science, Doctor of Science. I became ashamed of my recent opinion of such people. The protesting intelligentsia had much more to lose than simple "workers" and, naturally, more than we inmates. A prisoner has almost nothing to lose. He can say

COMING — IN OUR NEXT ISSUE:

What Is Africa to Me? Dilemmas of Transnational Ethnicity
by Martin Kilson

Ideal Roles and Real Roles Perpetuation of Gender Inequality
by Cynthia Fuchs Epstein

Ideas of Economic Democracy Workers' Control and Public Rights
by Allen Graubard

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about himself, in the words of Bulat Okudzhava,[9] "I will forget all my household cares, I don't need any salary or work." But on the outside, a person endangers the work he loves, his career, the well-being of his family, and not for a limited term but, as they say in the camps, to the end of the Soviet regime. (None of them were exempt from arrest. Many of my acquaintances later paid for their activities: some were dismissed from their work, some were demoted, some were dragged through endless meetings in an attempt to make them recant, and then fired anyway.)

Many people I met during those first days in Moscow have remained close friends. By the way, my notion of the material situation of the intelligentsia did not stand the test of experience.

The first couple to invite me into their home were Natasha Sadomskaya and Boris Shragin. They were academics living in a 15-square-meter room in a communal apartment. They both had work to do, but when one was typing there was no room for the other to sit down. The neighbors would argue in the communal kitchen, one of them constantly hissing angrily. Boris's salary was slightly higher than the average worker's (170 rubles a month, I seem to remember), and before defending her dissertation, Natasha's was much lower. But even after her defense I don't remember seeing Boris in a decent suit, and I remember Natasha in the same fur coat she wore for many years, which, I would guess, she had inherited from her mother.

Curiously, the notions I had harbored earlier are still held today by so-called civil servants—policemen, prosecutors, the KGB, and so on. For example, while interrogating one of the witnesses in Sinyavsky's case, the investigator Pakhomov said, "What kind of a writer is he? He only has one pair of pants!" And, after conducting a search in one home, Gnevkovskaya, an investigator from the Moscow public prosecutor's office, made a sarcastic remark to her friends: "Some intelligentsia! There's one suit hanging in their closet!"

In Tarusa, a junior police lieutenant, Kuzikova, discovered in one "unreliable" home someone who was not registered. As she was checking over his documents, making a list of all the facts so she could pass them on to the KGB, she learned he was a research scientist.

"How much do they pay you?"

"115."

"Hmm . . . *a scientist.*" Kuzikova smiled contemptuously. "Even I make a 170."

It is obvious who is more needed and whom our country values more.

In the early summer of 1967 I returned to Moscow from my parents' home; I knew I had to establish myself closer to the capital. (Since I couldn't find any work and I couldn't get registered in any of the nearby places, like Vladimir, Kaluga, Tula, or Kalinin, I went off to Barabinsk near Novosibirsk. My parents lived there. I registered, found work, and lived there from March until June.)

Six months earlier I had shared my plans with two or three Moscow friends. At that time I did not conceal I would try to go abroad since I could not carry out my plan by myself. My friends were very skeptical. They were convinced that any attempt to cross the border would end with my death. "You should write! Write down what you've been telling us," they urged me. "Let's see what will come of it." In fact, I preferred to come forward in my own country. Relying on the help of these new friends, I decided to write as best I could. . . .

I arrived in Moscow full of self-doubt. Before my arrival, Larisa had shown my letters to other friends and they advised me as before: "Write as well as you can." Larisa and I sat over my work. First, she made me remove all my harangues against labor camps and all statements about the regime in general. It turned out that my scribblings were saturated with just that. I had thought I was supposed to call everything by its name, and the sharper the better. "That is of no interest and of no use whatsoever to anybody," Larisa said. "You have to relate specific things and let the reader draw his own conclusions." I resisted, thinking she was softening my expressions for the sake of my security. Afterward, when I reread what was left, I was almost ready to believe she was right. But inside I still objected, and when I wrote again, I tried to spin out the whole story, as we used to do in our encounters with camp

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officials or visiting lecturers. "You're not writing for them," Larisa argued and again crossed things out. It was only when B. took her side that I finally calmed down, thinking the reader could get along without my prompting.

The writing itself gave me courage. Larisa never rewrote anything for me, but made me rework and rewrite it myself. She only crossed things out, threw out bits of sentences, paragraphs, even whole episodes. The volume of what I wrote grew, though very slowly. Yet what I had accomplished by the end of the summer did not amount to a manuscript.

Meanwhile, my circumstances made my attempts at writing resemble a steeplechase. Naturally, I was not allowed to live in Moscow although I had friends who would have given me a corner of their home to live in. But no one would register me and no one could give me a job. Lyuda Alexeeva helped me rent a corner in Alexandrov, in Vladimir province, a 2-hour journey from Moscow by train.[10] I managed to register there and got a job as a freight handler in a liquor factory. Registering and finding work was a hell of a problem; it took a full six weeks.

I rented a corner of a room from a lonely old woman on the outskirts of the little town. Auntie Nyura was very kind to me, especially after she was convinced that I was not a drunkard. I was willing to help her around the house: bring water from the well, stack firewood, fetch peat blocks. But my work at the factory plus these small chores took almost all my time. And I still had to run to the cafeteria or whip up something to eat on the kerosene stove.

On top of that I lived in the same room with the landlady. Her entire hut consisted of one room. There was a stove in the middle of the hut, in front of the stove was an area we called the kitchen, and behind the stove were the quarters that Auntie Nyura and I shared. She put down a wooden bed for me with a straw mattress, partitioned the room with a cupboard, and even set off my corner with a curtain. In addition to the bed, I fitted in a chair, and on top of it I put the suitcase with my clothing. There was a hanger on the wall above the chair, and there was also a tiny table-sideboard for dishes and supplies. Where could I write? Where could I keep my writing?

If I stayed up late, Auntie Nyura had to ask in the morning: "Tolik, what's this, don't you sleep at night? The lights were on almost until morning."

The first time I could say, "I was writing a letter." The second time too. And then?

At first, a small open corridor saved me. I told her I liked to sleep in the fresh air, and I lived there until September. On my days off, hiding a few notebooks in my pockets, I went off for "walks" in the woods. But then fall came, the rains began, and I was forced to cut out these "walks" and move behind the curtain where I was supposed to be. In the meantime I had to hurry. I was afraid the regime would somehow learn of my literary activities and arrest me under some pretext; in Alexandrov it is the easiest thing to concoct a "case." My plans would remain unfulfilled and I would end up doing time for nothing. I don't think I attracted attention, but who knows? Maybe former political prisoners are under special scrutiny, but Larisa came to visit me anyway, as did other Muscovites who were on the KGB books, and I myself went to Moscow to see them. It would have been impossible to accomplish anything without these visits. What if suddenly, in my absence, my innocent-looking possessions were searched? Or curiosity about my nocturnal writing got the better of Auntie Nyura? She could get frightened and inform on me. So I took all my notes to work, running the risk that sooner or later they would fall out of my pockets.

The experience of my camp colleagues proved that any underground work had to be done in one go, otherwise you just got burned out in vain. In a word, you had to hurry, hurry. Larisa was too busy to spend time on my drafts. She worked during the week, and when she came to me on her days off she was so tired that as soon as she started editing she would fall asleep.

Then suddenly I got lucky. One of my friends got a permit for September and October to go to a resort for writers and scientists. It was already fall, and the resort was nearly empty, except for a few houses where five or six people stayed. It was especially empty during the week, and only on Sundays did a few people come for a rest. My friend rented a

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large separate room and came only on her day off. She suggested I live there for a little while and arranged it with the administration. No one knew me there, and in such a resort someone writing all day was no surprise.

Luckily, I was able to get a two-week leave from work. Larisa took her vacation at the same time. So there we were at the resort. The grounds were an enormous parkland covered by a mixed forest. There was a restaurant in the village, ten minutes away from us; once a day we went there for a cheap meal.

When our friend came on Sunday, we allowed ourselves a small rest. In the evenings the three of us took long walks and at night we made a bonfire. It was a pleasant way to relax, to throw brushwood into the fire and chatter about everything under the sun.

But on weekdays we sat literally 18 hours a day working on the manuscript. Hard physical labor never exhausted me as this work did. Every evening, tired as a dog, I pushed my manuscript away, still not satisfied. It was not clear whether anything would come of it and there was no end in sight. These two weeks were my last chance. Afterward the merry-go-round world would start again: work in the factory, the daily routine, the corner behind the curtain. . . . Soon it would be a year since my release, and another year would go by without any results. The KGB might get wind of something and grab me. I was terribly nervous and often lost my temper. Even meals seemed like wasted time. I would accuse Larisa of losing precious minutes. . . .

Today when I remember those days at the resort, it seems as if they lasted for months, but in reality it was only two weeks. By the end of our "holiday," the book was almost completed: close to 200 notebook pages covered on both sides with my tiny handwriting. The last pages were composed in my head two or three days before setting them down, as if someone were dictating them to me. They didn't have to be changed at all.

After a few days in Moscow, three of us, B., Larisa, and I, discussed a variety of titles. They approved of *My Testimony*. Then with B.'s help, the introductory pages were written.

One copy had to be carried to the West as quickly as possible; only then could the book be circulated at home. Soon an opportunity came up, followed by tormenting expectation, waiting for the signal that the manuscript had arrived safely. I didn't know and didn't care who got it. But no signal came, and I had to send out copies another two or three times (either by myself or through friends). I don't know which of the copies—or whether all of them—finally ended up in a publishing house. I found out more than a year later that the book had appeared in the West; but by then I was in a labor camp.

I gave my friends two copies of the book for safekeeping, saved three copies for *samizdat*, one to send to the West, and one I kept for myself to submit to a journal. When the editors registered the manuscript, they would enter the date it was written. I might get lucky and fall under the amnesty.[11] When I made up my mind in the labor camp to expose the conditions of the political prisoners, I did not count on any indulgence or consider the possibility of an amnesty. Then suddenly, the deed was accomplished and I began to hope for a lucky star in my fortune. . . .

By the time of my arrest in July 1968, two critical observations reached me. One well-known scientist said the book might be true, but the camp and prison described in it were too horrifying. "People will be afraid of arrest," he said.

I was also given the opinion of Alexander Solzhenitzyn who thought present-day prisoners, as I described them, were too brave, and were provoking solitary confinement and other punishments. "It's hard to believe it was actually like that."

But this came later. In the meantime, the well-known writer K. read *My Testimony*. He liked the book very much.

"What do you want to do with it now?" he said.

I said I had sent it to the West and that now I wanted to submit it to a journal and told him why. Then he himself arranged for the editors of one journal to receive the manuscript, but to keep it from falling into the hands of anyone known to be an informer.

Less than a week went by before I got a

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message to come immediately to the editorial office and take back the manuscript. It turned out that several people had read it. They thought highly of the book and, as I was told, "the author's courage." "The author has decided to sacrifice his own life," they added, "but why does he have to drag others along with him? In the end, our journal will suffer." Of course, I retrieved the manuscript immediately, but I couldn't understand how a journal could suffer after accepting an unknown manuscript from an unknown author and *not* publishing it. It was later explained to me that under some kind of written or unwritten law, the editors are obliged to hand over any seditious manuscript like mine to the KGB. Being decent, the employees of the journal did not want to be informers, but they were afraid to keep the manuscript themselves and didn't register it.

With the manuscript under my arm, I went straight to the office of the journal *Moskva*. I was told no one there would be embarrassed by the necessity to inform, and that meant I would not ruin anyone. And because no one recommended me to them, I was really going on my own. Since that day, the second of November, the wheels started to turn.

Arbat Street. The offices of *Moskva* are to the right of the subway.

"Why is it such a poor copy?" the secretary asks with a displeased but not hostile voice, as she takes down my personal information on an index card. I mumble something in response. It is true they got the final carbon copy and not the one I had just retrieved from the other journal. Never mind, they'll read it anyway. My least worry was the convenience of those who would receive the book from them.

"What is it? A novel? A story?"

"I don't know. Well, all right, let it be a story."

"Fiction or nonfiction?"

"Nonfiction, nonfiction."

The secretary noted the information and put my manuscript in her desk without reading a line on the first page.

"Come back for an answer in about a month. Or we can send you an answer by mail."

Where would the manuscript be in a month? And where would I be myself?

My friends were all worried about me. At the outset they advised me to publish the book under a pseudonym in the West and not approach any magazine. How many arguments we had on that subject! They tried to convince me in groups and one at a time, at home, or while taking me for nocturnal walks through Moscow. Everyone said, "They will never forgive you for this." They predicted all the varieties of reprisal: from closed court proceedings ("and they'll finish you off in the camp") to an "accidental" murder in a brawl or some other unfortunate incident. This demonstrates, by the way, what kind of reputation the KGB has earned among the population, and specifically among the intelligentsia. What glory this organization had claimed for itself by 1967!

I didn't agree to a pseudonym, not out of a silly notion of bravery but for a very sober reason: specific places, people, and facts pertaining to a well-defined period are mentioned in the book; based on this material, an interested party could easily identify the author. Not to mention what value and kind of "testimony" it would be under a pseudonym!

After I had submitted the book to *Moskva* and the declaration of amnesty had passed—as should have been expected, it did not apply to political offenders—my friends and even slight acquaintances told me to go into hiding. I remember N. walked around the courtyard with me for two hours (such conversations were never carried on inside, we were afraid the apartment might be bugged), trying to persuade me to get on a train the next day and go to the North Caucasus. Her husband had friends there, they would hide me. "Don't you understand? They'll simply kill you! Who needs your heroism?" I. found a reliable refuge for me and even, it seems, a job somewhere in the northwest. K. suggested a secluded spot in the Archangelsk province. Everyone unanimously agreed on one thing: I mustn't show up in Alexandrov, even to pick up my things, because they'd knock me off in an ambush the very first evening. . . .

Now I had enough time. My friends supplied m with books. I also began to prepare for my future arrest and trial. I composed my last statement for the trial, learned it by heart, and

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gave a friend the text so people would know what I would say. I was sure no one would be allowed to attend the trial. One more concern was to find a "relative" among my Moscow acquaintances who would be allowed to take care of my affairs after my arrest, to negotiate with a lawyer and ask for visits. One lovely, single woman friend, Ira Belogorodskaya,[12] volunteered to be my "fiancée." We went together to the registry office and declared our intentions. In this way our "relationship" was formally recorded.

I lived quietly until December 10. Either they weren't looking for me or they couldn't find me (unlikely, since I wasn't hiding). Maybe I was being followed but didn't notice it.

Around the tenth, I was sitting in an empty apartment—my hosts were not at home—pecking quietly at the typewriter. I thought I heard someone scrape the window. (I was working without my hearing-aid; that's why I guessed rather than actually heard.) I threw open the blind and saw a young man outside the window. He looked well-fed and well-groomed and was dressed in formal wear as if he were coming from a diplomatic reception. A second man was hiding farther away behind a tree, but in contrast to the first, he was dressed carelessly, even sloppily. The closer one showed me through the window a red booklet with the golden imprint "The Committee of State Security of the Government of the U.S.S.R." From his lips I could read, "Open the door!"

While someone tinkered with the front door, trying to open it or break it down, and these two kept looking at me through the window, I jumped out the other window—the one facing the park—in just the clothes I was wearing.

From that moment until my arrest in July 1968, I never felt I was alone in Moscow, even going to a public toilet; you're in the cubicle, your antagonists are at the door, and duty does not allow them to do their own business. I go to the theater—a distinguished escort accompanies me and meets me when I leave. I get onto the subway—an agent stands on guard at the door. I take a trolley—two cars follow the trolley and when I get off police spies pour out of them like peas, rushing to take up their assigned positions. I am drinking tea at a friend's place and they are shivering in the entranceway and the archways, not taking a watchful eye off the door.

Around this time, a similar, tight surveillance was started on Pavel Litvinov and Larisa.[13] When the three of us went out together, a whole procession trailed after us: several cars and a gang of various boors with their implacable faces and the proverbial newspapers in their hands. It was like a game of cops and robbers: chases, dodges, discoveries, walkie-talkie communications. For instance, "Car to the Bolshoi Kameny Bridge, Car to the Bolshoi Kameny Bridge," the agent mumbles into his collar, and so on. You could make a movie from it. Once an acquaintance of mine actually recorded my pursuers with an amateur movie camera, but the film was confiscated and exposed.

I could avoid the surveillance only in Alexandrov, where I had to return anyway. The agents would accompany me to the train station in Moscow, ride together with me for a couple of stops, sometimes all the way to Alexandrov, then suddenly disappear in order to show up, invariably, on my return trip to Moscow.

It's shameful to say, but the excitement of this game drew me in. Without making a mistake I learned to recognize "them" from others breathing down my neck. I often lost "mine" out of spite, knowing that, wherever I was going, the same mugs would greet me all the same. Did they know whom they were following, and why? They knew. Late one winter night, I was coming home from some friends and walked by "my" car with its familiar license plate. I couldn't restrain myself. I waved at the driver: "Time to get moving or you'll miss me!" He opened the door and whispered menacingly, "Ooo-oo, writer!" and the car followed me every step of the way.

Then came a period when I expected arrest as soon as they located me. I tried to delay the inevitable—I was still waiting for a sign that the manuscript had reached the West—and managed to escape the agents in Moscow itself. I was living in a tiny room in the home of some elderly people who were well-versed in the intricacies of conspiracy. My hosts diverted me

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with interesting conversation; they had plenty to talk about. They let me out for walks only in the dead of night, and even their visitors never guessed there was a third person living in the apartment. I am not certain, but I think during this time the KGB lost me for about a month and a half.

Once again I was struck by the Moscow intelligentsia, its courage, its moral resistance against the activities of the regime. The all-powerful KGB was openly looking for me, but they offered me a place to live. In front of the agents and their cameras my friends accompanied me in order not to leave me alone with the plainclothesmen and so to deter provocations. No one, not even people I barely knew, refused contact with me, although I alerted them to the surveillance. I did not look for contacts, for friendship, or even for help, but I could not avoid those things. People probably considered it their duty to support me. They considered my actions courageous, not recognizing their own bravery!

Yes, it was a very narrow circle. Some were close friends of each other, while others were barely acquainted. Here's one example. The brother of a friend once joined us by accident. He was a trustworthy fellow, a gifted scientist. He had no connection with protests, open letters, and other "dissident" activities; I don't even know what his attitude was on these matters. We were supposed to go out, so we warned him KGB agents were going to follow us. There was no necessity for him to accompany us, but he came along anyway. He was the one who filmed the agents, protested when they took his camera, and presented his identification papers. . . .

Time went by, and my premonitions and the predictions of friends did not come true, thank God. I was followed, but not arrested. There were no attempts at ambush. It is still a mystery to me. Why did they hesitate to arrest me? Why did they follow me? What were they after? What was the point?

A few days after my escape through the window, they caught up with me, grabbed me, then let me go. A day later they arrested me once more and again released me. It is true that this time, in the police station, I had a conversation with a man who pretended to be a policeman but who, I immediately understood, worked for the KGB and probably not at a low rank. A pointless conversation: "We have to talk with you, Marchenko. You know about what." And that was all. The police recorded my registration violation (my stay in Moscow).

In January and February, as I mentioned before, the KGB had apparently lost track of me. But how long can one hide? How long can one burden kind, elderly people with one's presence? I came out from "underground" and in a few days I was nabbed again on the street and brought to a police station. The same man as before was waiting for me. This time he did not bother with any pretense.

"I am Semyenov from the KGB. Don't ask any questions. I'll do the talking. We know all about you, Marchenko, and about your book *My Testimony*. We know you sent it abroad and that you're circulating it throughout the country. No one intends to persecute you for that. You must understand it's not out of weakness but out of humanity. Go to Alexandrov, live, work like all Soviet people. No one needs you!"

What kind of dream was this? The KGB showing humaneness? This had never happened and could not happen. I didn't believe it. There had to be an objective, but I couldn't fathom it. (To this day, I rack my brain over it.) Semyenov's voice had ominous undertones.

"If you don't leave Moscow, you will be tried, not for your book but for your violations of Soviet passport laws. Live as others live! Stop pouring filth on your homeland and the Soviet system. If you don't stop this slander, I warn you, you will be exiled from the country."

"To Mordovia, or what?"

"To any country abroad. Didn't you once want to escape?" sneered Semyenov. Apparently adding to the script, he said on his own, "Some hero! You're just a coward. Hiding from our men, escaping through a window. You're all shouting, 'Just like the Stalin era, just like the Stalin era.' What would have been left of you during the Stalin era? Who would have bothered talking to you?"

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This time too they requested I sign a declaration that I would leave Moscow, then I went off to Alexandrov.

Who knows? If I had fulfilled Semyenov's orders and subsequently "lived as others live," maybe they really wouldn't have touched me? In any case, Semyenov's prediction came true. In August 1968 I was tried not for the book, but for "violating passport regulations."

Others were condemned—for reading *My Testimony*.

Translators' Notes

[1] The full Russian text of "Live As Others Live" appears in the journal *Pamyat* (or *Memory*) no. 3, compiled in Moscow in 1978 and published in Paris in 1980. That issue, which coincided with the tenth anniversary of the publication of *My Testimony*, contains interviews with a handful of former prisoners, asking them to describe how Marchenko's account coincided with their own experiences and how they themselves regard their years at hard labor.

[2] Marchenko described this arrest and his subsequent 55-day hunger strike in his second memoir, *From Tarusa to Siberia* (Strathcona, 1980), ed. Joshua Rubenstein.

[3] From 1954 to 1959 between 7 million and 8 million people returned to their families from labor camps, prison, and Siberian exile.

[4] Until 1970 any book published in the U.S.S.R. could be sent to prisoners by friends or relatives. There was not even a limit on the number of books. But in 1970 the regime imposed severe restrictions on parcels sent to the labor camps.

[5] Valery Rumyantsev was serving a 15-year sentence for treason under Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Republic. In the Potma camps of Mordovia, Rumyantsev participated in hunger strikes in support of other political prisoners. He was released in August 1974.

[6] Yuli Daniel worked as a translator from several languages when he was arrested in September 1965 for publishing short stories abroad under the pseudonym Nikolai Arzhak. Convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," he was sentenced to five years of labor camp. Yuli Daniel returned to Moscow where he still lives and works.

[7] Valery Ronkin, a chemical engineer from Leningrad, was arrested in 1965. He was a leader of an underground Marxist circle—the Union of Communards—which issued a *samizdat* journal entitled *The Bell*. He was released from labor camp in June 1972 with three years of exile still to serve.

Valery Smolkin, also a member of the Union of Communards, served a three-year sentence and was released during the winter of 1967–68.

[8] Alexander Ginzburg put together an anthology of documents surrounding the Sinyavsky–Daniel case, including an unofficial transcript of the trial, articles from the official press, and letters of protest. *The White Book* appeared in English in *On Trial: The Soviet State Versus "Abram Tertz" and "Nikolai Arzhak"* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966).

[9] Bulat Okudzhava is a much-beloved song writer in Moscow. Some of his songs have been officially recorded, but the majority circulate unofficially on tapes among large sectors of the population.

[10] Lyuda Alexeeva is a veteran Moscow activist, a historian, and former member of the Communist party. She was expelled from the party in 1968 following her participation in the protests surrounding the trial of Alexander Ginzburg and Yuri Galanskov in January 1968. She was a founding member of the Moscow Helsinki Watch Group in May 1976. Forced to emigrate in February 1977, she lives near New York City and is the official representative of the Moscow Helsinki group in the West.

[11] Marchenko was hoping that in October 1967 the regime would declare a general amnesty to mark the 50th anniversary of the revolution.

[12] Irina Belogorodskaya is a cousin to Larisa Bogoraz. Following Marchenko's arrest in July 1968, Irina was collecting signatures in his defense when she was arrested on August 7. Brought to trial on February 19, 1969, she was sentenced to a year in a labor camp for "attempting to defame" the Soviet political system. She was the first person to be arrested for distributing letters in defense of prisoners of conscience. She emigrated to France in 1975.

[13] On January 10, 1968, Larisa Bogoraz and Pavel Litvinov issued an "Appeal to World Public Opinion" on the conduct of the Ginzburg–Galanskov trial, which had just completed its third session. Pavel's name carried great prestige. His grandfather, Maxim Litvinov, had been foreign minister of the U.S.S.R. under Stalin and later served as Soviet ambassador to the United States at the height of World War II.

Pavel began his dissident career in 1967 following the arrest of Alexander Ginzburg. With the help of other activists, he compiled transcripts of two trials (*The Demonstration in Pushkin Square*, Ipswich, Mass.: Gambit, 1969; the defendants included Vladimir Bukovsky) and was later warned by the KGB not to circulate the material. Litvinov hardly finished compiling his massive account of the Ginzburg–Galanskov case (*The Trial of the Four*, ed. by Peter Reddaway, New York: Viking, 1972) when he was arrested with Larisa Bogoraz and five others in Red Square during their demonstration against the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. Pavel received five years of internal exile. He emigrated in 1974 and lives now in the U.S.

Translated from the Russian by C. E. Thalenberg *and* Joshua Rubenstein □

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Douglas C. Bennett and Kenneth E. Sharpe

Is There a Democracy "Overload"?

A principal feature of recent neoconservative thought has been the scapegoating of democracy for a host of political and economic ills—from declining governmental competence to budget deficits and inflation. Our political system, the argument goes, has become "overloaded" by demands from the citizenry, and democracy itself is to blame for stimulating these excessive demands. Less democracy is the proposed remedy.

Samuel Huntington provided the first influential formulation of this argument in the Trilateral Commission's *Report on the Governability of Democracies*.[1] A "democratic surge" in the 1960s had raised the level of popular expectations and group demands on the government, he argued, and this had resulted in both an expansion of governmental activity and a decline in governmental authority. He saw a widening gulf between expectation and institutional capacity, which led him to worry about the viability of democracy. To avoid "overload," he urged moderation in the level of demands. "The effective operation of a democratic political system requires some measure of apathy and noninvolvement on the part of some individuals or groups."

All that varies in later versions of this idea are the alleged symptoms of political and economic ill health. While Huntington is concerned with the sapping of governmental authority, far more numerous and influential are statements that see economic illness as the consequence of rising individual and group demands. If rising demands overload the federal budget and create deficits, then public-sector borrowing and the resultant expansion of the money supply cause, or at least aggravate, the inflation we have been experiencing for the last decade.[2]

The strongest indictment of democracy for our economic woes comes from Samuel Brittan, who blames it for "the English sickness"—inflation, unemployment, lack of productivity, and balance-of-payment troubles. Organized interest groups, especially "union monopolies," insist upon larger shares of the national product. Insofar as they are successful, they may bring about a measure of unemployment, since some goods are being offered at a price above the market equilibrium. These and other groups then clamor for government relief from this unemployment. And here electoral competition works its mischief: "Politicians," writes Brittan, "compete in the marketplace for the votes of an extensive electorate in the same way that oilmen bid for oil or salesmen bid for customers." Democracy thus encourages these rising group demands.[3]

If all this is true, what are we to do? One relatively mild prescription urges constitutional amendments to limit government spending. Huntington's cure is greater reliance on nondemocratic sources of authority (expertise, seniority, experience, special talents) to place necessary limits on democracy; he also counsels "self-restraint." Samuel Brittan implores the intelligentsia to give up their infatuation with egalitarianism. "The ideal of equality," he argues, "has done immense damage to my country." Perhaps the most ominous prescrip-

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tion comes from Robert Lubar, an editor of *Fortune*. Drawing together the work of these overload theorists, he assigns democracy "a large share of the blame for the economic troubles that afflict the advanced nations." "If democracy fails to cope with inflation, the system itself may be in danger," Lubar concludes. "Democracy helped put us in our present fix and it has to get us out. Otherwise a desperate nation may well reach for ways that imperil our liberty."[4]

This style of thought is founded upon an intellectual conception of democracy that prevailed over the last half-century: *the economic theory of democracy*, which was most lucidly formulated by Joseph Schumpeter in the 1930s. It conceives of democracy merely as a political mechanism, modeled on the market, "in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for people's votes."[5] An important distinction is drawn between elites and masses, though both are assumed to be motivated by the same calculus of benefit and loss. Elites are seen as political entrepreneurs who seek to gain power and its rewards by offering programs (products) more attractive than those of their competitors. At intervals, competing sets of elites present themselves to the electorate—"the masses." The masses are seen as consumers who spend their votes in the political marketplace to purchase programs and their sponsoring decision-makers. The masses are taken to be involved in politics only marginally and intermittently, with their main objective that government satisfy their demands.

All the overload theorists share four major assumptions of the economic theory of democracy:

(1) Men and women are conceived as atomistic, self-interested, rational individuals who seek to maximize pleasure through accumulating material goods.

(2) Political participation is essentially the making of demands upon government.

(3) Democracy, because it is reduced to a mere marketlike mechanism, cannot affect the character of the citizenry or the content of these demands.

(4) Finally, the economic theory of democracy is taken to be a factual description of what democracy "really is," not a moral or prescriptive theory of what it "should be."

THERE IS A CONCEPTUAL FUZZINESS to the overload theory that makes it difficult to criticize it. Analyses rarely specify what *kinds* of demands cause overload through their excess. Demands on government for more transfer payments to the elderly and unemployed might strain limited budgets; but other demands do not. The anti-Vietnam War protests and current protests against increased militarization can be seen as demands that government spend less: here increased demand could produce less overload. By selective examples, the overload theory implies that all popular demands—and democracy itself—lead to excess.

The overload theory also tends to take "supply" as a given. It assumes, for example, that taxes cannot be raised, even though the U.S. tax rate is relatively low compared to many of our major capitalist competitors. Moreover, rarely is the allocation of supply questioned.

The very conception of "overload" itself is hazy. While its advocates claim that government is being "overloaded" by demands that it spend (or do) more, what often appears (or feels) to them as "overloaded" are private corporations—as with demands for more government regulation of occupational safety or the environment.

Despite these ambiguities, we cannot simply dismiss the overload thesis. If we employ a market metaphor to describe democracy, there certainly is *some* meaning to "demand" and "supply," so that there indeed can be an excess of demand over supply—an "overload." Simply put, what the overload theorists have discovered is a *corollary* of the economic theory of democracy: democracy conceived as a political market lacks the built-in *equilibrating mechanism* of the economic market. In the continuous pull and haul between sellers and buyers, and even in very imperfect markets, economic wants have a mechanism that pushes toward balance between supply and demand. But a political market has no equivalent mechanism.

When originally propounded, the economic theory of democracy contained no such worry

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about overload, for it was assumed that the citizenry would be politically active only sporadically. So long as the Western democracies functioned smoothly in the years after World War II, overload was only a theoretical possibility. But when political participation increased in the late 1960s and early 1970s and Western democracies found themselves with economic ills, Huntington et al. discovered "overload." Forgetting that theirs is but one model of democracy, they claimed the problem to be inherent in democracy itself.

SELF-RESTRAINT: Solution for Overload? Given the basic assumptions of the economic theory of democracy, there is nothing surprising about the solutions propounded by its theorists. When "demand" is greater than "supply," and supply cannot easily be increased (as in the current climate of stagnation), demand must be limited. But how? Either the citizenry must exercise self-restraint in its demands upon government, or there must be some kind of external restraint—in milder form, corporatism or depoliticization; in more coercive form, authoritarianism. Anyone committed to democracy would prefer the first alternative. But can the economic theory of democracy provide a satisfactory basis for self-restraint, or must it rely on undemocratic methods? One possibility is that self-restraint could be founded in self-interest; another, that it might be founded in shared values.

SELF-INTEREST AS A SOURCE OF RESTRAINT? According to the economic theory of democracy, people enter the political market as rational, self-interested individuals who seek to maximize fulfillment of their largely material desires. The following argument maintains that this self-interest could also encourage individuals to restrain their demands on government.

Social cooperation is in your interest. Without it there will be conflict and anarchy, and it will be impossible for you to have any security in the pursuit of your interests. A democracy is the best political form for such cooperation because it is more likely than any other political system to control the rulers and thereby allow your interests to be represented and protected. This possibility, however, presents two serious problems.

If self-restraint is rational because democracy is valued, but democracy is valued merely because it generally serves one's self-interest, then the value of democracy, and of self-restraint, can be displaced by something of more *immediate* value to oneself. As soon as compelling arguments can be made that one's private goals are best pursued by violating democratic processes, it is irrational for the self-interested individual either to support democracy or restrain his pursuit of private goals.

The other difficulty here is the free-rider problem. It is possible that rational, self-interested individuals who continue to value democracy and know that excessive demands can undermine democracy will still find it irrational to exercise self-restraint. In many situations each person finds it rational to pursue private interests even though everyone acting this way would threaten a shared goal. Rational individuals will then see no reason to restrain their own excessive demands since doing so *as individuals* is not sufficient (or even necessary) to sustain democracy. The egoist in the political marketplace does best when other people restrain their demands and he does not. Such an individual will be a free rider, carried along on the self-restraint of others.

CAN SHARED VALUES be a source of self-restraint? The rational, self-interested individuals assumed to inhabit the marketplace thus provide fragile building blocks for the self-restraint needed to support democracy. But if this is true, why has democracy seemed so stable in the United States? Is it not possible, perhaps, that the citizenry does not mainly consist of the rational egoists assumed to be its mainstay by adherents of the economic theory of democracy? Perhaps, in the past, the actions of most citizens were informed by shared values of trust, compassion, social responsibility, public-mindedness, and national community, which did restrain them in the pursuit of private or selfish goals.

Before the 19th century, political theorists emphasized the importance of such civic virtue. They saw individuals who were ruthless in behalf of private goals as a corrupting force that invited despotism. Rousseau argued that

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democracy would cease to function as soon as individual self-interest rather than the common good guided citizens. John Stuart Mill argued that there was a certain natural sympathy in all of us that, if nurtured by education, would provide reliable "internal sanctions" restraining greed. More recently, Fred Hirsch has emphasized the importance of such shared values for the continued functioning of even the economic market. "Truth, trust, acceptance, restraint, obligation—these are among the social virtues grounded in religious beliefs which are also now seen to play a central role in the functioning of an individualistic, contractual economy." Hirsch stresses this, we must note for the future course of our argument, because he is concerned about the dangers posed by the erosion of such a "supporting social morality."[6]

The significance of such shared values was not lost even on Schumpeter when he formulated his market model of democracy. He argued that one condition for the success of a democratic society was a "social stratum" (such as the English aristocracy) with high "moral character" from which politicians would be chosen by the electorate. Another condition was at least a minimum of democratic self-control—a high enough moral as well as intellectual level among both electorate and politicians. Most of those that have adopted his conception of democracy, however, put little emphasis on shared values. Only recently, when the overload theorists concluded that the current "crisis" was the result of a lack of restraint, has some attention been given to civic virtue. Brittan, for example, mentions the importance of "the moral heritage of the feudal system" as a source of democratic self-restraint. The notion that personal success was firmly connected with "duty performed" helped limit "the demands on the sharing-out functions of the state." But "the feudal legacy was bound to be extinguished by the torchlight of secular and rationalistic inquiry, which was itself so closely associated with the rise of capitalism."

Even such cursory attention to shared values reveals a crucial, hidden assumption in the economic theory of democracy: if equilibrium is to be maintained between demand and supply, self-interest must be *internally* tempered by a public morality. But such belated recognition of civic virtue also reveals an important limitation in the whole theory. If it remains within its own assumptions, the theory is unable to give an account of shared values. It conceives of no basic part of human character or psychology—such as John Stuart Mill's "sympathy"—which could serve as a foundation for such civic virtue. The men and women participating in the democratic market, like the economic market itself, are simply self-interested pursuers of private goals. And since these individuals are taken to exist prior to any social institutions, it is impossible for the theory to recognize a historical process by which human nature is shaped. Such basic assumptions thus make it difficult for overload theorists to move beyond an ad hoc recognition of shared values and toward an explanation of the conditions under which these values are maintained or eroded.

Let's now talk of a worse problem. Capitalism as much as democracy requires a broad sharing of certain values—for example, trust and honesty. In the past, not only religion and other traditional bases of morality but the functioning of democracy itself helped sustain capitalism as well as democracy. Capitalism, as Schumpeter suspected, cannot be relied on to reproduce even the minimal shared values that it nevertheless needs. It may even subtly undermine them. If so, the attempt to deprive democracy of an independent moral foundation and justify it instead by a market model aggravates the problem. There are distinct dangers in viewing both a society's economic and political arrangements through the lens of the market.

(1) AN IMPORTANT FOUNDATION for the shared values enabling self-restraint is the morality of the political system itself. As the political system becomes more closely entwined with the economic system, the outcome of the political economy must be seen as moral and just, if the value of self-restraint is to be maintained. So long as shared values had a traditional basis in custom or religion, there was a built-in, almost

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unconscious check on the pursuit of self-interest: lying, cheating, deceiving, and harming another to benefit yourself were just plain *wrong*. But as religion and other supports for morality eroded, a conscious, rational basis became necessary. Mere self-interest (we saw earlier) was not enough, and this was especially true when contradictions emerged between capitalist accumulation and democratic social reform. The only remaining prop for internal restraint of self-interest is a conscious sense of civic duty, the recognition that certain actions are just and moral because they support a just and moral society. People foreswear certain kinds of self-interested actions in the name of justice. Yet such a sense of justice cannot simply be tacked on to self-interest. If people are to be educated to a sense of civic duty, they must perceive the system itself to be just and moral.

The theorists of overload crisis have a difficult time understanding that the foundation for self-restraint is the *larger morality* of the political economy itself. They do not see the connection between the citizens' view of the market system and the citizens' willingness to restrain demands. Why? Because, given the assumptions of the economic theory of democracy, the individual (with his own wants and interests) is conceived of as apart from and unaffected by the democratic system. Democracy simply is a mechanism for aggregating individual demands. The possibility that the kind and level of demands made would be shaped by a view of the morality of the market system itself cannot be accommodated within the economic theory of democracy.

This in turn raises two other closely related problems: *the market itself may actually promote the disappearance of the shared values upon which it rests*, and it may be unable to reconstruct the necessary shared values once these are threatened.

(2) THE MARKET ITSELF may help to undermine the shared values upon which it rests in two rather distinct ways. The current problems with our capitalist political economy and the way these are dealt with by the government may be perceived as unfair or unjust, thus undermining the moral justification for self-restraint. Alternately, the more general workings of the market itself may be encouraging unrestrained self-interest and discouraging civic virtue.

The first contention is based on the link citizens see between the "political market" and the economic market: they no longer judge democracy (as perhaps they once did) as a "working" or "just" system in narrow political terms but rather by wider political-economic criteria. Because the overload theorists see demands as a problem for democracy they miss seeing the source of these demands in the injustice of the larger political economy.

Since the New Deal, our government has gradually come to be seen as responsible for welfare measures that would ameliorate economic inequalities and lessen the risks to the normal routines of life posed by the market. Other citizens, often from economically more powerful classes, have come to see the government as responsible for market outcomes in a different sense: democratic government is expected to manage the economy to insure steady, noninflationary growth so as to enable capital accumulation and profit. This managed economy goes hand-in-hand with the welfare state: growth is considered essential to finance income-maintenance programs, and government management of the economy ensures such growth. Democracy is seen to "work" insofar as government can accomplish these twin tasks of reform and accumulation.

Changing historical conditions may be forcing a clash between these tasks. The ebbing of U.S. hegemony in the international economy, rising energy costs, declining industries, and persistent stagflation all are making it harder for the democratic welfare state to finance the social reforms needed to lessen the inequalities of the economic market. Particularly when accompanied by huge military expenditures, the continued financing of these reforms has called forth fiscal and monetary policies that interfere with growth and accumulation.

In frustration, people clamor for the government to do something. The overload-crisis theorists, however, overlook the deeper roots of the problems and fail to see that citizens may be making these demands because they perceive the political economy—capitalism, and not

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just democracy—as dishing out results that are unfair and unjust.

There is also a more subtle way in which the market may help undermine shared values: by encouraging the pursuit of self-interest and discouraging action based on virtue. Hirsch, for example, argues that the precapitalist and preindustrial social morality that served to contain economic individualism within permissible limits "has diminished with time and with the corrosive contact of the active capitalist values—and more generally with the greater anonymity and greater mobility of industrial society." Drawing on a variety of data, Robert Lane has argued that the market has definite consequences for the shaping of personality. It has increased self-reliance and cognitive complexity, and it has taught "a version of justice where work or contribution to the economy is rewarded." But the market also erodes civic virtue:

> Through its emphasis on transactions it has eroded some of the sources of sociocentrism. By its destruction of sources of humane values, its instrumentalism, it has made identity hard to achieve and its amoralism has made difficult the identification with moral values.[7]

(3) SHARED VALUES (social morality, civic virtue) cannot be reconstructed through a market method. Schumpeter recognized that the national character and habits necessary for democratic self-control could not be produced by the democratic method itself, but he did not elaborate on these difficulties. The shared values that undergird self-restraint and allow a democracy to function are, like public goods, things that benefit the whole society. Yet, like other public goods, these social norms cannot be provided through the market. Everyone may know that self-restraint is something that would benefit the entire society, but the democratic marketplace never offers people the choice between a disorderly society ruled by excessive demands and an orderly society ruled by reasonable, self-restraining people. Instead, it gives its citizens a choice among various politicians who rarely speak for a party with a coherent program, offering instead discrete, piecemeal proposals. The market makes it rational for individuals to decide each of these matters on the basis of individual self-interest, despite any unintended consequences.

A central element in the critique of the economic theory of democracy is that this conception fails to provide for the inculcation of democratic values through participation. Theorists who make this criticism—such as C. B. Macpherson—deny that human beings are essentially and unchangeably self-interested utility maximizers. They argue instead that the social order and particularly its political and economic institutions deeply affect human personality. If participation were nothing more than occasional trips to the polls, the citizenry would never learn the public morality needed for the survival of democracy. "A political act, to be done only once in a few years, and for which nothing in the daily habits of the citizen has prepared him," John Stuart Mill argued, "leaves his intellect and his moral dispositions very much as it found them."

These critics are attacking not democracy but the *economic model* of democracy. Drawing on such earlier theorists as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, and G. D. H. Cole, they argue for the educative importance of participation in making political decisions, not just the election of—or pressure on—decision-makers. Such participation should take place at the local and national level, as well as in the workplace. Public-spiritedness, respect for others' virtues, a sense of responsibility, a sense of justice, and the proper self-restraint that follows—in short, a democratic character—all these are being developed by participation, though they may be something that already exists.

The theorists of economic democracy erroneously reduce human beings to rational egoists, call that egoism human nature, and then describe (or justify) a market method for aggregating these interests without ever realizing that the method itself discourages anything but the development of such utility maximizers. The more people are shaped in the image of the model, the less well, ironically, the model will work; for the democratic character, discouraged by the market method, is no longer there to support it. The theorists of participatory

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democracy, on the other hand, argue for transforming democracy.

There is, however, one important assumption these theories of more participatory democracy share with the economic theory, and the pitfall to which this leads warrants exploration. The economic model of democracy, as we have been arguing, is blind to the relationship between its market method and social morality. The economic theory divides facts from values, and it insists that values are merely a matter of individual taste. This doctrine will not make it possible to say which values ought to be encouraged. Perhaps because they share the doctrine of the subjectivity of values, the theorists of participatory democracy also tend to be silent about the kind of public morality that ought to be encouraged. In insisting on more active participation as a necessary condition for democracy, they argue for replacing one method with an alternate, better method. And thereby they risk expecting far too much of a mere method.

More participation will not itself automati-

Arthur L. Fox

Dissenters Win Right to Space in Union Papers

In a precedent-making case, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has held that members of the National Rural Letter Carriers Association (NRLCA) have a right of access to their union's newspaper. The case arose when the NRLCA leadership refused to run a paid advertisement in the *Rural Letter Carrier* submitted by the Knox County (Tenn.) Local. The ad appealed to the membership to reject the 1981 contract negotiated by the NRLCA leadership with the U.S. Postal Service.

The Knox County Local . . . was comprised of 125 letter carriers, could not afford a mailing to the 64,000 members covered by the new contract and looked for other means of communicating opposition to the agreement. Inasmuch as the *Rural Letter Carrier* regularly carried commercial advertisements, the Knox County members hired an ad agency to prepare and submit camera-ready copy of their message, together with the cost of a full-page ad. The journal's editor refused the ad because, in his words, it "would just create internal strife." The local and several members sued the NRLCA claiming that the Union was stifling communication in violation of their Title 1 right of free speech. They argued that there could be no democratic referendum over the new contract if members voting on it were not exposed to competing viewpoints. Relying upon decisions upholding the First Amendment freedom of the press, the district court refused to order the NRLCA to print the ad and dismissed the action.

The court of appeals reversed. It rejected the notion that a union may lawfully restrict expression because of its message. On the contrary, the court said, the democratic process cannot function if, on a matter as important as contract ratification, there is no debate. The court observed that free and enlightened self-government can exist only where there is "a rational interchange of ideas on issues of great moment—the very goal envisioned by the framers of the First Amendment. . . . By refusing to allow [dissident members] access to its union-wide publication, the NRLCA foreclosed the only reasonable avenue for the effective communication of opposition to the new agreement."

Members of other unions will undoubtedly want to know whether they, too, can now force their union publications to print their messages on union policy matters. That depends. Technically, the Sixth Circuit opinion prohibits only discrimination based upon the content of members' speech. Unions may try to argue that the Letter Carriers' decision applies only where the union officers advocate one side of an issue in a publication that routinely accepts advertisements or member statements. Even then, unions may contend that members can force journals to print their viewpoint only where the paper is the *exclusive* forum of communication on a particular subject; if there is some other reasonable means of disseminating opposing viewpoints, the union may argue, it must be used instead of publication in the journal.

However, in the landmark Letter Carriers' decision, the court says much more. But exactly how far it does go may be determined by the next court that is asked to decide, under different circumstances, whether the members of some other union can force their publication to print their message on union policy.

Meanwhile, the Letter Carriers' decision is an encouraging breakthrough for union democracy. For the first time, the right of union members to express dissenting views in their own union newspaper has been recognized in federal court.

— *Union Democracy Review*, January 1984 □

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cally create democratic character. Democratic theorists must therefore also argue for a public morality, a conception of social and economic justice that can deal with such issues as the proper distribution of sacrifice and gain, especially in a time of recession or slowed growth. *The social virtues learned through participatory democracy must be grounded in the justness of the political economy.* Unless the question of the justness of the political economy is squarely faced, participatory democracy will be as inadequate as market democracy.

THE OVERLOAD-CRISIS THEORISTS use impressionistic data and a bold example or two to demonstrate the excessive nature of demands, but their thesis has not stood up well to systematic empirical tests. Surveying the available evidence for the 1970s, Hugh Heclo concludes that

> . . . almost nowhere could political parties be found trying to outbid each other in promises to continue rapid expansion in social policy spending. . . . [Moreover,] survey information for the United States and Western Europe shows a considerable willingness in the general public to act sensibly and lower expectations in response to (and in anticipation of) unfavorable events.[8]

Nevertheless, the overload-crisis argument has shown itself to have a distinct intuitive appeal, perhaps because of the extent to which market imagery has permeated our national consciousness. We cannot dismiss it without scrapping altogether the economic theory of democracy from which it so easily derives. Democracy must be conceived not just as a method but as a kind of society with a set of moral ends. Equality cannot simply be the equal weight of each citizen's demands as expressed through the vote. There must be a promise of relatively equal life chances for all citizens and a social definition of life that encourages the development of character, not merely the satisfaction of ever-increasing material desires. The distribution of sacrifices and benefits must be perceived as fair, if self-restraint is to be thought of as moral. Finally, there must be institutional mechanisms for debate and decision that not only accord citizens power over the terms of their lives but teach civic virtue and educate citizens to their responsibilities.

Unless the economic theory of democracy is swept away, we risk being caught in its dangerous web. "Overload" will then seem to be the problem, "excess of democracy" its cause, and authoritarian institutions a solution waiting in the wings.

Notes

[1] Samuel P. Huntington, "The United States," in Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, *The Crisis of Democracy: Report on the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission* (New York: New York University Press, 1975), p. 113.

[2] For various formulations of the overload crisis perspective, see: James Sundquist, "Crisis of Competence in Our National Government," *Political Science Quarterly* 95 (1980), pp. 183–208; Aaron Wildavsky, *How to Limit Government Spending* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); James Buchanan and Richard Wagner, *Democracy in Deficit* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); Richard Rose and Guy Peters, *Can Government Go Bankrupt?* (New York: Basic Books, 1978). Closely akin are arguments postulating a "political business cycle." See, for example, Edward Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

[3] Samuel Brittan, "The Economic Tensions of British Democracy," in R. Emmett Tyrell, ed., *The Future That Doesn't Work* (Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1977), p. 129.

[4] Robert Lubar, "Making Democracy Less Inflation Prone: Can Our Political System Tame the Monster It Helped To Create?" *Fortune*, September 22, 1980, pp. 78–84.

[5] Joseph Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (London: Unwin University Books, 2nd edition, 1974). For a formalization of the economic theory of democracy, see Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957). For critical discussions, see Peter Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism, A Critique* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967); Carole Pateman, *Participation and Democratic Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970); and C. B. Macpherson, *The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

[6] Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 124, 141.

[7] Robert E. Lane, "Markets and Politics: The Human Product," *British Journal of Political Science* 11 (1981), p. 15.

[8] Hugh Heclo, "Toward a New Welfare State," in Peter Flora and Arnold Heidenheimer, eds., *The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 383–406. □

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Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato

The German Green Party

A Movement Between Fundamentalism & Modernism

West Germany's Green party is so little understood that we suspect it can't be elucidated by traditional political categories. The standard view is that the Greens are a single-issue, middle-class, left-leaning youth movement—a temporary irritant for the more serious German parties. Such a view obscures the two most interesting aspects of the Greens: their ambiguity and the importance of the political questions they raise.

The Greens have never seen themselves as a single-issue movement. They emerged as a national party in January 1980; yet only in October '80 did they first sponsor a demonstration against nuclear weapons, and not until 1981 did peace become their main concern.

The Greens see themselves as the voice of the various radical, democratic, ecological, antinuclear, citizen-initiative movements that have been active in West Germany since the early '70s. They are responsible for placing the idea of the society's further democratization on the political agenda. And they contest the prevailing interpretations of ecology, development, sovereignty, peace, national identity, democracy, and even socialism.

This is not to say that the Greens among themselves are in complete agreement about the meaning of these terms. Their party must be seen as part of a movement that holds up the key values of West German politics for reinterpretation. There are, not surprisingly, deep conflicts within the Green party over how these values should be understood.

The West German political system has lacked a meaningful opposition since the Great Coalition of 1966 between the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Social Democratic party (SPD). The resulting arrangement placed the highest value on political consensus, and all too often consensus has been reached by behind-the-scenes bargaining that precludes public debate of fundamental issues. The low tolerance for dissent or extraparliamentary political action typical of postwar Germany complements this mode of policy-making.

Given this arrangement, it's not surprising that the early '70s saw a proliferation of citizen movements undertaking direct action on housing, transit, pollution, and industrial siting. By 1972 there were at least 1,000 such groups; by 1977 there were 50,000, with over 2 million members—more than those of all the other political parties combined.

This milieu gave rise to the Green "antiparty party." In 1977 a number of regional, provincial Green parties were formed, and by 1980 a disparate group of figures founded a national Green party to synthesize "left and right, red and green." Among these were the ex-CDU delegate Gruhl, the New Left activist Rudi Dutschke, the former East German dissident Rudolf Bahro. Their "synthesis" proved illusory: by the end of 1980 most of the party's prominent conservatives had left the Greens, and the party had passed a rule against dual membership, aimed at excluding authoritarian leftists. Nevertheless, it still is difficult to place the Greens on the traditional political map.

Even more indeterminate in terms of political implications is their sociological makeup. Most Green militants are young, well-educated, urban, and of the "new middle class"; Green electoral support is greatest in university towns and the northern cities. Yet its supporters include farmers, fishermen, scientists, law-

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yers, church figures, and marginals. Clearly, standard sociological categories of class, strata, or function do not yield meaningful conclusions about the Greens' motivations or goals. This is a "catch-all" party with a difference: a *real opposition* in the West German political system.

It is also, however, an extremely unstable opposition. The Greens' very decision to form a political party and their success in entering provincial parliaments and the Bundestag is divisive to the Greens in their fragile political identity. If the parliamentary Green factions comport themselves in accord with the "fundamentalist" tendencies of their movement, refusing all political compromise, they will at best block the Social Democrats' return to power. Much worse, this strategy could create the kind of political deadlock that, in Germany, is likely to have an undemocratic outcome. Yet if the Greens conform to normal parliamentary procedures, this may lead to splits within the movement itself. The most important split is already manifest in the conflict between two broad groups called "fundamentalists" and "realists."

In fact, there are two types of "fundamentalists"—one ecological and the other leftist. The ecologists include Petra Kelly and Rudolf Bahro. The leftists, coming from the tradition of Marxism-Leninism, include such ex-members of Communist groups as Rainer Trampert and Thomas Ebermann. There are also two distinct types of "realist-moderates": again, one stressing the ecological issues (Joschka Fischer and Otto Schilly), the other a socialistic direction (Claus Offe, Oskar Negt, the late Rudi Dutschke). Both these fundamentalist groups are opposed to arrangements with the SPD, but the ecological fundamentalists are explicitly antimodern while the socialistic fundamentalists are explicitly authoritarian. Among the moderates, the socialists are more open to the unions, while the ecologists confine their openness to the SPD. Only the socialist fundamentalists are one-sidedly anti-American; the ecological fundamentalists try to be even-handedly critical of both superpowers, though occasionally an exclusive emphasis on the value of "mere life" leads them to a unilateralist position.

These groups disagree, not merely on parliamentary procedure, but about each of the movement's key values. Underlying these disagreements is a basic difference about modernity—modern society itself.

Ecology

THE CONFLICT between the fundamentalists and the realists first appeared in relation to one of the Greens' primary concerns: ecology.

The ecology movement was born out of the shocks created by destructive effects of unimpeded industrial growth and by the crisis of welfare-state economics. It sought to provide a critique of industrial society, in the name of a "postindustrial" or "postmaterialist" cultural model. The meaning of this alternative model, however, has been in dispute.

The two conflicting interpretations of "ecology" may be seen as antimodern and modernist. That of the ecological fundamentalists is hostile to complexity, economic growth, industrialism, and the state; it defines "life" as the highest value. This latest version of a romantic and populist protest against modernity that dates back to the 18th century appeals to "nature in itself" as the source of inviolable limits to "artificial" human intervention. Its ideal community is small-scale, autonomous, and technologically primitive. This version of ecology is guided by an ascetic moralism regarding needs, an "ethics of conviction" about the value of life and nature, and by a fondness for "exemplary actions." The clearest exemplar of this tendency is Bahro, whose stress on the "species interest" of humankind, visions of countercultural religious communities, and simple-minded third-worldist rhetoric have recently taken on alarming authoritarian implications.

The "realists" believe that a sane approach to the ecological problem entails not a rejection of modernity but a realization of its potential—that is, control by society as a whole over its own development. Such control could involve a reinterpreted "ethic of responsibility" that includes the democratization of decision-making regarding the use of resources. Scientific assessment of interventions in the environment would inform public discussion of alternatives.

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The use of counterexpertise by the Greens is a promising idea, for it implies a shift of emphasis from exclusive concern with "life" itself to considerations of "the good life"—the kind of society we need and want. The limits to human intervention in the environment are not determined by "nature in itself" but are agreed on, through public discussion, by those affected.

The Greens' program includes much that is consistent with this view. It calls for a new economic rationality that includes environmental protection and retraining programs in the calculation of costs; for the expansion of civil liberties and workers' rights; for greater socioeconomic equality, and for social control over technological innovation. All of this surely requires a complex, pluralist, and democratic modern society—not the anarchistic utopia the fundamentalists dream of. Yet it is also clear that there is nothing inherently democratic in this modernist ecological consciousness. There are many antidemocratic, scientifically sophisticated partisans of ecology. The very existence of the Greens reveals what is at stake in the struggle over ecology: it is the very mode of control over science, knowledge, and investments that is to be developed. Is it to be democratic—or authoritarian? The "realist" tendencies within the Greens favor the first.

Peace and Sovereignty

In the last few years, opposition to American and West German military policy has become the Greens' central concern. At first glance, their aim seems clear: the preservation of peace and the recovery of full West German sovereignty. But on examination, this aim is not unambiguous.

The movement, to its credit, promotes open public discussion of the hitherto taboo issues of defense, foreign policy, and alliance. It has already had important democratizing effects. Its stated goals, however, are logically compatible with two different political positions: fundamentalist and antimodern on the one hand, democratic and modern on the other. The first position, held by a majority of Greens, favors unilateral disarmament and seeks to do away with (or seems to wish away) the modern state and its military capacity. The second seeks to establish alternative centers of sovereign power in Europe, based on a new level of West European coordination. It seeks *both* peace and sovereignty. A less desirable version of the latter focuses exclusively on the reunification of Germany.

In practice, if not by intention, the first position tends toward a policy of capitulation to the Soviet Union—even if its adherents dream of alternative forms of defense designed to decimate Soviet generals by making them laugh themselves to death. Its advocates protest Pershings and cruise missiles, but they say nothing about the SS–20s; when Solidarity was crushed in Poland, they offered little protest.

An articulate minority among the Greens is striving toward the second position. This minority protests both American and Soviet missiles, and it spoke out in support of Solidarity. But because the mass appeal of the Green party is based on the defense of "life as such," and because the party has gained a substantial following among pacifists, the second position has been articulated only rarely within the party. It has been put forward mainly by left Social Democrats, though even they have not faced the economic and political costs that a viable European defense would involve. The SPD, as it comes close to this position, may be ready to make important compromises with the Greens. This new flexibility, however, is a result of recent pressures put on the Social Democrats by the peace movement—also of the SPD's fall from power. Whether the Greens will be similarly open depends on how they resolve a deeper issue: that of national identity.

National Identity

This issue, while not raised in the official Green programs, is crucial to an understanding of the movement.

Now, almost 40 years after the Second World War, the younger generation of Germans is searching for a positive national identity—and rightly so. Since the formal institutions and political culture of both Germanys are in many ways marked by a great continuity with the past, it would be highly undesirable to leave the question of national identity to the

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state. A new and democratic political culture must be formed from below.

The Green movement is part of this effort. Yet here, too, sections of the movement are dominated by antimodern, romantic, and quasi-religious conceptions of community, and only a minority has begun to reflect on how a modern and democratic cultural identity might be formed.

None of the Greens favor a militaristic nationalism, yet those who want to disarm unilaterally and "Finlandize" their country represent a form of national identity that is in some ways frighteningly continuous with the past. For these Germans dream, while choosing particularism rather than universalism, that Germany might exempt itself from Europe's problems. Here an all too common lack of interest in the fate of Eastern Europe provides an important clue.

Unfortunately the alternative democratic conception of national identity, uniting a concern for peace, sovereignty, and freedom, has not yet been coherently developed within the movement. This is because the Greens who would potentially be interested in this idea come from the antiauthoritarian, socialist, extraparliamentary movement and tend to be allergic to raising the national issue in any form. Yet if they won't do so, others will—with potentially drastic consequences. In the meantime, the Greens are engaged in a wide-ranging debate about a closely related concern: democracy.

Democracy

AN IMPORTANT ACHIEVEMENT of West Germany's citizen movements since the '60s has been the revival of public discussion on the meaning of democracy, and the contesting of quasi-official definitions. Yet the project of democratizing German society remains ambiguous.

The ecology and peace movements have insisted on public debate of issues that were formerly the province of technocrats. They've discredited elitist theories about the ignorant and apathetic "masses"; they've challenged the prevailing authoritarian thrust of German politics that subordinates individual and social rights to a "public interest" supposedly embodied in the state. Yet it remains uncertain whether the Greens will be able to revitalize existing democratic institutions and create new ones.

The dominant ideal among the Greens is that of full and direct democracy, on some sort of council model. As long as the Greens were only a "movement" this ideal could remain intact, even with the unfortunate implication that a democratization of the state is excluded. When the Greens entered party politics, however, the question of how to relate parliamentary issues to those of direct democracy could no longer be avoided.

The consequences of pursuing the ideal of direct democracy in parliament—insistence on the "imperative mandate" (delegates strictly bound by party instructions), biannual rotation of delegates, a refusal to compromise—are disastrous for the existing form of democracy. They don't revitalize the parliamentary sphere, as some of the Greens claim; they paralyze it. Symbolic gestures tend to destroy parliamentary discourse and prevent the formation of a general political will. True, the parliamentary groups of the other parties do not take such discourse seriously either and have their own versions of the imperative mandate. But this is not much of an argument for a party seeking to make society more democratic. Subverting existing forms of democracy in the name of a more democratic alternative is bound to have authoritarian consequences. In Germany as elsewhere, it is time to lay to rest the impossible utopia of a self-managing communitarian society that could dispense with the mechanisms of formal democracy, yet remain democratic.

Fortunately, there is a group among the Greens that not only wishes to prevent the crippling of the parliamentary system, but seeks to revitalize and supplement it. This group wants to create new democratic forms in the workplace, in local communities, in urban centers, and so on. The Greens' participation in parliament should strengthen those who advocate this model of democracy.

The model raises interesting questions for real democrats. In a society with several centers of democratic power, which center shall be sovereign, and in regard to which issues? Such questions should be debated; but advocates of

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this model must make it clear that parliamentary democracy *is* an end in itself, and that whatever other centers of democracy may be developed, the form of representation characterizing parliaments should be maintained. Direct democratic models have their value on local and/or functional levels; a variety of forms of representation have their place on regional and federal levels. The expansion of democracy, indeed its preservation, must, in a complex society, involve a plurality of forms.

Finally, any social movement that relies on demonstrations must face the question of whether this kind of mobilization is to be considered an end or a means. As an end, it is not always compatible with democratic principles: militants rarely have a democratic relation to the people they mobilize. As a means, demonstrations have their place; they draw attention to the rigidity of political institutions and to the need for greater participation. But however festive they might be, demonstrations should not be confused with politics. (Nor should rallies and civil disobedience be dismissed as criminal acts in a democratic society, since they are an important way for excluded groups to express their concerns.) Collective action of this sort should be seen as a means to creating more sophisticated forms of assembly (councils, parliaments, associations, and so on) to address key issues.

In this regard, the Greens still have a lot to learn from the working-class movement. But the Greens' relation to the workers' movement —the unions and the SPD—has yet to be clarified.

Socialism

On a recent visit to New York, Rudolf Bahro left us with the uncomfortable impression that his party is opposed to the satisfaction of the immediate interests of the working class, that it does not distinguish between the Social Democrats and the parties of the right, and that it is willing to look for allies anywhere on the political spectrum.

Fortunately, Bahro's is a minority position among the Greens, and it's losing popularity every day. The Green party's national program advocates increased workers' rights, self-management, the defense of jobs, and a 35-hour work week. And Greens in provincial parliaments are showing an increased willingness to cooperate with the SPD.

Nevertheless, the conflict with the SPD remains. The Social Democrats' Schmidt-Löwenthal group, which opposes cooperation with the Greens, has lost out only on the issue of nuclear missiles. With its union support, it will be much stronger on economic issues. The apparent success of Willy Brandt's line, which seeks a national majority left of center, will be hollow unless the Greens show a readiness to work together with the SPD in coalitions or at least informally. And for this, two preconditions are needed. One is the defeat of the fundamentalists; the other is the development of a coherent industrial policy addressing workers' fears about jobs and offering a more imaginative vision of the future than the Social Democrats' static defense of the welfare state.

To our knowledge, only one group of Greens, in the city of Bielefeld, has made a truly interesting proposal in this direction. They want a drastic reduction of "official" work time and the legitimization of a second sphere of work, distinct from the labor market, in which all who seek to supplement their guaranteed minimum income could participate by exchanging goods and services. Rather than desiring to eliminate modern industry, this proposal seeks to reduce the importance of the sphere of "necessary labor." At the least, it is a promising attempt to deal with the problem of structural unemployment; but as yet it is no more than an outline.

What Prospects for the Greens?

Two final questions: Will the Greens survive? And what do we mean by the success or failure of a social movement?

There might eventually be a split between the parliamentary party and the larger movement. As long as some ties are maintained, this could be a sign of the need to seek democratic social reform along many different avenues, institutional as well as extrainstitutional. It is also possible that a reformed SPD will absorb the Green electorate, leading to a disappearance of the Green party. But this could happen

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only if the SPD also absorbed important parts of the Green program. The Greens would then have contributed to the necessary revival of Germany's "vanishing opposition."

The best way to guarantee the existence of an opposition would be the reconstitution of the Greens as a parliamentary, democratic, socialist, and ecological organization. This, clearly, would require a definitive rejection of the fundamentalist line, a coherent industrial program —and the luck to survive the resulting splits.

How long the Green *movement* will last is another question. It can't long claim to be a democratic movement without creating democratic institutions. This would be a great achievement; it would also mean the end of the movement *as a movement*. But it is not desirable or even possible for a democratic social movement to be permanent. The goals of a movement can be realized only by institutional actors: party, parliament, pressure groups, direct democratic associations.

The success of a movement can be measured by the traces it leaves in the political culture and by the contribution it makes to institutional reform. "Success" on the cultural level, however, depends on a transformation of the rather authoritarian German political life, one that will strengthen the rights of individuals and of groups, toleration of dissent and alternative life styles, formation of a democratic national identity, and the expansion of the possibilities of action by new social movements. Above all, it depends upon the extension of institutionalized spaces for free public assembly and discourse.

The Greens have already accomplished a great deal in bringing about a more democratic society. Yet much more work remains to be done if West Germany is to be transformed into a freer society. If the Greens can affirm the values of both democracy *and* modernity, they will continue to play a significant role in this transformation. □

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Ted G. Goertzel

Costa Rica: Democracy and Antimilitarism

The Central American countries won their independence in 1821 as a by-product of the Spanish defeat in Mexico. All were part of a loose Central American federation, which fell apart in 1838 because of regional and ideological conflicts between anticlerical, commercially oriented liberals and more traditional conservatives. The Costa Ricans didn't take these disputes quite so seriously as their neighbors in Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, largely because they were too poor and widely scattered to devote much time to politics.

Costa Rica had only a small native population. It was settled by less fortunate Spaniards who had no option but to work the land themselves. Living in such dismal poverty that they often had no proper clothing, the settlers were embarrassed to show up in church, even under threat of excommunication. Informality in personal and social life minimized social class divisions. In their rustic, egalitarian poverty, the Costa Ricans resembled the settlers of the New England states more than the wealthy slaveholders of the Southern states or the Caribbean. Democracy seems to thrive on soil that is not suitable for plantation agriculture.

While many Costa Ricans trace their nation's democratic traditions to the era of frontier egalitarianism, on the fringes of Spanish America, the economic foundation for this rustic tranquillity ended with the development of coffee as an export crop in the second half of the 19th century. In Costa Rica, as elsewhere in the Central American highlands, the best land was rapidly monopolized by a coffee-exporting elite, and politics became the exclusive domain of a landowning oligarchy. In Costa Rica, 26 percent of the land holds the less than half percent of the farms with over 1,000 hectares, while less than 2 percent of the land holds 36 percent of the farms with under 5 hectares. These figures are only modestly better than those for the other Central American countries.

While differences between Costa Rica and its neighbors in the size of farms and the ways in which they are used are small, there is a much sharper difference in the forms of ownership. Almost all the farms in Costa Rica are operated by the owner or by a collective. In the rest of Central America, various semifeudal arrangements predominate, where peasants are allowed to use the land in exchange for a payment in cash or in kind, or are simply tolerated on undesirable land if they don't cause trouble and are available as occasional laborers. To be sure, there are landless farm workers in Costa Rica, especially in the tropical banana-growing regions where many of the workers are blacks of Jamaican descent. But the proportion of peasants who own at least some land, especially in the central coffee-growing areas is high. There is also no ethnic division in Costa Rica between the Indian and Ladino populations, a division that is so important in Guatemala and El Salvador. Almost all of Costa Rica's population is of Spanish, Jamaican, or European descent. Inequality in Costa Rica is more of a purely capitalist nature, based on the amount of land or other wealth owned, or on occupational status in the urban areas. Class boundaries are relatively blurred, and there are few racial or ethnic barriers to social mobility.

Costa Rica's origin as a poor, peripheral community of self-sufficient settlers may have had enduring consequences for the national character. The sociologist Eugenio Rodríguez Vega describes his fellow Costa Ricans as a

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timid people, socially conservative and individualistic, and lacking in entrepreneurial or creative spirit. A nation with no distinctive folk art, regional dances, or a vigorous tradition of popular music, the Costa Ricans prefer to keep to themselves, to avoid taking sides in disputes, or making a public display of their emotions.

Rodriguez Vega may be drawing a caricature that is unfair to some of the outstanding leaders produced by a nation of little more than 2 million people. But other observers paint a similar portrait of the Costa Ricans as a people who stress individual liberty and look with disdain on the antics of their violence-ridden neighbors. While political alliances are often organized around loyalties to individuals, Costa Ricans would not be likely to respect a leader who clung to power at all costs; and their political leaders seem comfortable with the idea of returning to private life after a period in public office.

In the 1930s, Costa Rica responded slowly to the world economic crisis because much of the population could survive on subsistence agriculture outside the world market. This contrasted sharply with El Salvador, where a peasant uprising in 1932 was met with massive killings by the military. In the '30s, throughout the rest of Central America, the elites relied more and more directly on the military to maintain order. None of the Central American countries had the resources or internal markets needed to begin producing industrial goods for their own domestic market, as many of the larger Latin American countries were able to do at the time. The various Costa Rican governments then had no progressive economic plans or long-range social goals, but they managed to muddle through by maintaining public works and borrowing money.

In 1940, the Costa Ricans, eager for a more positive approach, elected, by an overwhelming majority, the presidential candidate Rafael Calderón, who promised significant social reforms based largely on principles of Christian sociology he had learned as a student in Europe. This meant the establishment of a welfare state. Calderón introduced national health insurance, minimum-wage and labor legislation, was instrumental in setting up the University of Costa Rica, and in passing legislation that allowed landless peasants to acquire ownership of unused land.

As Calderón's policies became more progressive, his base of support narrowed. He began to rely more and more on the Communist front group, Vanguardia Popular, which eagerly endorsed his programs and was reasonably "respectable" while the Soviet Union was allied with the Western democracies against fascism. In 1944 Calderón's chosen successor, Teodoro Picado, was easily elected, but in 1948 Calderón's candidate lost to a conservative, Otilio Ulate. Capitalizing on confusion in the electoral process, the government refused to turn over the presidency.

This violation of the electoral process led to Costa Rica's brief encounter with revolutionary politics. An armed movement was organized by the prominent liberal coffee planter José Figueres, with the support of a small group of social-democratic intellectuals and their sympathizers from nearby countries. The announced goal of these revolutionaries was to restore the integrity of the electoral process, but they were also eager to impose reforms that were not part of the conservative leader Ulate's program; their immediate objective, however, was to overthrow the Picado government. The Costa Rican army remained loyal to the government, but it consisted of only 300 poorly armed and trained men, supplemented by the militia of banana workers organized by the Vanguardia Popular. The government's alliance with the Communists was no longer respectable in the Western hemisphere, and there were frequent rumors of intervention by American troops based in Panama. Finally, President Picado and Communist leader Manuel Mora agreed to surrender to Figueres' forces, in exchange for a promise of amnesty for their supporters.

Figueres ruled for 18 months at the head of a revolutionary government before turning power over to Ulate. This period of revolutionary rule was not really justified by Figueres' announced goal of restoring the integrity of the electoral process, but it did give his group an opportunity to institute many of their reformist ideas. Figueres nationalized the banks, extended Calderón's social-welfare policies, passed a constitution that guaranteed human

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rights and free elections, and abolished the army. Abolition of the army was largely a symbolic act, since it was tiny and ineffectual in any event; it was replaced by a larger civil guard. However, the symbolic gesture was important in establishing civilianism in a region where armies are used primarily for domestic repression.

Since 1948, Costa Rican elections have been sacrosanct, and power has generally alternated between Figueres' National Liberation party and its opposition, currently organized as the Unity party. Differences between parties are small, and many voters alternate from election to election on the principle that it's best to throw the rascals out. The National Liberation party, which has a strong organizational network in all economic sectors and among social groups such as women and youth, is affiliated with the Socialist International. The Unity party is beginning to develop a coherent philosophy along Christian Democratic lines. Both parties recognize civilian democracy as a key element in the social contract. This contrasts sharply with other Central American republics where military intervention has been a regular part of the political process.

The present crisis in Central America is the result of a long period of modest economic growth under the leadership of political elites which, except in Costa Rica, have relied on brutal repression to avoid the social reforms needed for adjustment to economic development. The economic growth began after World War II when the Central Americans found themselves with resources accumulated from wartime sales. There was the pressure of rising expectations from the people, and encouragement from international agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. These agencies, however, recommended orthodox economic strategies that emphasized maintaining "a good climate for foreign investment" by keeping wages under control, developing the infrastructure, and maintaining a strong export economy. The Economic Commission for Latin America, under Raúl Prebisch, criticized this approach on the grounds that it would lock the Latin American nations into a pattern of selling primary products at declining prices relative to the industrial products of the advanced countries.

Prebisch proposed a number of alternatives, including increased state involvement in setting investment priorities, placing limits on imports in order to encourage domestic industrial production, and establishing free-trade zones between countries in order to provide larger markets for local industrial products. The Central American governments were receptive to the idea of establishing free-trade zones since this did not threaten private-sector interests or require political or social reforms. The conditions were ripe for this step, also, because the Pan American highway had recently been completed as part of an American wartime effort to provide access to the Panama Canal. The Central American Common Market, which began in 1959, coincided with the increase in United States aid under the Alliance for Progress. Public expenditures increased in all the Central American countries, based in large part on borrowed money. Throughout this period, Costa Rica—although it is that region's country with the smallest population—maintained the highest level of public expenditures: for popular pressure for increased public spending is more easily felt in a democratic system.

Costa Rica's policies, when compared to those of the other Central American nations, were quite effective in stimulating economic growth. In 1945, Costa Rica's gross domestic product was about equal to that of its neighbors on a per capita basis. By the late 1970s, it was approximately double. This economic growth was the result of conventional Keynesian economic policies, which stimulated economic demand through government spending. The Costa Ricans spent heavily on social security and welfare, while keeping defense spending low. They also spent heavily on their economic infrastructure and on investments in enterprises not attractive to private capital. By comparison, the other Central American countries followed the orthodox prescription of keeping social expenditures low while relying on the military to "solve" social problems.

Economic growth has led to some changes in the Costa Rican class structure, as compared

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to other countries in Central America. There was a decline in the proportion of workers engaged in agriculture, and an increase in the number in professional, technical, and administrative jobs. However, inequality, as measured by the proportion of income received by each segment of the population, does not seem to have decreased. A study by the Economic Commission for Latin America shows that the *relative* distribution of income is almost the same in El Salvador as in Costa Rica. Costa Rica's welfare-state policies, although intended to help those in greatest economic need, have in fact served to increase the size of the economic pie rather than changing the share of the pie going to each social class.

In the last few years, Costa Rica's economic growth has leveled off, because the nation has suffered from an excessive accumulation of foreign debt similar to that affecting many other countries in this petrodollar era. The country has been hard hit by the cyclical decline in coffee prices. Costa Rica's foreign debt now is the largest in the world on a per capita basis, and the country has been forced to renegotiate payment schedules and accept an austerity plan from the International Monetary Fund. The Costa Rican colon has dropped sharply in international currency markets. Domestic prices have increased, and living standards have fallen.

In his quest for aid, social-democratic President Luis Alberto Monge has been quick to capitalize on Washington's new concern about Central America. He welcomed Reagan to San José in December 1982. The city was plastered with posters showing Monge and Reagan side by side over the slogan "Two Peoples, One Ideal." Monge has embarrassed his European and Venezuelan social-democratic comrades with his outspoken criticism of the governments in Managua and Havana for their lack of democracy and their interference in Costa Rican affairs. He won the February 1982 elections with 59 percent of the vote, after a campaign that strongly emphasized political and social democracy and criticized Marxist-Leninist totalitarianism. Monge's campaign platform called for an increase in agricultural development through cooperatives. Government slogans include "We Shall Return to the Land" and "A Country of Owners, not Proletarians."

The Costa Rican experience demonstrates that it is possible to combine democracy with economic growth in a poor country. It does not seem to be necessary to solve the problems of economic dependency and social inequality before doing this. Certainly, Costa Rica has not solved these problems. The policies that it has followed are hardly unique, they seem indeed old-fashioned at a time when so many governments in Latin America and elsewhere have attempted to stimulate growth by cutting wages and services. Costa Rica shows that spending on human needs can be a good stimulus to economic growth as well as a more humane way to run a society.

The most unusual thing about Costa Rica is its virtual lack of military forces, something that can only be done by a country that does not fear foreign invasion. Costa Rican leaders simply say that they would call on the Organization of American States for help in repelling any invasion that could not be met by civilian volunteers. In practice, this means accepting the hegemony of the United States in the region, although Costa Rica has resisted Washington's urgings that it set up an army of its own. Accepting American dominance would be repugnant to nations such as Sandinist Nicaragua, which is committed to social policies that threaten American interests and ideological concerns. Most Central American governments, however, are firmly in the American camp and usually need armed forces only for purposes of internal security. English-speaking Belize is another example of a Central American country without significant armed forces, since it relies on the British for defense. During its short period of independence, it has maintained peaceful and reasonably democratic institutions.

With the high level of conflict in the region, Costa Rica's military weakness may prove to be a problem. The government fears that Guanacaste province, in the northwest, may become a sort of Lebanon, dominated by Nicaraguan militias. While anything that sounds like the establishment of an army is taboo, the

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National Liberation party has called for upgrading the civil guard, including the creation of a professional antiterrorist squad. It hopes to prevent the development of an officer caste in the newly reinforced civil guard by having officers move into civilian jobs after at most eight years in the guard. Another approach is to rely on troops from Mexico, Colombia, or Venezuela for border defense.

President Monge's shrewdly timed courting of Washington has paid off handsomely in economic aid, and widespread business failures have been avoided through government credits. The unemployment rate has been held to abut 10 percent, and Monge's Administration is quite popular. Leftist opposition is largely limited to the banana-growing regions and intellectual circles.

The unique historical factors that facilitated the emergence of democracy in Costa Rica cannot be duplicated in countries that have been more tempting targets of foreign intervention or have histories of bitter class or racial antagonism. This does not mean, however, that other countries could not learn from the Costa Rican experience. Cutting military spending, expanding human services, and providing poor peasants with the dignity of owning even a small parcel of land would do much to ease tensions in many countries. Such policies are consistent with the vision of more liberal U.S. administrations, and not quite so likely to excite the ideological prejudices of the American right wing. A stance like that does not appeal to nationalistic sentiments or rely on the rhetoric used by revolutionary groups, but this is probably a price worth paying, given the geopolitical and financial realities in Central America. If the United States were to promote such policies in Latin America, President Monge's vision of "Two Nations, One Ideal" might have more substance. □

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Janet Aviad

Israel: New Fanatics and Old

The Temple Mount Becomes a Political Issue

> And David said to Solomon: My son, as for me, it was in my mind to build an house unto the name of the Lord my God. But the word of the Lord came to me saying, Thou hast shed blood abundantly, and hast made great wars: Thou shalt not build an house unto my name because thou hast shed much blood upon the earth in my sight.
>
> — I Chronicles 22:7–8

On March 10, 1983, Jerusalem police prevented four armed men from ascending the Temple Mount, the site where the Temple stood, sacred to Jews and Muslims. The four men, yeshivah students, had intended to perform a Passover sacrifice there.

The students were followers of Rabbi Yisrael Ariel. Police, after the incident, found in Rabbi Ariel's apartment a cache of weapons, maps, and diagrams of the Temple Mount. The rabbi and 40 of his followers were arrested, but subsequently released.

There had been two previous assaults upon the Temple Mount since Israel conquered the Old City in 1967. In 1969 an Australian Christian tourist tried to set fire to the Aksa Mosque, and in 1982 an American Jewish immigrant killed several guards and civilians while shooting his way toward the Mosque of Omar. Each of these events sent shock waves through the Arab population of East Jerusalem—indeed, through the entire Arab world; but each, however ugly, was an isolated act, the work of a single disturbed man.

The most recent assault was different—a well-planned effort involving many people and linked to a definite goal. And while the students who took part in it were clearly extremists, they are supported by a larger following of religious and secular nationalists who are determined to extend Israeli sovereignty over the Temple Mount.

After the 1967 war, the Israeli government acted quickly to demonstrate its recognition that the Temple Mount is sacred to Muslims too, and that it had no designs on the site. Control of the Mount was left in the hands of the highest Muslim authority, the WAQF. Moshe Dayan, the architect of this policy, stated that

> Israeli soldiers will be found only outside the Mount itself. The Israeli government will guarantee general security but will not intervene in the internal guarding [of the sites]. These are Muslim mosques and should be autonomous. . . . We have not come to rule over the Muslims' holy places or to interfere in their religious life.

This policy, though by no means based on considerations of Jewish religious law, was acceptable to the vast majority of Israel's Orthodox Jews. Two main factors motivated the position of the Orthodox on the Temple Mount in 1967. First, problems of religious law concerning ascent to the Mount, and second, the

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dominance of a moderate leadership that was not fired by a desire to "push [toward]" and establish Jewish sovereignty over the Mount.

The primary religious legal problem is one of purity. Here a distinction must be made between the place where the Temple itself stood and the area around it. As to the former, a 16th-century legal code, the *Shulhan Aruch*, states that "anyone who enters the place where the Temple stood incurs the death penalty, because all Jews today have been violated by the impurity of death." Such impurity is said to derive from direct or indirect contact with dead bodies. Because the attainment of a state of complete ritual purity is virtually impossible, the rabbis have ruled that ascent to the Temple area is forbidden.

Concerning the area outside the original boundaries of the Temple, purity restrictions are less stringent. In theory, any Jew may ascend after taking a ritual bath. However, because the boundaries of the Temple are no longer demarcated today, the dominant Orthodox position, and that of the Chief Rabbinate, has been to forbid ascent altogether.

The other barrier to ascent concerns the spirit, rather than the law, of Judaism. In the centuries since the destruction of the Temple, hope for its reconstruction has been transformed into a distant, indeed an eschatological vision. This eschatological spirit is evident in a statement made by Sephardic Chief Rabbi Nissim in 1967: "We have done all that human hands can accomplish. For [this is the teaching] we have received from our masters: the third Temple will be built by God himself." In a similar vein, a noted Orthodox professor of philosophy has said that "not only the building of the Temple but also the erection of an altar . . . require a special inspiration, an inspiration of prophecy . . . and without it, heaven forbid that we ascend unto the Lord to carry out the sacred service."

This moderate religious outlook, widespread in religious Zionist and non-Zionist circles, corresponded to the Israeli government's explicit desire to maintain a national consensus in favor of leaving the Temple Mount undisturbed. And indeed, for 15 years the issue excited very little controversy.

Only one small, extremist group has been dedicated to disrupting the existing peaceful arrangements. "The Faithful of the Temple Mount" have never numbered more than 100 members, among them a good many Jews from England and America. Their leader is Gershon Saloman, a seventh-generation Jerusalemite Revisionist who joined the right-wing Tehiyah party after Begin signed the Camp David agreements.

Saloman restated the beliefs of his group in a recent letter to the *Jerusalem Post*:

> Fifteen years ago Israel liberated the Old City and all Jerusalem from Arab occupation. Yet the Temple Mount has remained a Muslim enclave. . . . Though all Jerusalem is at last, after 2,000 years of dreams and prayers, under Israeli sovereignty, the Temple Mount has been surrendered to the violently anti-Zionist Supreme Muslim Council, the WAQF. . . . The Faithful of the Temple Mount . . . are striving to achieve and ensure freedom of access to and worship on the Temple Mount. This is the essence of Zionism. There cannot be full redemption of the People and the Land of Israel as long as the Temple Mount is ruled by an alien power.

For years the activities of the Faithful were conducted in muted tones and attracted few people. But in the past two or three years, the issue of the Temple Mount's status has been taken up by the right wing of the religious Zionist camp. This is not at all surprising: the return of Jews to the Mount, the redemption of the Mount from the hands of non-Jews, and the restoration of sacrifices are all part of their "messianic agenda." The script—if one insists on reading it literally—moves inevitably to the Temple Mount.

The radical religious right is not united in a single organization or party. It is made up of the more extreme elements of several different groups: the National Religious party, the Tehiyah party, Herut, Gush Emunim, Mazad (a new party), and the settlement organizations. All these groups share a messianic ideology that is centered on two interwoven ideas: the realization, in our time, of redemption through Zionism, and the right of the People of Israel to possess all of the ancient Land of Israel.

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In the view of the religious right, the modern Zionist movement acts as God's agent in returning his people from exile and establishing "the third commonwealth." Israel's wars are seen as miraculous victories advancing this process. Particularly charged with meaning is the 1967 Six-Day War, which is compared to the miraculous victories of the Maccabees. Characteristic of this perspective is the great success, in Zionist yeshivot, of *The Great Period*, a work whose significance lies in its literal application of messianic categories to contemporary events.

Settlement and, if necessary, conquest of the land are seen here as essential to the messianic process. Settlement, for the groups of the radical right, is not simply a political process, a way of annexing territories; it is also much more. In the view of these groups, settlement has become symbolic of the total process of redemption from exile through which the Jewish people is passing. The completion of the redemptive process depends on the literal fulfillment of the Biblical promise regarding the Land of Israel: all of it must be settled by Jews, to whom it was promised more than 3,000 years ago. The latter-day pioneers of Gush Emunim, fundamentalist in their understanding of the Bible, insist that the policies of the Israeli government must be guided by the religious imperative of settlement. Delays are regarded as backsliding and those who cause them as betrayers of the vocation of the chosen.

For the religious right, settlement is also the empirical expression of Jewish self-determination. The pioneers carry the flag of Jewish strength. In its revulsion from what it regards as the dependency inherent in the state of exile, the radical right places a fierce emphasis on Jewish autonomy. The "goy" cannot be permitted to interject rational political considerations or to impose pressures—whether the "goy" is the United States or the part of Israel that does not share the messianist-nationalist orientation. In this view, Israel, even in its semiredeemed state, remains "a people that dwells alone."

Understandably, the Camp David Agreements came as a shock to the religious right. Gush Emunim and other groups formed a movement to block the withdrawal. Hundreds were sent to the Sinai, both to force the government to reverse its decision and to stage a rehearsal for later action in Judea and Samaria. The resistance in the Sinai failed: the settlers were removed and the settlements demolished by the very government ideologically committed to the "Greater Israel." Nor did the Lord intervene.

The withdrawal caused serious self-questioning within the religious right. Rabbi Yehoshua Zuckerman articulated the thoughts of many:

> A great tragedy has occurred. . . . Why did the Lord do this to us? Did we not build Azmona on the foundations of pure faith? Did we err? Have we revealed our own weakness? Have we hurt the cause of the Land of Israel? In these difficult hours we must return to our sources, to our rabbis who set our course. Only on the basis of these sources can we stand firm in the struggle over the future of Zionism that now rages within our people.

This period of self-doubt was genuine but brief. The sources, especially the utterances and scant writings of Rabbi Zvi Yehuda Kuk, provided guidelines for a response. The withdrawal was finally understood as a mere delay in the messianic process—a delay that must be overcome by intensified settlement on the West Bank and an eventual return to the Sinai. Gush Emunim reaffirmed its mission to press the redemptive process forward.

> Our work for the Land of Israel is not done out of bitterness or disappointment but out of certain faith in the absolute divine imperative regarding the renewal of Israel upon its inheritance. . . . Therefore we shall overcome the shame of concessions and retreats, as we have shaken off the impurities of exile. . . .

The war in Lebanon raised a new set of issues for the religious right. Its majority gave total support to the war, in all its stages. There were three major reasons. First, the right believes that the real borders of Israel extend into southern Lebanon, and a war of conquest is justified. Rabbi Yisrael Ariel, who had gained fame as the militant rabbi of Yamit, published a pamphlet in which, on the basis of Biblical evidence, he described Lebanon as the very heart of the Land of Israel. Second, the war

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was understood as a war concerning Judea and Samaria. The right believed that the destruction of the PLO would relieve pressure for territorial compromise and Palestinian self-determination on the West Bank. Third and finally, the war was seen as a great demonstration of Israeli strength. It washed away some of the bitterness of Camp David.

The religious right found it easy to dismiss most criticism of the war. Criticism from abroad was anti-Semitism—domestic criticism, self-hatred or even treachery. But a more formidable challenge arose when voices of protest began to be heard from its own ranks.

Rabbi Yehuda Amital, the head of Yeshivat Etzion, one of the most illustrious institutions associated with the religious Zionist movement, became the leader of religious opposition to the war. Amital spoke out sharply against the fundamentalism of those who claim that Sidon and Tyre are as much a part of historic Israel as Tel Aviv and Judea, and therefore must be retaken:

> It may be possible to say that Lebanon is our possession according to the divine promise.... So what? Are we obligated to conquer every inch that was promised to Abraham, our father? Why should we be concerned about the Damascus-Beirut road when we have great problems within the Land of Israel?

Amital charged that many religious Zionists were embracing a militaristic nationalism at the expense of basic religious values—such as the love of peace and life itself. With evident horror he quoted a statement that appeared in a religious journal at the time of the bombing of Beirut: "We must stay in the Land even at the price of war. More than that, we have to initiate war in order to conquer and free the Land. Without the Land of Israel we are not the People of Israel." Such a statement, said Amital, is false to the laws and spirit of Judaism.

The response to Amital was vehement. "There is no room for doubt here," said Hanan Porat, a leading organizer of the Gush Emunim and now a Member of the Knesset representing the Tehiyah party:

> Even according to the minimalists [he continued], Southern Lebanon is part of the Land of Israel.... The root of the mistake of Rabbi Amital lies in a basic misunderstanding of the value and centrality of the Land of Israel in the process of the redemption of Israel.... The connection between the people and the land is analogous to the connection between the body and the soul.

Some of Amital's right-wing critics spoke as if waging war and defying world opinion were admirable ends in themselves. "In the war for the Peace of the Galilee our military powers were revealed again, and our image as a military power was enhanced among the nations," said Eliezer Waldman. "We have proven that we can make autonomous decisions without considering what the 'goyim' think."

No moral defense was presented by the rabbis who responded to Rabbi Amital, as if the sense of acting in a drama of redemption had released them from such responsibilities. "We have claimed that our task is to create order in the world," said Eliezer Waldman, "an order of faith and holiness.... Who else will create this order? If we don't, there will be none. This is a total teaching of faith."

Such confidence in its world-historic mission enables the religious right to march on, brushing all criticism aside, identifying completely with government policy in Lebanon and pressuring the government to expand settlement on the West Bank.

It is hardly surprising then that growing circles within the nationalist religious right have recently shown an increased interest in the Temple Mount. Yigal Ariel pointed the direction. "We have been confused since Yamit," he said, "and fail to assert our national and religious rights." These rights, he said, could be asserted by continued attempts to ascend the Temple Mount; by the publication of rabbinic opinions endorsing prayer on the Mount and the claim to Jewish sovereignty there; and by the introduction into the public schools of a new curriculum on sacrifices.

Gush Emunim and Bnei Akiba, two major groups of the extremist nationalist religious right, have become newly active on this issue. Rabbis and activists associated with Gush Emunim are working for a change in the status

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of the Temple Mount. Bnei Akiba, the religious Zionist youth movement, introduced the issue for the first time this year at its annual conference. The conference produced this statement of principles:

> The Temple Mount, the place of the Temple, is holy to the Jewish people. The Conference looks upon the present situation, in which the rights of all religions except Judaism are safeguarded, as grievous. The Conference calls upon the government of Israel to find a fit expression for Jewish sovereignty on the Temple Mount and a proper arrangement for Jewish prayer there according to the decisions of the Chief Rabbinate. Bnei Akiba will now include the subject of the Temple Mount on its agenda, out of a deep expectation that the Temple will be rebuilt [and] seen in our day. The Conference opposes illegal actions on the Temple Mount.

The last sentence is comforting in its moderation. However, the very fact that the Temple Mount has become a concern of this activist movement is one more sign that the Mount is becoming a contested political issue.

In December 1982, the annual conference of the Faithful of the Temple Mount, usually attended by only a handful of members, attracted hundreds of participants. The talks delivered there may be divided into three main themes.

- First, the Faithful restated the absolute and pressing obligation to redeem the Temple Mount from the hands of non-Jews. A collection of authoritative sources was cited to legitimate the call for realization, in the present, of what has long been an eschatological vision.

- Second, lectures delivered at the conference reviewed the state of the current struggle to assert Jewish sovereignty over the Mount. Particular attention was paid to the activities of a recently organized Knesset committee whose aim it is to reverse the 1967 law giving authority over the Mount to the WAQF. Although this committee has made no great strides toward its goal, the Israeli government could choose to make it a more effective body at any time.

- Finally, the conference provided a variety of challenges to Jewish laws that hinder ascent. Dr. Asher Kaufman, a physicist, presented archeological evidence that he claimed identifies the exact location of the Foundation Stone and of the Temple itself. With the aid of slides and diagrams, he attempted to prove that the site of the Temple is north of the Mosque of Omar. This would mean that the Muslim shrine would not have to be destroyed in order for the Temple to be reconstructed. Kaufman claimed that since the boundaries of the Temple are now known, there is no reason why Jewish prayer, outside of those boundaries, should not be permitted.

Kaufman's arguments resemble those of Rabbi Zalman Koren, who has also demarcated areas outside the Temple where he is certain that Jews may pray. Because they are based on a study of Biblical and religious sources, Koren's conclusions have won great respect within religious circles. The new Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel Mordecai Eliahu has suggested, on the basis of Koren's opinions, that a synagogue and yeshivah be constructed in the permitted zone.

The religious right's increased interest in the Temple Mount has recently led to the founding of a yeshivah for the training of priests—the "Crown of the Priests" yeshivah in an old building in the Muslim Quarter of Jerusalem. The building, still inhabited by Arab families, had once belonged to Jews. According to those who founded the yeshivah, acquiring it is part of the process of redeeming the Land. Under the direction of Rabbi Shlomo Aviner, 30 young men study the talmudic tractate on sacrifices there. They are preparing themselves to serve as priests in the Temple, believing that they live in the aeon of redemption, and that its final stages are drawing nigh. These young men are not involved in political organizing; they do not speak of "hastening the end." They do, however, help to create an atmosphere of anticipation in which extremist activists can thrive.

During the Passover week of 1983 the Temple was the subject of a well-attended two-day conference sponsored by the Crown of the Priests yeshivah. In his opening remarks, Rabbi Aviner said that "we must not forget that the ultimate purpose of the ingathering of the exiles is the building of the Temple." Rabbi

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Hayim Druckman, the founder of the Mazad party, proclaimed: "Our reality brings us to the building of the Third Temple. . . . There is no retreat from the Redemption, which has begun."

The rhetoric of redemption in such addresses is used by people who believe firmly that the footsteps of the Messiah can be heard:

> This is already the middle of the Redemption . . . the Kingdom of Israel has been rebuilt. . . . This is a manifestation of the Kingdom of Heaven. . . . The IDF has absolute sanctity. It represents God's rule in his Land.

To these people, settlement activity, as conducted by Gush Emunim in Hebron, and actions by the Israeli Defense Force (the army), such as the invasion of Lebanon, are manifestations of the messianic process. The symbols of holiness are earthly and concrete; assessments of political opportunity are guided by the messianic vision.

At the same conference, Rabbi Druckman told his admirers that

> . . . we are drawing close to a great future, in which we shall celebrate the Passover fully. Then we shall no longer say "the Passover lamb that our fathers used to eat when the Temple was standing," but rather, "the Passover lamb that we eat in the Temple."

The statement is meant to be taken literally. For Druckman and other religious zealots, the only question is one of tactics; the ground in Jewish law has been prepared to permit ascent. The Knesset committee is pressing for legislative changes that would permit ascent and the construction of a synagogue. The troops, in the form of yeshivah students, rabbis, and settlers, are prepared to move.

Just as the West Bank could not have been settled if the Israeli government had not supported that policy, the Temple Mount will not come under Jewish control if the government does not wish it so. During the election campaign of 1977, the future prime minister promised Gershon Saloman that if he were elected, Jews would be permitted to pray on the Mount. Although Mr. Begin did not keep that promise, he did help bring about a political mood in which the demand for Jewish sovereignty over the Mount could come to seem legitimate and proper. His successor, sharing his revisionist ideology and his confidence in Jewish might, may well be prepared to go further.

It is difficult to imagine anything that could do more harm to the possibility of peace than a change in the status of the Temple Mount. The Aksa Mosque and the Mosque of Omar are the holiest Muslim temples in the area. Any act that would seem to profane these sites would strike at the heart of Arab religious and national sensibility, and the Arab-Israeli conflict would be raised to a new level.

All this is both known and dismissed by the zealots who have planted settlements on the West Bank and have now turned to the Temple Mount. They are animated by an ideology that permits them to ignore the political and moral claims of others: they insist that they know God's will.

It would be better, in their view, if the rest of the nation understood God's purposes as they do: the end station could be reached much more quickly if it were so. But even without such general understanding and conviction, the right and the righteous push on. And as they do, they push the entire region closer to Armageddon. □

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Colin Crouch

Public Expenditure in Socialist Thought

The demand that public spending should be kept high and frequently increased has long been one of the hallmarks of political movements of the left in virtually all industrial societies. It provides one of the very few points of consensus linking parties as far apart as the French Communists and the West German Social Democrats, and extends to the progressive wing of the United States Democratic party. Furthermore, it is a demand that has survived the radical changes in social circumstances from 19th-century poverty, through two world wars, the interwar depression, postwar affluence, and on to the recent return of global recession. Indeed, the commitment of the left to public expenditure is so much a part of our accustomed political life that we take it entirely for granted.

However, during the past few years, policies of high public spending have come under new and heavy attack—intellectually from a school of conservative economists and social commentators, and in practice through the policies of right-of-center governments and international economic agencies. In Britain, the attack has been given an added point by the violent ideological hostility to all public spending apart from the police and the armed forces expressed by the current Conservative government.

It is therefore an appropriate time to reconsider the taken-for-granted commitment and to examine some of its paradoxes. This essay does this, first by a brief historical review of how public spending came to occupy its prominent place in British socialist thought, and second by an examination of some of the inadequacies that have been revealed in the labor movement's approach to the question.

Several areas of public spending—including one of the biggest single items, defense—are in no way distinctively socialist. Public expenditure becomes a particular concern of socialists if it falls into one or more of three categories.

First and most straightforward, state spending may be used to offset the inequalities that exist in the operation of the market by enabling citizens to enjoy certain goods and services as their right (or for token payment) regardless of their ability to buy them at the market price.

Second, there are several goods citizens quite rationally seek but that cannot be provided by the market, or can only be provided at a cost so high that they would be available to very few people. A wide variety of goods comes into this category, ranging from clean rivers to the police force, to grand opera. Defining this broadly, there is no *a priori* reason why socialists should have any global commitment to this category. There are, however, good reasons why they tend to embrace a wide range of causes within it. Given their dissociation from the interests of capital and their long-standing belief in intervening in market processes in the interests of equality, socialists are more likely than supporters of bourgeois parties to be sympathetic to appeals that there should not be complete reliance on market mechanisms for the provision of people's needs.

In a great many, if not most, instances even the clearest cases of public goods can actually

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be provided through market mechanisms for a small minority; if there are few unpolluted rivers, it will be the rich who will monopolize access to those that remain; several exclusive American housing estates employ private police forces. In general, one can argue that where provision by public expenditure will potentially put within reach of everyone a good that would otherwise be accessible only to a wealthy minority, socialists will be prominent among advocates of that provision.[1]

There is no particular reason why socialists should be particularly committed to the annual subsidy to the Covent Garden Opera, because even as subsidized it remains accessible only to very few. They should be, and are, heavily committed to the tradition of public-service broadcasting, exemplified by the BBC, because that makes available to a mass audience a richer variety of cultural experience than would result from radio and television services governed by commercial criteria alone. The dividing line is difficult to specify clearly, and there will be interesting and continuing debates over where it falls, but the rule of thumb given here will serve for present purposes.

Third, socialists are interested in the use of public expenditure as a means of maintaining demand in the economy in order to secure full employment—in short, in Keynesian economic policy. Closely related is spending on job creation through special schemes, subsidies, and investment incentives. This is because the strength of the labor movement and the welfare of those it represents depend on full employment. This category differs from the previous two in that it may involve indiscriminate support for *any* public expenditure that increases demand,[2] something that the definitions of the two previous categories have deliberately tried to avoid. If one's aim is simply to boost demand, then it does not matter much whether the expenditure goes on the salaries of top-level bureaucrats, the production of kidney machines, or the manufacture of hydrogen bombs.[3] Indeed, before 1945 it was often argued that the only way in which a capitalist economy would be able to sustain full employment would be through maintenance of a permanent war economy—a reasonable argument at a time when the only available examples of full employment had been Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany, and the combatant countries of the Second World War.[4]

Most socialists would reject the idea of indiscriminate support for public spending on the grounds that there are sufficient unmet needs under the first two categories, and that it is inconsistent with socialism's stress on the conscious choice of priorities to show unconcern about the objects of state expenditure. This is a sound and reasonable argument, though it is remarkable how often the labor movement has, especially recently, allowed itself to be maneuvered into a position where it is willing to support any spending, provided it emanates from the state. Let us assume that the basic distinctive commitment of socialists is to those elements of public spending covered by categories one and two, plus items of demand stimulation and job creation that accord with some plan of economic and social development.

A Historical Perspective

EARLY WORKING-CLASS MOVEMENTS were confronted by a world in which the two principal sources of power and the allocation of resources—the market and the state—operated in ways largely hostile to their interests. Labor's place in the market was weak and by definition subordinate, while workers were excluded from political citizenship. The aspiration of the early socialists was therefore to transcend both these conditions by social regulation based on cooperation and community. For all his refinements of and improvements on early socialist theory, Karl Marx did not really differ from this ultimate ideal, nor did he improve on the hopeless vagueness of its formulation. Instead, the idea of a marketless, stateless society largely survived as an unworldly utopia while labor movements, growing in strength, took as their practical goal amending the way the state and market operated. This was as true of revolutionary as of reformist movements. No one needs reminding that the Bolshevik revolution failed in its avowed intent of smashing and subsequently transcending the powerful, autocratic Russian state; instead it consolidated its position by using the resources of that state and by devel-

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oping them even further—a process that continues today. Elsewhere the socialist and communist objective of challenging the state in order to transcend it has become in effect a policy of trying to adapt it and make use of it.

There are several reasons for this crucial change: the failure to develop, intellectually or practically, alternatives; the need, in desperate situations, to use whatever resources are at hand to gain some results; the naiveté of the Marxist concept of political power, which sees it as something generated solely by the class nature of society and not as an inherent process of social organization. For our purposes, the most important point is that the consistent pressure of the working-class left in politics—the movement most alienated from the authorities of the state—has led to a situation where the state looms larger and larger within social life rather than, as originally envisaged, "withering away." In the countries of Western Europe, the reason for it has not been the success of revolutionary captures of the state but the advance of universal suffrage: the state was becoming responsive to a wider electorate than before, and this might be expected to force changes in the interests served by that state.

The existing bourgeois state, responding to an enfranchised and increasingly organized working class, could be pushed into making reforms that changed the unequal distribution of resources through regulations, public ownership, and public spending. This new sense of the opportunities presented by a changing capitalism was grasped by the revisionist wing of the socialist movement in Germany—a movement with objectives far more radical than present-day social democracy, but which saw scope for achieving them through the transformation rather than the destruction of existing institutions.

In Britain, it was the Webbs and their associates, working from rather different sources, who represented the most fully worked-out philosophy of reformist socialism. They built on the existing tradition of British domestic and imperial government: a strong sense of the "public interest" and of public service, an efficient tax-collecting system, an increasingly professional bureaucracy, even some development of public enterprise, particularly in the imperial civil service in India. The Webbs believed that the state could be developed further to counter some of the gross irrationalities produced by the theoretically entirely rational system of the free market economy. Needs that the market system neglected, such as those of working-class health and security, could be met through public spending, financed by redistributive taxation; through the state a form of collectivism could limit the disorder and avarice of individualism.

This was how the Webbs' policies joined with the aspirations of the labor movement, with emphases that remain at the core of its politics. But it is also necessary to consider other elements in the Webbian program. Along with others at that time, the early Fabians were concerned about popular health and welfare for reasons other than the interests of the people concerned; they were committed to a search for national efficiency.[5] The competitiveness of the economy, the need to maintain the Empire and to be prepared for war were becoming important preoccupations of a Britain that could no longer take world domination for granted. It was necessary to ensure that all the nation's resources, including the physical welfare of its people, were deployed as efficiently as possible. The role of the Boer War and the First World War in encouraging concern for the physical conditions of the working class is well known, and the Webbs shared fully in that aspect of welfare policy—motives similar to those that had led the highly conservative government of Bismarck to equip Germany with the world's first, if rudimentary, welfare state. In other respects, the extensions of public services advocated by the early Fabians, several Liberals, and "social Toryism" were aimed at providing capitalist industry with infrastructural facilities that could not be produced by the normal market process but that industry needed: good roads, a work force with basic educational skills, publicly owned utilities.

This last point does not, as some Marxists would have it, automatically discredit this brand of socialism.[6] There is an alternative view of the matter. Capitalism is an inherently divisive and competitive system, incapable of providing some of its own needs. However

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much it might be in the overall interests of capital for certain unprofitable public services to be developed, the task of provision would have to be carried out by the state, with finance raised from taxation; and individual capitalists would be likely to oppose both the taxation and the extension of state activity involved. The most important power for change therefore had to come from outside capital's own political organizations.[7] This was provided by the labor movement, which wanted an extension of state spending primarily for purposes of its own. From this a compromise has emerged.

In many ways public spending was developed on capitalism's terms, but not entirely so. For example, one may take the argument that industry needs a work force with certain levels and types of educational skills—from ordinary workers it needs basic literacy and numeracy, from others specialized technical skills, from others again more advanced scientific and intellectual abilities. One may therefore regard those aspects of educational spending that provide for these skills as being at least in part explained by industry's needs. But this leaves much educational activity unexplained. Once a service has been established, other aspirations that do not necessarily have anything to do with industry's needs make themselves felt in policy making. Included among them have been essentially socialist pressures for educational opportunities to be opened to all and not just to those who could afford to pay for them; though probably more important have been pressures from within the educational profession itself.

Thus a socialist concern for public spending has been able to entrench itself in the politics of the society because it coincided with certain interests of capitalism, which the latter found great difficulty in realizing by itself. At the same time, bourgeois parties adjusting themselves to universal suffrage had to accept social spending. But the ambiguities of this compromise left their mark on the development of public spending policies. The early welfare-state plans assumed that there were no difficulties in implementing measures through the existing apparatus of the bourgeois state and its civil service. The measures were essentially *de haut en bas*, the people being the passive and sometimes obligatory recipients of what was considered good for them. This is seen most clearly in those aspects of public spending that simply redistribute resources among the working and lower-middle classes, requiring them to consume services that they might not choose in the market.

This kind of paternalism is often attributed to the policy-makers' belief that they know better than the people themselves what is good for them. But it is not just that; it is also a question of doing to people what is good for the system as a whole (empire, nation, capitalism, whatever) rather than for the people themselves. A significant legacy of this approach to public spending was the absence of any theory of widespread participation in the control of the new public services, apart from Parliament and various systems of token representation. One aspect of this, emerging clearly in the thinking of the Webbs and becoming firmly entrenched in Labour party policy, was the strategy of concentrating the administration of welfare activity in the hands of employees of the state and local authorities, rejecting the system of voluntary action that had been developing since the later 19th century, and that increasingly found its political supporters on the right. This is a theme to which we shall return.

The basic cast of socialist thinking on public spending had been set by the early decades of this century, but the two major developments that firmly established a high level of public spending on social services as part of British national life took place during the Second World War: the adoption of an ambitious and systematic set of social policies (on health, education, and social insurance) and the acceptance by the government of Keynesian economic policies, which provided a means for the financing of public spending and a clear philosophy for the use of public expenditure to maintain full employment. The basic concerns of those policies had been brought to political life by the socialist movement: security for working people and entitlement to certain services as of right, irrespective of capacity to pay in the market. However, the policies also took their place in the overall national consensus, becoming, in T. H. Marshall's important phrase, "as-

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pects of citizenship."[8] It is significant that a wartime coalition government introduced the policies, and that the two men most closely associated with them, Lord Beveridge and Lord Keynes, were Liberals.[9]

The welfare state and the use of public spending to provide a wide range of nonmarketable services probably remain the most important practical contributions made by democratic socialism. Socialist economic policies have had nothing like this success in becoming indelibly implanted in the practice of government. While subsequent Labour governments have been responsible for an extraordinary number of institutional innovations, there has been nothing to compare with the contribution to social philosophy and practical politics of the actions of the 1945 government in implementing the policies that had emerged from the war period. This remains the high water mark of the impact of socialist thought on public spending and related questions.

But the ambiguities of the earlier period were carried forward in the postwar policies. As well as being designed to provide certain services, public spending was part of overall demand management. And the needs of macroeconomic policy rather than the emergent needs of the services or political decisions about their desirability would determine whether spending would rise or fall—though in practice it has never been as simple as that. Also, while constituting a challenge to the earlier form of capitalist economy, Keynesianism in other ways furthered the aims of capitalism. By solving the problems of underconsumption and unemployment, it actually increased the scope of the market economy, bringing idle resources into use and giving to capitalism a stability that it had never known. This ambiguity helps explain the contradictory attitudes toward full employment and Keynesianism among business interests. They like the stability and expanding markets that it provides but resent both the freedom afforded to their workers by full employment and the constraint imposed on themselves by a large public sector and high levels of taxation.[10] Such ambivalence is part and parcel of the compromise embodied in public spending policies as they have developed.

The Keynesian and Beveridge revolutions did little to alter the basic mold in which British socialism's approach to public spending had been set: services provided for the people by the state and its bureaucracies, with a continuing remoteness from the people themselves. Indeed, the more remote the services and the less interest people took in them, the more readily could their development be subsumed under policies of demand management.

By the mid-1950s, the new stability imparted to Western capitalism by these measures and by the postwar economic recovery led the reformist wing of the Labour party to align itself more closely with the compromise as such, rather than to remain, as did the party's left wing, unreconciled to an economy that was still primarily capitalist.[11] Anthony Crosland and others in the Gaitskellite movement considered that the capitalist economy no longer needed structural transformation, but that existing weapons of economic regulation could, through taxation and public spending, be devoted more consistently to the overriding priority of social equality.[12]

A further important contribution to this line of thought came from the U.S. in the form of J. K. Galbraith's book *The Affluent Society*.[13] In his analysis of the contrast between the private affluence and public squalor, which developed in a rich society that neglected to provide for services the market itself did not generate, Galbraith provided a clear perspective for those who, while accepting the main contours of existing economic and social arrangements, remained sharply critical of several of their aspects from the standpoint of the Webbian tradition, showing concern for the neglect of collective needs in an individualistic society.

Whatever its deficiencies, this was a powerful and coherent philosophy, well tailored to the needs of that particular stage of capitalist development and serving as a useful guideline for the main reforms introduced by Britain's Labour governments of the 1960s and '70s. As a result, several areas of glaring underprovision in the social services have been rectified, new areas of policy opened up, and public-service staffs have become an important lobby for expansion of their numbers and salaries.

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Perhaps the philosophy was too well tailored to the period of easy economic growth, since the ending of that period has robbed it of some of its initial assumptions. With the international economic crisis, the basic consensus over public spending and Keynesian economic policy has burst asunder. Full employment has gone, so has the constantly expanding economy that Crosland had felt able to take for granted in 1956 as the background to politics. And the association between uncontrolled public spending and inflation has been used by international finance and the Conservatives to launch a wholesale roll-back of public expenditure.

In order to tackle these problems and their relation to developments in socialist thinking, let us now consider the range of problems confronting the commitment to public spending.

Contemporary Challenges: Charges from the Right

FIRST, THERE IS the battery of charges from the right, asserting the essential profligacy of high levels of public spending. Second is the need for socialists to be prepared to criticize aspects of public spending. Finally, there is the problem of remoteness and public alienation from public services. These problems are linked, and can all be interpreted against the pattern of historical development discussed above.

In debates on public spending, socialists are used to defending principle against expediency. To take an example familiar from the debates of the early 1960s, the free market produces plenty of slot machines but leaves schools poorly equipped. By increasing public spending, governments are able to ensure that widely recognized social needs are met, perhaps at the expense of the more effete frills of the private market system. But recently the right has developed some moral arguments of its own, regarding a high level of public spending as evidence of moral decadence on two grounds: that governments do not subject themselves to the discipline of spending within their means, and that public spending is a form of electoral bribery.[14]

Some years ago, the American political scientist Anthony Downs tried to demonstrate why it was that public services would always be either underprovided or underfinanced.[15] While individuals make a distinct contribution to financing public services through taxation, their return in the form of enjoyment of services is indistinct and uncertain. Therefore, while electors may be willing to vote for public services, they will be unwilling to give adequate financial support to them and will prefer to keep more of their money for private consumption, over which they have individual control.

The new right has accentuated part of this argument to claim that public services will always be *over*provided and underfinanced. They claim that politicians will initiate spending projects to "buy" votes, while governments, unlike private persons, do not have to ensure that their spending is balanced by income. If there is public resistance to higher taxes, then governments can go on spending by the simple expedient of printing more money. This introduces the whole monetarist argument about the causes of inflation.[16] There is, of course, some truth in this, and only the most obtuse among socialists will argue that in no circumstances should public expenditure be contained in relation to national income—though it is relevant to notice that the major historical case cited of a government being unwilling or unable to raise taxation to meet its expenditure is the Johnson administration's deficit financing of the Vietnam War, hardly an instance of socialist public spending!

But the rightist argument here is not quite as strong as it seems. First, it is assumed that governments can go on indefinitely with deficit spending, even if associated with increasing inflation. This is simply not true. A high level of inflation is itself a source of pressure on governments to act, through public concern about rising prices, the threat to investment levels, balance-of-payment crises, and difficulties in raising credit. Why should it be assumed that governments are vulnerable to popular pressures for public spending and low taxes but not to these other pressures—some of them also being democratic forces?

There is a further argument. It will probably be universally conceded that high levels of inflation are undesirable, but it is by no means

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clear that the evils consequent on a low or moderate level of inflation—setting aside certain unresolved technical debates on how long inflation can be contained at moderate levels—are greater than those of trying to eliminate it from the system altogether.[17] Thus if Downs was right in his argument about popular unwillingness to support an adequate level of public spending, it may well be that it is only through a certain amount of inflation that public spending can be kept high enough to fulfill important social purposes.[18] Once the issue has been posed this way, it ceases to be an economic one and becomes one of basic values, and the right is forced back into its ultimate, long-standing position of claiming that all private spending is inherently superior to public spending. Against this, socialists argue that many basic services are not marketable, and they emphasize the arbitrariness introduced by the ultimately indefensible inequalities of income and wealth distribution that determine our ability to secure goods and services in the market.

As for efficiency, the right's view that the internal rationality of the market is superior to that of the political process has far more to commend it than socialists are usually prepared to acknowledge.[19] However, there are two points to be set against it. First, the substantive outcome of the free market may well be inefficient if (a) it makes inadequate provision for infrastructural goods and services that are not fully marketable but on which economic activity depends, for example, if it fails to provide an educated work force; or (b) it leads to arbitrary concentrations of wealth, whose owners are so rich that they have no incentive to act efficiently. To try to refute such arguments by claiming that the market is the sole guide to efficiency is to reify an indicator and to make an argument true by definition. Second, even if the distortions of underprovision and gross inequality that the market produces are efficient, it remains in the last analysis a question of value, over which reasonable men can disagree, whether one prefers the narrow efficiency of the market or is willing to compromise some of this in order to secure some goals that the market will not achieve at all.

At this point, the right uses its second "moral" argument against public spending. Whereas I have here assumed that public spending is directed at certain widely recognized needs, the new right sees it as a set of bribes: governments spend money in order to win electoral support from specific sections of the population. Closely related to this argument, though more sophisticated, is the recently popular thesis of the political trade cycle.[20] Politicians, it is argued, increase public spending before an election and reduce it (or raise taxes) afterward, thereby distorting the rhythm of the true economic trade cycle in an inflationary way. This is not an argument one can dismiss out of hand. However, electoral bribery will be the more an element in public spending the less comprehensive the general welfare system of the country (or the party's policy) and the less it is oriented to the goal of reducing inequality.

Conversely, the more socialist and far-reaching the system, the less will it be vulnerable to corruption. It is when spending is carried out in an ad hoc way, with few guiding principles, as a small item within a system primarily governed by market processes, that politicians have the kind of discretion deliberately to target their spending on electorally sensitive groups. And "bribery" will be most manifest when the spending policy departs from egalitarianism and is directed at groups already privileged in market relations.

Contemporary Challenges: Reexamination on the Left

A FURTHER and distinct aspect of the new attack on public spending concerns its alleged negative consequences for the level of investment.

Nearly all Western societies have effected some kind of compromise between the capitalist economy and the thrust of socialism, and part of the compromise consists in the uneven penetration by social reforms of different areas of the society. Important though the process is, it has not yet been subjected to any detailed study, and in our characterizations of the political balance of any particular society we usually

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make some overall assessment, ignoring differences between sectors. In the United Kingdom the main achievements of socialist reform have been in the scope of the welfare state and (until recently) in the general consensus over full employment. Left virtually untouched by socialism has been the question of investment and indeed, apart from fitful short-lived experiments, the whole area of economic planning. Important here has been the dominant role of the City of London, which, being primarily an international institution, has been almost immune from domestic political pressure.[21] One consequence of this lack of integration is that investment has been the casualty of the system, being sacrificed both to public spending needs and to the defense of the currency.

In stopping short of this point, government economic policy has not changed to the extent perceived necessary by Keynes himself as a consequence of the adoption of his demand management techniques. In an admittedly brief and ambiguous passage at the end of the *General Theory*, Keynes spoke of the probable need for a "comprehensive socialization of investment" if full-employment demand management policies were to be sustained.[22] In the absence of this, British governments have had to manage the economy through the infamous process of "stop-go," hindering both investment and public spending. Alternatively, there has been "over-full" employment and an inflationary level of public spending. The Labour party's power has been concentrated at the point of making effective demands for spending, with little leverage at the level of investment and production decisions.

In times of prosperity, a labor movement with power in the area of public spending and a capital with power over investment lead to a reasonably happy compromise, but in times of difficulty they will lead to a stalemate, and inflation is the main consequence. As the economic situation has worsened, its unsatisfactory consequences have become more marked.

An indication of how the compromise can turn out differently, and in some ways more constructively, emerges from comparisons of British and Swedish experience. In Sweden, too, investment has been left to private capital, largely beyond the reach of labor's powerful political forces, and in the past few years this has become an issue of controversy linked with problems of inflation control, much as in Britain. But in other aspects of economic policy, the Swedish labor movement has in the past been able to achieve things not possible in Britain.

In 1948 the Swedish unions propounded what has become known as the "active manpower policy," and by the late 1950s important elements of the program were adopted by the Social Democratic government.[23] The policy rested on the identification of different degrees of profitability in different sectors of the economy.

The aim then was to encourage workers to move from the less productive to the more productive sectors. Fiscal policy would be *more* restrictive than in the initial stages of Swedish Keynesianism, keeping demand high enough to ensure full employment in most of the economy, but not in the least productive sectors. There would be, for example, increased indirect taxation through a sales tax, diminishing the extent to which firms could pass on increased wage costs in price rises. Meanwhile the unions would pursue a "solidaristic wage policy," insisting through centralized bargaining on equal increases for equal work regardless of an employer's ability to pay. Through this pincer movement, firms would be forced to become more efficient or to close down. The unions were prepared to propose such a policy, which obviously threatened higher unemployment, because they were confident that a Social Democratic government would maintain a policy of overall expansion for the economy, constantly creating new job opportunities, while also vastly expanding selective manpower policy, including information, retraining, and financial support during the process of transition from old to new jobs. As A. Martin comments:

> In this way, a process of structural change in industry would be encouraged, increasing the proportion of efficient, low cost activities capable of paying standard rates without putting increased pressure on prices. At the same time, manpower policy would assure that the costs of structural change would be shifted from the workers involved to the society as a whole.[24]

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And all within a fiscal policy becoming more restrictive and less inflationary because of the degree and type of government intervention involved and because of the integration between union and government policy that could be expected.

The Swedish economists knew that the stable-money policy would lead to unemployment if nothing were done about it; their analysis was similar to the monetarist account of the "natural rate" of unemployment. However, unlike the monetarists, they recommended measures to reduce the actual and the "natural" rate. This would be achieved by means leading as far as possible to allocative results similar to those produced by the market, but with results that would be better in terms of a level of unemployment consistent with a constant rate of inflation, preferably close to zero. They argued that without an efficient administrative and legal apparatus for that purpose, governments would be tempted or driven by political pressures to apply distortionary measures of an awkward kind.

To draw attention to Swedish experience is not to argue that British should or could simply have adopted the same policies; certain specific structural characteristics of Swedish political economy were important to its acceptance. But it illustrates the advantages of having public spending incorporated into a policy of overall economic regulation.

A further question that tended to be ignored by socialists in those years of capitalism's acceptable face in the 1950s was the possibility of companies avoiding those countries that imposed either heavy taxes to finance public spending or restrictions on industrial activity in pursuit of social goals. Recently this has become a major issue, as capital has shifted to a number of newly industrializing Third World countries with weak or nonexistent labor movements. The scope for companies doing this is not infinite. The very public spending that leads to high taxes often provides industry with the infrastructure it needs, while there may be advantages of natural resources or the location of work-force skills that lead a company to remain in a particular country whatever its policies; but the danger is real enough.

The internationalization of the world economy is among the most significant political facts of our time, and it is experienced doubly by Britain. As the result of loss of Empire and of economic decline, Britain is more vulnerable than it once was to international forces, at a time when those forces are becoming generally more powerful. This happens in two ways: through the growth of the multinational corporations, and the rising importance of international monetary organizations. The ability to operate internationally is almost entirely a monopoly of the interests of capital; capital is highly mobile and there is no democratic international polity. The international organization of various essentially left-wing lobbies and pressures therefore is becoming crucial to the interests of socialists within individual nation-states. Movements of this kind have begun: there are occasional instances of transnational trade unionism. But the task remains extraordinarily difficult; for some time to come the general internationalization of economic affairs will work against using public spending as an instrument of socialist policy.

Defects in the System

ONE WAY of beating off the challenge from the right is to ensure that the pattern of public services we have deserves wholehearted support. Frequently, however, this isn't the case, yet socialists often seem unwilling to accept a reexamination of the system we have inherited. They seem committed to defending any public spending apart from armaments, almost regardless of whether in its existing form it continues to serve a useful purpose. In the late 1940s an unusually favorable political conjuncture enabled a whole range of ambitious social services and spending items to be introduced. Any surrender now of an item in that program seems a concession to the enemy, even if the overall system has become ridden with imperfections and vulnerable to attack.

An important cause of difficulty is the use of hidden, unquantified and sometimes unacknowledged subsidies that arise through various services being allowed to run at a deficit. If pressure is to be applied to a nationalized industry to keep open an uneconomic plant in

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the interests of reducing unemployment, then some attempt should be made to assess the cost of that decision, and the industry given specific grants in compensation. This is preferable to the industry making do as best it can and reporting at the end of the year a variously attributable overall deficit that has to be met by an even larger, unexpected subsidy.

Politicians often find it convenient that responsibility for a given item of expenditure be shuffled around and diffused, in the hope that, at the end of the day, it might be lost altogether.

It may be argued that by covert subsidies a minister can "do good by stealth," funding good causes for which he could not get direct support. The attraction of this reasoning is deceptive; the more a system becomes permeated by actions of this kind, the more of an inchoate jumble public spending becomes, *and* the more remote from the public.

It has always been socialism's claim that it improves, not fudges and botches, the efficiency of the market. This is best achieved by planned, calculable interventions in a market process that is otherwise left to do its work. Economic pricing, whether directly or through analogues, remains an invaluable means of weighing the relative costs of alternative courses of action.

Many of our problems here are the result of the inevitable coexistence of public spending with private markets. Unless we are prepared to seek the abolition of virtually all markets—which would be impracticable as well as undesirable—we need to pay special attention to what happens at the interface between public and private, to those aspects of public spending that cover items very similar to those that people normally buy in the market. A British example is the subsidy on school meals. The public visibility of such a subsidy means that any reduction is likely to cause a major price increase and tends to be avoided. It is far easier to make cuts in capital spending, though in the long run this does far more damage to the service in question. As a result the pattern of existing spending becomes impossible to justify as an expression of socialist priorities, and highly vulnerable to political attack because it is seen as irrational.

Remoteness and Bureaucratization

OUR UNWILLINGNESS to reexamine the existing network of subsidies and services may be partly both consequence and cause of a final problem: the continuing and possibly growing remoteness of public services, including even the social services, from ordinary people. This aspect of the way public expenditure is organized and dispensed is becoming increasingly important as large numbers of people experience the welfare state as a tax "burden," and as the bureaucracy needed to administer services becomes more impenetrable. Working people have more control over the money they spend in the private market than over the public spending compulsorily levied on them through taxation and dispensed by bureaucrats and politicians.

This is indeed something to which social democratic parties have failed to respond, to the advantage of their opponents. It is only by a verbal conceit that the "public" arena can be regarded as a genuine communal property in any sense of the term. It was all very well for the early socialist visionaries to regard the democratic welfare state, or an individual local authority, in these terms, but it will not do for our generation. We know too much about the obstacles to mass participation in formal politics, about the techniques whereby politicians and bureaucrats deflect and fob off attempts at finding out what they are up to, about the sheer difficulties experienced even by men of probity and good will in rendering any large-scale organization transparent and open to influence. The response of many local councillors when told that they ought to open up channels for community participation is to say, with righteous indignation, that they are themselves the embodiment of it. They have constitutional law on their side, but not social reality.

One can regard the issue as being between bureaucracy and community; but another formulation, taking the debate back to an earlier period, is that between statutory and voluntary action. Thus, A. H. Halsey, pondering these problems in his 1977 Reith Lectures,[25] quoted what he called "a lament" by R. H. S. Crossman, writing in 1973, "for the eclipse of voluntarism by bureaucratic organization":

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From the 1920s on, the normal left-wing attitude has been opposed to middle-class philanthropy, charity and everything else connected with do-gooding. Those of us who became socialists grew up with the conviction that we must in this point ally ourselves with the professionals and the trade unions and discourage voluntary effort particularly since it was bound to reduce the number of jobs available to those in need.

I am now convinced that the Labour party's opposition to philanthropy and altruism and its determined belief in economic self-interest as the driving dynamic of society has done it grievous harm. For, ironically enough, the party, trade unions, and the co-operative were all a hundred years ago inspired by a profound and passionate altruism—a belief in a new Jerusalem—linked with an urgent sense of duty—a conviction that it was an essential part of socialism to practice what one preached by volunteering to help comrades in distress.[26]

Crossman was, of course, giving only half the story; the social services dispensed by Victorian charity were at least equally remote from the recipient community as the institutions of the welfare state—distributed at the whim of upper-class patrons with a keen desire for receiving gratitude and deference from the recipients, and with a constant tendency to apply their own smug criteria of desert to the supplicants.

Further, complaints that the welfare state removes responsibility from people for their own lives is often a concealed conservative demand that the less able and less wealthy be left to drift by themselves.

Seen as the choice of a universal, systematic welfare service available to all as a right of citizenship, the ultimate victory of the approach of the Webbs over that of the advocates of voluntary charity was almost entirely a worthy victory for socialism over liberalism and conservatism. However, in the above quotation, Crossman reminds us of earlier labor-movement traditions that were also expunged. Having quoted that passage, Halsey continues:

> So the movement which had invented the social forms of modern participatory democracy and practiced them in union branch and co-op meeting, thereby laying a Tocquevillian foundation for democracy, was ironically fated to develop through its political party the threat of a bureaucratic state. So much is this so now that when Norman Dennis protests against these emerging tyrannies with the authentic voice of a deeply rooted English socialism, he is heard with approval by Keith Joseph, and dismissed as a nuisance by the Labour establishment. Mr. Dennis has written, for example, a completely convincing demolition of British planning practices, from the standpoint of democratic socialism in the English tradition which I have described.[27]

Dennis (a former Labour councillor in Sunderland), in dealing with urban planning in the northeast of England, was confronting a political process that we now know from the revelations of certain legal cases to have been riddled with corruption, by no means unrelated to problems of large-scale public expenditure by remote and unscrutinized authorities.[28]

In criticizing public bureaucracy and extolling voluntary action, Halsey is not in fact favoring Victorian charity. He want participation by the community itself in the running of its services, making democracy more real than is possible through existing statutory authorities, and tapping the wellsprings of commitment to community responsibility.

What of Voluntarism & Participation? Some Prescriptions from the Left

VERY SIMILAR was the vision of the welfare state promulgated by its greatest exponent: Richard Titmuss.

For Titmuss, the welfare state did not mean a system of impersonal expenditures by public bureaucracies and employed professionals but the conscious, altruistic dedication of the members of a society to ensuring that all its citizens enjoyed the basic means to health and happiness. In his last work, *The Gift Relationship*, he contrasted such a vision with the practice of a capitalist market-oriented society by contrasting American commercial blood banks with the British voluntary blood transfusion service.[29]

But how characteristic of the welfare state is the blood transfusion service? Titmuss did show convincingly how the capitalist element

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in U.S. medical practice has helped to drive out voluntary effort. This serves as a useful antidote to the more frequently voiced claim that the welfare state has eroded a voluntary commitment that would exist in a society without government social policy. His hope was that institutions like the voluntary blood transfusion service would reinforce the ties of community loyalty that in turn produce further examples of altruism. In this his argument is similar to the more rigorous formulations of Fred Hirsch: a market society depends for social stability on certain bases of trust and on the willingness of people not to pursue their own interests to the extent that the free-market model implies.[30] But the tendency of a society organized on increasingly capitalist lines is to drive out such restrained or other-regarding behavior; it certainly cannot create it. Thus Hirsch described capitalism as living on a "depleting moral legacy" of codes of restraint and deference inherited from precapitalist institutions.

At this point one wants to be able to claim that socialism can create a new, egalitarian base for altruistic, community-concerned behavior. But to the extent that socialism has meant the establishment of centralized professional administrations, much of the evidence points the opposite way. Centralized bureaucracy depends on, but drives out, a depleting moral base just as does capitalism, forcing voluntary participation to the margin and treating it with arrogance. This is often as true of its approach to elected representatives as it is to voluntary helpers. As a result, community effort declines further, and even more tasks have to be undertaken by the public authority. If we want socialism to reproduce the moral base of community life, we have to look beyond the existing mold of social policy administration.

Of course, there is no way that we can avoid the need for a large state bureaucracy and fiscal machinery for the efficient operation of social services. Neither should we assume that professional employees are incapable of providing a genuine dedication to the purposes of the services they administer. But all that granted, I am still driven to the conclusion that the welfare state now needs a major shift toward community-level bases controlled by volunteers assisted by small teams of locally based professionals, wherever this is practicable.

Moves of this kind constitute the best available means for making the notion of a "public" service more than a verbal ploy; for realizing Titmuss's vision of a welfare society rather than an administrator's welfare state; and, not least, for finding for public spending the constituency of support that it will desperately need in the current climate of monetarist economic policy, international recession, and threatened "tax revolts."

The policy has its dangers and problems. First, participatory exercises can be introduced by authorities as meaningless tokens, within which a few self-appointed local worthies serve simply to give increased legitimacy to the bureaucracy. Reformers may be able to ensure basic minimum standards in the structure of the institutions that become established, but for the most part the effectiveness of participation will depend on the energy and vigilance of those concerned, and on the opportunities and constraints presented by the social and economic structure of society at any particular time.[31] As Crosland pointed out, the dangers of new channels of participation being meaningless are reduced if they exist at the genuinely local level, where people have a direct identity with institutions.[32]

A further problem concerns the inequalities that develop if matters are left to voluntary initiative. People from the educated, wealthy, professional, and managerial classes have more time, more resources, and the appropriate skills to devote to voluntary action in the interests of their communities. They will therefore lobby and work hard to ensure that funds come their way. They will, for example, ensure that their children's schools attract the best teachers and have the best facilities. Against this, control vested tightly in the hands of bureaucracy will ensure an even-handed distribution based on formal criteria of need. As Crosland put it: "There are times when only the despised local councillors and bureaucrats stand guard on behalf of the majority."[33]

Much, but not all, of this argument has to be conceded. The assertion that existing bureaucratic procedures are egalitarian can be con-

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tested. There is a good deal of evidence to suggest that several public services embody built-in advantages for the better off. For example, much town-planning legislation operates to protect the environmental amenity of wealthier areas far more than it does that of the poor. Class differentials in political effectiveness existed long before increasing public participation came on the scene.

Beyond that, the undoubted superior capacity of the better off to take advantage of participatory opportunities has to be counted as a cost of the reforms, to be set against their many merits. And as Richard Titmuss used to remark in a slightly different context, one argument for universal public services is that if the middle classes have to make use of them rather than escape from them into the private sector, they will deploy their energies and resources to improve them, and from that everyone will gain. Also, initiatives developed in enterprising communities may spread to become general practice.

A different problem concerns the relationship between voluntary participation and the professions whose skill is necessary in several services: medical practitioners, social workers, schoolteachers, planners, housing managers, municipal engineers, and so on. Most of the practitioners of these occupations work according to an ethic of devotion to the task in hand, to the achievement of substantive results within their service. They do not present the same problems as the blind forces of the market or the obtuseness of formal bureaucracy. And they do have forms of knowledge that limit the challenge the layman can make to their authority. However, they do tend to wield that knowledge as a mystique to shield them from criticism. Asserted but unargued "medical" or "educational" reasons may be an excuse to enable professionals to do what suits them. Penetrating this cover, and doing so in a way that achieves a proper balance between the rights of lay participation and the proper knowledge of the professional, is not easy. This problem is not limited to the area of public spending; it is inherent in any relationship between professional and client. But it is exacerbated by the nature of a public service.

In a private-sector relationship the client pays the professional a fee, and if he is dissatisfied with the service he goes elsewhere. Within the public service it is far more difficult because a government or local authority department is paying the fee or salary, and a transfer will need to be negotiated through its administration. People can sometimes change schools, less easily their general medical practitioner, never their housing manager.

Conservatives have recently suggested a method of easing the problem of transfer, at least within the school system, with the idea of educational vouchers parents may use to "buy" education at a school of their choice. Is this an alternative to participation? Vouchers have certain distinct advantages. Parents are required simply to make a decision about their own child; they make that decision themselves and can act on it immediately; the effect on a poor school of a sudden removal of children can be salutary, and fear of this occurring could be a pressure on teachers to keep up their standards. Against the directness of this form of "voting with one's feet," participation can be a difficult process, requiring organization, constant commitment to working for other people's as well as one's own children, and an attempt at improving an existing institution rather than moving from it to a known success.[34]

However, participation, if it can work, is likely to lead to more balanced improvements. The viability of a system for increasing choice depends very much on the choice that a given geographical area can provide; the number of secondary schools within reasonable distance of a great many children's homes is no more than one. Further, participation can do something to remedy the problem of inadequate knowledge already referred to; teachers and parents can work together to discuss educational problems. In contrast, a system of vouchers is likely to lead to panic removals from schools in response to rumors and misunderstandings.

A final gain from increased participation in the government of welfare-state institutions is the creation of a powerful lobby for the continuous improvement and strengthening of the social services and the maintenance of a high level of public spending. This will be vital in

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the years ahead. While defects remain in our existing pattern of public services, there can be no doubt that the essence of the socialist commitment to social expenditure remains valid. It is impossible to envisage an egalitarian politics, concerned with a man's collective and unmarketable needs, that will not have to divert resources from the unequal, individualized market process so that they can be put to communal use by popularly responsive public agencies. It is largely in the adequacy of our existing institutions to match up to the challenge of responsiveness that improvement is so badly needed.

Notes

[1] A sophisticated version of this argument can be derived from Fred Hirsch's thesis of positional goods, *The Social Limits of Growth* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976). He argues that there are many goods that can by their nature be enjoyed only by a minority, and that no improvements in the general standard of living can do anything to change this. To give just one example, not everyone can have a house overlooking the sea. Some of these situations are incapable of any remedy—no amount of educational reform will lead to everyone's child being top of the class—but others can be alleviated if there is communal provision of some of the goods in question, rather than private ownership. Thus it is far more intolerable for those of us without houses overlooking the sea if the whole coast is preempted by private building plots, and much better if stretches of it are left open to public access. In many cases, only publicly financed provision can provide this kind of access.

[2] Not all public spending has this effect: for example, taking an industry into public ownership involves public (capital) spending, but does not necessarily have any effect on demand.

[3] This is not entirely true: the extent to which demand is boosted will depend on the marginal propensity to consume of the initial recipients of the spending; but this is largely a technical question not immediately related to political principle.

[4] M. Kalecki, "Political Aspects of Full Employment," *Political Quarterly* 14 (1943).

[5] B. Semmel, *Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought 1895–1914* (London: Allen & Unwin, and Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960).

[6] I. Gough, *The Political Economy of the Welfare State* (London: Macmillan, and Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities, 1979).

[7] In many ways this reluctance to accept a large state role was peculiar to countries industrializing in the Anglo-Saxon pattern, with a long period of economic liberalism. In France, Scandinavia, and countries within the German political tradition, the state was more active in industrial development from the outset. As a result, public spending of various kinds was possible at an early stage; the legacy of this can still be seen in the high spending levels of governments in these countries, irrespective of contemporary political complexion. See, for example, Colin Crouch's "The Conditions for Trade Union Wage Restraint," in L. N. Lindberg and C. S. Maier, eds., *The Politics and Sociology of Global Inflation and Recession* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, forthcoming).

[8] T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge University Press, 1950).

[9] J. Harris, *William Beveridge: A Biography* (Oxford University Press, 1977); D. E. Moggridge, *Keynes* (London: Macmillan and Fontana, 1976); M. Stewart, *Keynes and After* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967).

[10] When government assistance to industry is taken into account, private enterprises in Britain have in fact been net *gainers* from the balance between taxation and public spending for many years. However, businessmen may still claim to respond to the effect of taxation on their personal incomes.

[11] D. Howell, *British Social Democracy* (London: Croom Helm, 1976).

[12] C. A. R. Crosland, *The Future of Socialism* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1956).

[13] J. K. Galbraith, *The Affluent Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1958; paper, New York: New American Library, 1978).

[14] It is not always clear whether the central concern of recent conservative writers is with individual freedom and natural rights—an essentially moral commitment —or with the technical criterion of efficiency. The two are not necessarily compatible. This issue really needs sustained philosophical analysis. For present purposes, comment will be restricted to a small number of critical observations, some of which are directed to the moral, others to the technical, versions of the doctrine.

[15] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

[16] J. Buchanan and R. Wagner, *Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes* (New York: Academic Press, 1977); also S. Brittan, "The Economic Contradictions of Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975).

[17] For a good discussion of these lines, see B.Barry, "The Inflation of Political Economy: A Study of the Political Theory of Some Economists," in Lindberg and Maier, eds., *Politics and Sociology of Global Inflation and Recession.*

[18] Downs's arguments apply most clearly to economies in the Anglo-American tradition. As pointed out in note 7, other political traditions have experienced less difficulty in achieving high levels of public expenditure—and have found it easier to levy the taxation to pay for them.

[19] By "internal" rationality I mean the clarity, objectiv-

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ity, and rule-governed nature of the process, and recognize implicitly that the substantive outcomes of the market are often irrational.

[20] W. D. Nordhaus, "The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Economic Studies* 42 (1975).

[21] See S. Blank, "Britain: The Politics of Foreign Economic Policy, the Domestic Economy and the Problem of Pluralist Stagnation," *International Organization* 31 (1977), no. 4; F. Longstreth, "The City, Industry and Economic Planning," in Colin Crouch, ed., *State and Economy in Contemporary Capitalism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979); S. Strange, *Sterling and British Policy* (Oxford University Press, 1971).

[22] J. M. Keynes, *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (London: Macmillan, and New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1936); also A. Martin, "The Dynamics of Change in a Keynesian Political Economy: The Swedish Case and Its Implications," in Crouch, ed., *State and Economy*. . . .

[23] Martin, "The Dynamics of Change. . . ," see note 22.

[24] Ibid., p. 105.

[25] A. H. Halsey, *Change in British Society: Based on the Reith Lectures* (Oxford University Press, 1978).

[26] R. H. S. Crossman, "The Role of the Volunteer in a Modern Social Service," in A. H. Halsey, ed., *Traditions of Social Policy* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1976).

[27] Halsey, *Change in British Society*, p. 85.

[28] Norman Dennis, *People and Planning: The Sociology of Housing in Sunderland* (London: Faber & Faber, 1970); also *Public Participation and Planners' Blight* (Faber & Faber, 1972).

[29] R. H. Titmuss, *The Gift Relationship: From Human Blood to Social Policy* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970, and New York: Pantheon, 1971).

[30] Hirsch, *Social Limits of Growth*.

[31] For some studies of the possibilities and limitations, see: C. Clarke, "Community Councils: Power to the People?" and G. Smith, R. Lees, and P. Topping, "Participation and the Home Office Community Development Project," both in Colin Crouch, ed., *British Political Sociology Yearbook, Vol. III: Participation in Politics* (London: Croom Helm, 1977); see also Stephen Hatch and Howard Glennerster, eds., *Positive Discrimination and Inequality* (London: Fabian Society, 1974), especially G. Green's chapter, "Towards Community Power"; A. Heath, "Sociology and Community Work: The Problem of Participation," in P. Evans, ed., *Community Work* (London: Arc Publications, 1971).

[32] C. A. R. Crosland, *Socialism Now and Other Essays* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), p. 67.

[33] Ibid., p. 90.

[34] Stemming from the work of A. O. Hirschman, in his study of problems of state-owned enterprises in Latin America, there has recently been considerable interest among political scientists in the difference between the alternative modes of "exit" (the market and analogous processes, where one expresses preference by "taking or leaving" an offered service) and "voice" (where one participates in decision-making within a service that one is incapable of "leaving"). Only too often public services eliminate the chances of "exit" without providing scope for "voice." See A. O. Hirschman, *Exit, Voice and Loyalty* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970). □

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(3) Type your ms *double-spaced* with *wide* margins. Check all your figures, dates, names, etc.—they're the author's responsibility.

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THE EDITORS □

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Rosette C. Lamont

Dog Meat – Notes from Poland

Last year, in May, I had occasion to revisit Warsaw, where I had stopped in 1974 on my way back from the Soviet Union. Détente, in 1974, was at its height, yet, when I reached Warsaw after a month in Russia, I felt as though I had crossed a time zone. The air was palpably free.

I embarked upon my return visit with a good deal of apprehension, thinking that the Warsaw I remembered would not be the one of today. This proved to be not entirely correct.

I had arranged, through Polish friends in New York, for a room in a private apartment. My hostess was a lady in her seventies, a widow, retired from her own professional activities as one of the city's leading architects.

Since I had arrived with heavy luggage I had hoped for some assistance. None was in evidence. I inquired whether the house had a janitor. "There is a woman downstairs," my landlady answered with a bit of hesitation, "but I avoid asking her for anything." I registered some surprise. After a while my hostess ventured: "I feel funny about this woman. You see she raises dogs. No, not as pets. For food." I suppose my face showed dismay. The lady went on in her quiet voice: "For meat. People come here and purchase her dogs for stew. You know, of course, that meat is scarce, rationed. An old woman like me can manage with no meat at all or very little, but for a family with children it is very difficult. Sometimes you can buy a whole pig from an independent farmer, but then you must slaughter the animal and dress it. In secret many families make their own sausages, and ham. It is not legal. Chickens are sold in the market with their feathers. For some reason there are plenty of eggs, but a chicken is a delicacy one can hardly afford. So my concierge has found a way of making ends meet. Sometimes I hear the dogs howl, and it gives me a creepy feeling. Most of us don't think of slaughter houses when we eat a piece of steak, but then we don't happen to live above one either."

I would have dismissed my landlady's story had I not noticed her warmth, wit, and lucid intellect. This was no Gothic novel I had stepped into but a bit of Polish quotidian reality. That night I woke up more than once, listening to the silence. In the morning I heard a yelp, but it turned out to be the sound of a healthy pet running through the yard. Yet my hostess's story revealed something to me about today's Poland.

I had come here to study the Polish theater and to see how much could get by the censor. Soon after my arrival I realized that there are two places in Poland where people find solace and feel relatively free: churches and theaters. The churches are always full, throughout the day, and many of the parishioners are young. Within the enclosed space of a theater a special spirit reigns as well. To laugh or applaud when a certain joke is made is a way of showing defiance, of entering into the friendship of a warm complicity with the audience.

One of the devices most commonly used lies in the presentation of well-known classics in novel, unexpected, even jarring ways. Familiar texts can be made to address the audience in the coded vocabulary of a parable. Of course, this presupposes a public educated in the fine art of deciphering messages that rely on inflection, mimicry, and the gestural aspects of production rather than on a careful rendition of the lines. The subtext tends to become the text.

A theater director explained to me: "Sometimes we realize that we are dealing with a special kind of audience. For example, a group, perhaps former members of Solidarity, will buy a block of seats for a certain performance. Officially, it is simply a

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circle of friends out on the town, but one always knows by the quality of the applause. You will also invariably see—as you did in my theater tonight—a couple of men who sit in stony silence. They are policemen in civilian clothes."

Although the theater is not beyond the pall of censorship—every new script must be submitted to the censor's office—this was one of the places where I felt among friends. A secret, unspoken alliance connects the audience, the actors, and the director. Listeners are not passive. Glances are exchanged, and applause and laughter become an act of defiance. Even the traditional tossing of flowers onto the stage at the end of performance becomes a demonstration. More often than not, the flowers in the bouquets are white and red, the national colors of Poland. Even the flowing script adapted for some program covers is an echo of the one that was developed for *Solidarność* posters and banners. Thus the script itself becomes a secret rallying sign.

ONE IS ALWAYS AWARE of the psychic energy released when like-minded members of a theater audience come together to watch a show. I remember being taken to see Slawomir Mrozek's *Pieszo* ("On Foot") on the evening of May 3, the anniversary of the 1791 Polish Constitution. In the afternoon, there had been numerous street demonstrations and clashes with the police. The audience was in a special mood that night.

Mrozek is a kind of resistance hero in Poland. He left his country 20 years ago and lives in Paris, but his plays are now performed all over Poland. For the past three years his *Pieszo* has been part of the regular repertory of Warsaw's Teatr Dramatyczny, the Polish equivalent of the Odéon in Paris, or London's Aldwych. Until last spring, the Dramatyczny was directed by Gustaw Holoubek, one of Poland's best actors. Holoubek, a liberal, served as a member of the Parliament during the time of Solidarity's official existence. People still speak of his brilliant speeches delivered during those months when "words could be used" (an eloquent phrase from an irreverent show written that same spring, *Clowni*). The present regime replaced Holoubek with Jan Pawel Gavlik, the former administrator of Cracow's Stary Teatr. It was rumored in Warsaw that Holoubek was moving to another theater, and that many of the company's leading actors were going to follow him. Holoubek is not the only theatrical director to have been summarily replaced. One of the government's policies is to keep the independent theater community on tenterhooks.

Mrozek's *Pieszo* is a powerful, disturbing drama that presents a cross section of Polish society cast adrift by the Second World War. For this production, Jerzy Jarocki, the director of the play, had one-third of the orchestra seats removed in order to extend the proscenium. This vast stage shows a desolate, barren field traversed by train tracks. The *dramatis personae* are an impoverished father and his son, a blasé aristocrat and his mistress, two partisan fighters, a Mother Courage type of canteen woman with her pregnant daughter who is an innocent victim of a rape by a gang of German soldiers, a professor of mathematics, and a mysterious, symbolic figure, the incarnation of Death on a rampage. The flotsam and jetsam of an irretrievably fractured society seem to have drifted to this spot in the absurd hope of catching some passing train. When a train comes at last, it does not stop: it is one of the cattle trains that carries prisoners to Auschwitz. "It was not for us," comments one of the characters.

The audience hears the train coming and passing. On the stage, its phantom presence is reflected on the upturned faces of the stranded human beings. Slowly they grasp their luck in having managed to slip through the iron spokes of the Nazi war machine. For the audience, the Auschwitz train is all the more real for having remained invisible. As though to fulfill the public's frustrated expectation, Jerzy Jarocki, a director who has been labeled "an irreverent neonaturalist," treats us to an exalting final image: tiny Soviet fighter bombers travel in formation across wires strung high above our heads. If they look like the toy planes they are, the illusion of height is all the more complete. Yet Mrozek and his director avoid the easy optimism of "socialist realism." The closing lines spoken by the father to his son are full of both resentment and weary acceptance: "They fly. We go on, on foot."

The thunderous applause of this Third of May audience demonstrated the public's identification with the plight of the Polish common man unawed by the technological prowess of a superpower, albeit, allegedly, a liberating one.

Last May's season was dominated by two productions of Witkiewicz's masterpiece *Szewcy* ("The Shoemakers"). As directed by Jerzy Krasowski for Warsaw's Teatr Polski, Witkiewicz's expressionist drama assumed the trappings of a good-natured folk operetta. The surface style, however, was being undermined, or derided, by the uncanny intrusion of vaudeville gags; moreover, the spectacle was bathed in an all-pervasive aura of gross sexuality. Yet the entire performance was punctuated by an ironically defiant chuckle rising

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from an extraordinarily comic actor, Bogdan Baer, who played the master shoemaker, Sajetan Tempe. Krasowski conveyed the idea that a bygone era of noble values and ideals was inexorably vitiated by demonic cravings for power, arising in the nicest and simplest of people, transforming them into monstrous tyrants.

Witold Skarouch's production of the same play for Stettin's Teatr Wspolozesny turned it into a terrifyingly contemporary tableau of political struggle for power. Gone is the traditional shoemakers' hut in the center of a naive village. Almost at once the characters find themselves trapped inside the iron mesh of a prison cell. The whole theater resounds with the grating noise of sliding metal gates, the pounding of feet marching on suspended prison walkways. The screams of the tortured are matched by the shouts of their executioners. The process of justice is ridiculed in the person of the Attorney General who is led on a leash by the grotesque aristocratic vamp, Irina Wsiewolodowna Zbereznicka-Podberezka. Skarouch brings to the fore the dramatist's doubts about the outcome of any revolution, however noble in its early planning stages. In the role of Sajetan Tempe, Tadeusz Zapaśnik looked like a caricatural amalgam of Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. At the end of the play we see his head being lopped off by his erstwhile associates who hope to rule in his place. The play ends with the shuffling appearance of faceless, ashen doubles, Comrade Abramowski and Comrade X, the new leaders of a bureaucratic state.

Poland's theater does not confine itself to a restaging of the classics, even such modern classics as the works of Witkiewicz and Mrozek. This past spring two shows were the focus of lively interest: Andrzej Strzelecki's *Clowni* ("Clowns") on the small stage of Hübner's Teatr Powszechny, and Andrzej Jarecki's *The Unforgettable Year 1961* at the Teatr Popularny. Both plays are musical revues, and both have casts made up of the finest students of the Warsaw Drama School. The youthful spirit of these two productions did much to strengthen their message of defiance. "There may be no salvation, but we'll just keep on hoping!" (The final song of *The Year 1961*).

IT IS ALWAYS POIGNANT to see Warsaw's young people, for they are the victims of the police and the special shock troops, the *zomos*. One day at lunchtime, I was talking with a stage director at the Writers' Club on the corner of Miodowa Street. Although the Writers' Union had been suspended, the club's dining room and café were still open. We discussed the heavy presence of the *zomos*, in front of the nearby Royal Castle. "Never mind," said my companion, "we're in no danger, you and I. The police are bent on clubbing the young." Prophetic words: ten days later the nineteen-year-old student Grzegorz Przemyk was arrested in the Old Town where he had stopped for a glass of wine with school friends. Taken to the police station, the young man was beaten to death. Przemyk's funeral was attended by some 50,000 people who had come from all over Poland—the most impressive demonstration since the imposition of martial law.

Poland is in no need of martyrs, yet young people risk their lives every day. Solidarity has been suppressed, but the spirit of solidarity is still very strong. A painter I met in Warsaw said to me: "Here, unlike in the Soviet Union, we never fear betrayal by our friends. There are no spies in our midst. Solidarity has remained a moral force. The Soviet Union cannot gulp us down; we'd stick in their throats."

The Poles may be forced to feed on dog meat, but they will never swallow their pride. □

Emanuel Geltman

Sclerosis of a Sect

Information comes second-hand, and it varies as to details. Fifty or more members of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers' party have been expelled, most of them old-timers. Apparently there were many differences, but what seems to have precipitated the expulsions is not so much that the "expellees" wanted to hold to traditional Trotskyism but that they spoke about their differences outside such channels of High Office as the SWP National Committee. They apparently took their case to mere party members.

Among those expelled are many who were leading members for decades: one was celebrated a few years ago in the *Militant* for his membership of 50

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years and time served in a Minnesota jail along with leaders of Teamsters' Local 544. (They were indicted under the Smith Act with, it is worth recalling, the applause of the Communist party, whose leaders were *later* indicted under the same Smith Act.)

Some literature has come to hand, too, and it's more confusing than illuminating. Like a foreign language once learned and forgotten, the language in these documents has to be relearned. Disputes, factions, even splits are common enough in political organizations. With several grouplets of expellees or voluntary exiles, dating back at least to 1977, getting at the whys and wherefores is not easy. The expellees, I gather, favored a degree of support to Solidarity; opposed Khomeini as a counterrevolutionary; preferred "*critical*" support of Castro. The official line favors Khomeini, opposes Solidarity, offers uncritical support for Castro—Cuba having replaced Russia in the canon. One of the theoreticians of the SWP proposed to jettison Trotsky—arguing that he was wrong whenever he differed with Lenin, that "the permanent revolution" (a cornerstone of Trotskyist theory) was wrong.

There are at least four grouplets, of which only one has gone public: "Social Action." One group wants to form a new International, with Cuba at its center! Castro, however, doesn't seem eager to receive them, or to give them the time of day.

There is something ludicrous in the twirling of these sects, but one feels also just a little sadness. Trotsky clobbered the opposition in true Marxist-Leninist fashion; he had a talent for sharp polemic, to put it mildly. But expulsion? That's what *Stalinists* did. Or keep expelled members from attending *public* meetings? That, too, is happening, just as years ago when some of us tried to attend Stalinist meetings.

I remember coming around, at about age 16, to the Trotskyist movement. Big issues were at stake, which I may or may not have understood: China, industrialization in Russia. What caught my fancy most was a certain spirit of open debate. Leaders argued in public! It took a few years before I, and others, began to think that people outside the party—Russians in particular—also deserved full democratic rights.

Some issues are so grave, there is no way out except to separate. But it is a sad spectacle: old-timers, who have devoted a lifetime to their beliefs, expelled from a "Trotskyist" organization for being undeviating Trotskyists. Another "ism" is taking over. You name it. □

Marvin E. Rozen

Sabotage, Anomie, and the Economy

In *The Engineers and the Price System*, Thorstein Veblen defined "sabotage" as "the conscientious withdrawal of efficiency" from productive activity. He then enlarged its meaning from signifying spiteful and covert destruction to embracing all restrictive practices—of firms as well as of workers—that aim to reduce supply as price-raising and market-managing strategies. I shall extend this Veblenian notion of sabotage to: (1) the numerous work situations where adverse conditions also tend to generate this "conscientious withdrawal of efficiency," and (2) a parallel and more general phenomenon whereby social interactions in modern industrial societies tend to generate "anomie" or "the conscientious withdrawal of trust." Sabotage thus can arise from unmotivated, resentful, and antagonistic attitudes induced by bad work conditions; and anomie can take the form of an increased desire for privatization, aloof and unsympathetic attitudes toward others, and a disbelief in the possibility and/or efficacy of collective action. Both sabotage and anomie, I believe, already pose significant social problems, and their influence is likely to grow.

I: Sabotage

What is it about contemporary work and life that leads to the conscientious withdrawal of efficiency and trust? How do these tendencies manifest themselves? Taking work first, at least four separate considerations tend to promote sabotage.

(1) The classic Veblen case is still very much alive: fears concerning job security—not wanting to work oneself out of a job—cause many workers to slow the work pace. Slowdowns and pressures against high performance can also be motivated by the fear that today's production overfulfillment will become tomorrow's output norm. Even when work is highly controlled, some self-pacing will be possible. One powerful tactic in a labor dispute is to follow work rules and job duties meticulously and to the letter. The consequent chaos is a vivid reminder of how workers can influence their work pace.

(2) Working conditions themselves induce sabotage; monotonous, repetitive, short-cycle, dead-end

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jobs do not call forth Veblen's "instincts of workmanship." Something is wrong with the world of work. And what could be a more natural and direct response to dehumanizing jobs than deliberate underperformance? If work does not draw upon a full range of skill and effort, is it likely that these capabilities will be brought to bear on the shriveled tasks the worker confronts?

(3) Conditions on the job reflect an ongoing conflict. Continuous adjustment of work rules and monitoring/surveillance takes place in response to changing work performance. Such adjustments—some tightening supervision, others meliorating harsh conditions—are the most likely countermoves to sabotage; but where adversarial relations are prominent, intensified supervision usually breeds new forms of sabotage. As Richard Edwards has suggested, the workplace is "contested terrain." Increased sabotage becomes a likely response to intensified and malign supervision.

(4) A low-trust society that seems unfair to large elements of its population and thereby forfeits its claim for respect can cause increasing sabotage. Work becomes a natural channel through which social antagonism finds expression. If life appears to be one big rip-off, work presents opportunities for getting even.

II: Anomie

WHAT ARE THE MAJOR CONSIDERATIONS behind a conscientious withdrawal of trust? What brings about this guarded, egocentric, mind-your-own-business, life-is-a-jungle outlook where, as described by British sociologist John Goldthorpe, "... each group [focuses] on its own deprivations and on improving its own position within the existing institutional order or, at all events, with little apparent concern for the building of some radically different one"?

These trends reflect, first, powerful sociocultural influences that long have been molding attitudes—most significantly, factors directly touching our individual lives. The focus of our lives has become increasingly privatized. The uprootedness and mobility of modern society, the declining sense of identification with place, a consumerist ethos with its emphasis on quick gratification, the exaltation of individualistic goals, the growth of large bureaucratic organizations, and the depersonalization of much work and social contact—all push us toward a concern for private goals. Ultimately, such single-minded pursuit of private interest will prove futile, because it undermines the social order whose health is a precondition for the realization of private ambitions.

Yet even as our lives are privatized, we enter an era of increasing organization. Groups formerly subordinated are insistently, if often unsuccessfully, demanding their long-deferred share. Group loyalty grows at the expense of broader allegiances. To emphasize group identification is also to accentuate differences with those outside the narrowly defined group. In this way pluralism may be linked to anomie, which will erode more widely held universalistic beliefs.

Independently of the growth of pluralism, finally, the power of unifying ideological beliefs has declined. For one thing, to the extent that previous ideologies projected a false consciousness of the real world, their demise was inevitable. Our American myths—such as equality, the melting pot, abundant opportunity for all, classlessness—were always larger than life and, however useful as ideals, they could not meet the test of comparison with reality. For another, the complexity and magnitude of major public questions are overwhelming. Despairing of successfully grappling with very complicated issues, or relying on people who seem to know more, we seek to escape into our private worlds. Thus public responsibilities are abdicated.

Although a seemingly reasonable and proper response from each individual's point of view, in the aggregate such behavior turns out to have undesirable consequences. Attempts to achieve individual and small-group solutions are unlikely to succeed. Trust will decline, and its absence will matter more.

Several factors magnify the impact of lessened trust. Economic interdependence in a modern industrial order runs counter to the strong drives for greater privatization and small-group association. Closely related is the growing significance of "prisoners' dilemma" choices that face society, when the structure of rewards and penalties often leads to choosing the worst alternative. Because one group assumes that another will act on short-run and selfish considerations, and vice-versa, the combined effect of each group acting upon these assumptions produces the worst outcome of all. Mutual suspicion and seemingly unbridgeable differences of goals prevent the formation of lasting coalitions.

One last factor determining the growth of anomie is the persistent inequality in the distribution of income, wealth, power, and privilege in the face of public expectation of greater equality. Such disparities are widely (but not universally) perceived as unjustified, excessive, and rigged ar-

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rangements benefiting the minority of the rich and powerful. Small wonder that when the public is thus confronted with disturbing outcomes, rigged rules of the game, and unavailing reform, anomie is the most likely response.

Anomie, thus, can be interpreted as individualized response to the fact of social impotence.

III: How It Works

ONCE SABOTAGE AND ANOMIE TAKE HOLD, for whatever reason, each will get worse, and will exacerbate the other, as diminishing efficiency undermines social trust and diminishing trust impairs efficiency. Increased monitoring/surveillance seems a natural managerial reaction to declining effort and efficiency, but in an environment that fosters sabotage it will increase resentment and hostility. These attitudes, in turn, will motivate more sabotage, setting in motion an action/reaction process in which the "cure" may be worse than the "disease."

The centrality of the work role and the fact of its major claim on our time influence our leisure activities. Mean and dispiriting jobs cast a long shadow over off-the-job lives; Alan Fox, a British sociologist, has termed this process a "low-trust dynamic." Clearly, this low-trust dynamic heightens self-absorption and narrow participation in groups, inhibits common action, and usually entails less sympathy and understanding for, and hence less accommodation to, the views of other groups.

Anomie also feeds upon itself. Increasing suspicion of others and greater privatization tend to be both self-justifying and self-perpetuating. Unfortunately they may also seem, from an individual perspective, optimizing and rational responses. Given the increasing complexity of choice and the consequently high cost incurred by the necessary search, information, and organization associated with common efforts, individual solutions may offer more promise than group actions based upon trusting others. And, of course, the worst of all possible strategies might be to place undeserved or unrequited trust in others. By reinforcing the motivation for lowered trust, the decline of trust is made certain.

Anomie also has consequences for the job, which becomes the natural channel for a strongly held sense of generalized resentment. Sabotage becomes a form of revenge against all those larger and unreachable forces that frustrate one's ambitions. Feelings of distrust find expression in the single activity that most ties one to others. "Getting even" and "getting back" then can become important motivators, as deteriorating trust finds outlet for expression in one's work.

IV: Economic Implications

IN THE CONTEXT of the recent recession and the present recovery, these implications of sabotage and anomie may have special relevance. Consider anomie first. Inflation has been termed by Fox the "supreme symbolic expression of low-trust society." The virulence, persistence, and intractability of inflation in modern industrial societies, despite extensive efforts to control it, suggest that traditional monetary-fiscal policies alone are unable to achieve the joint goals of high employment and reasonable price stability. The mechanisms behind this incompatibility of objectives have been largely sociological. Policy commitments to high employment, by strengthening the bargaining position of organized economic interest groups, lead to intense jockeying among such groups to enlarge or maintain their income share by raising the price of what they sell. Such price increases are, in turn, "validated" when policy-makers are pressured to expand money demand sufficiently to honor their high-employment commitments. The absence of trust sustains this process by encouraging preemptive price increases, and inflation becomes the inevitable accompaniment of relatively high levels of employment.

Our usual defense against high rates of inflation has been to renege on the high-employment commitment and deliberately engineer an economic slowdown. Not only is this a tremendously wasteful policy; it is also an increasingly ineffectual and therefore costly one. As James Tobin wrote prophetically in 1980:

> Conceivably the economy is moving to ever higher rates of unemployment that impose no greater discipline on wage increases. After another half-decade of stagflation, the fear of acceleration is likely to be as great an impediment to expansion at 7 or 8 percent unemployment as it has recently been at 6 percent.

In principle, joint employment price-stability goals would be attainable if incomes policies, or "social contract" agreements in general, could be used in conjunction with monetary-fiscal policies, since bargaining over income shares would then take place within the context of standards of fairness generally accepted by all parties. But in sharply divided and low-trust societies, it is unlikely that such income policies can be successfully implemented.

Sabotage, in this connection, is significant

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largely because of its consequences for productivity. Declining productivity growth rates have been perhaps the most discouraging feature of our recent economic history, and they contribute importantly to the sense of economic malaise. The productivity slowdown also seriously exacerbates the difficulty of accommodating the various income claimants. Although most explanations for declining productivity do not stress sabotage, the morale and attitude factors behind sabotage must have profoundly retardant effects. If workers do not fully use their productive capabilities, the cumulative impact upon productivity is bound to be significant.

V: Remedies

TWO SHARPLY CONTRASTING OPTIONS are possible. One, the current Administration's, is the path of fear and threat. It seeks to counteract the consequences of anomie and sabotage by using the pain and fear of prolonged high unemployment to restrain wages and intensify work effort. The reserve army of the unemployed will make workers more accommodating, more content with less, and more willing to work harder. Prolonged recessions, argue those who recommend this option, are necessary to bring about fundamental changes in worker attitudes—improving work incentives, wage behavior, and labor discipline. Chastened and subdued workers, after having faced the harsh pressures of market forces, will no longer be a source of trouble for the economy. Anomie will become irrelevant, and sabotage virtually eliminated.

Now that recovery is under way, this policy confronts its critical test. Has the medicine worked, so that the period of economic suffering has, by disciplining workers, paved the way for sustained and vigorous growth? Or will the economy lapse into its old ways as expansion proceeds and the fear of unemployment recedes? And will the Administration's divisive domestic and reckless foreign policies create circumstances that strictly economic measures cannot possibly overcome? The odds are, in my view, heavily against the Administration.

The other road is one of responding more positively to the underlying social pressures that generate sabotage and anomie. A three-part attack is required. First, work itself needs to be restructured to overcome the inherent contradiction between worker aspirations and the reality of inadequate jobs. Second, the large and unjustified disparities in income, wealth, power, and privilege must be narrowed. In both areas, once the present economic policies have failed, there will be opportunities for more constructive measures.

In a different political climate, reorganizing work and augmenting economic opportunity will have their chance tomorrow, if the coalitions needed for such programs can be built today. Such coalitions can be based on some simple and compelling ideas: new forms of work organization can liberate great economic energy and respond to people's desires for more satisfactory jobs; in the process of narrowing socioeconomic disparities, sources of hope and trust for many people will be renewed. In these more favorable circumstances, more cooperative solutions to the conflicts over income shares will be forthcoming; the benefits from a more equal society flow in many directions, and improve all our lives in numerous and complex ways. From this perspective, recent economic policy can be most charitably viewed as a last-ditch effort to resolve the complexities of an interdependent economy by relying on the principle of each-man-for-himself. The inconsistency between the fundamental condition of extensive linkage and the presumption that a resurgent individualism can conquer all dooms this effort to failure.

But only after the first two steps—work reorganization and narrowing disparities—can the third initiative, increasing trust, make rapid progress. Anomie and sabotage cannot be magically dissolved, and trust established, by promises of wonders-to-come; practical accomplishments are necessary. Although explicit conflict-resolution mechanisms and institutional reinforcement for greater cooperation need to be developed, most important is to make the start. Social experimentation generates its own data for refining, modifying, or rejecting different approaches.

Once started, an upward spiral is likely to be in operation, as each positive step sustains the next. Clearly, increasing trust among modern society's diverse and conflicting elements is no easy task and flies in the face of much history and many countervailing pressures. But the longest journey must always begin with the first step, and the sooner begun, the better off we'll be. Although we may strive for perfection, modest improvements on what is can yield substantial benefits over what would otherwise be. □

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Alan Trachtenberg

Bile from the Literary Right

THE AIR-LINE TO SEATTLE: STUDIES IN LITERARY AND HISTORICAL WRITING ABOUT AMERICA, by Kenneth S. Lynn. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 227 pp. $17.50.

The first oddity about Kenneth Lynn's book of once-published pieces is its title. True, the locomotive on the dust jacket gives away what kind of line is an air-line, but who would have guessed that this particular railroad passed through Cambridge on its ineluctable way west—or at least did so in 1900, when the Spanish-born Harvard philosopher George Santayana delivered himself one October evening before the student Signet Club of a satiric poem joyfully mocking the smug gentility of his Harvard colleagues. Well might the Yard believe it has safely enclosed itself against the importunate world, that it has "shut the mucker-village out," wrote the philosopher-poet,

> Yet the smoke of trade and battle
> Cannot quite be banished hence,
> And the air-line to Seattle
> Whizzes just behind the fence.

A literary allusion, then, the title evokes that workaday world of machines and dirt and blood held at arm's length by what Santayana some years later would dub, in his famous lecture of 1911, "the Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy." It evokes "reality," and as he explains in his prologue, Lynn wants to pursue Santayana's theme into the present, to show that a "hermetic mentality" still rules "the nation's intelligentsia," that indeed "the spirit of the genteel tradition is triumphantly alive in American thought."

Lynn, a professor of history at Johns Hopkins and author of several works in American studies, including a major biography of William Dean Howells, thus appropriates Santayana, yet with a curious twist. For the Harvard philosopher "genteel" meant conservative and reactionary. Lynn would have us believe it meant something like antibusiness, anticapitalist, even anti-American. He would have us believe that Santayana's poem of 1900 as well as his lecture of 1911 were addressed against the likes of William James, whose denunciation of the annexation of the Philippines as a "shameless betrayal of American principles" that reeked of "greed, ambition, corruption, and imperialism" Lynn characterizes as "moralistic lamentations," a prefiguring of the latter-day gentility, which so upsets him—that of "the sons of the genteel tradition" who are "too affronted by their native land to study it with care." Since he does not provide footnotes or clear guidelines, it is not at all clear whether, in the following sentence, Lynn is paraphrasing or quoting directly from Santayana, though the disapproval is unmistakable:

> James simply could not see that in the context of America's drive to acquire far-flung bases for which Alfred Thayer Mahan had persuasively argued in his recent book on the influence of naval power upon history, the Declaration of Independence was nothing but "a piece of literature, a salad of illusions."

It may well be true that Santayana disagreed with his friend's anti-imperialist stance or even thought it naive; but the impression left by Lynn that Santayana ranked William James among the genteel is so grossly wrong as to seem dishonest and self-serving. The judgment of dishonesty becomes all but unavoidable when we read that Santayana exempted only Whitman and Henry James from the taint of gentility, when in fact he devoted close to a quarter of his lecture to an account of how William James had "broken the spell of the genteel tradition," had given it "a rude shock" and led it "a merry dance."

WHY SUCH AN EXTREME DISTORTION? Lynn wishes to recruit Santayana for the sake of a covering argu-

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ment for the 16 separate pieces that comprise the book. But detailed elaboration of an argument is really not the purpose of such a book. Known recently as an acerbic neoright reviewer for *Commentary* and the *American Scholar*, where most of these pieces first appeared, Lynn holds his book together more by a consistency of tone and stance than by any clear and positive statement of his point of view (as distinct from his positions on particular issues). The aim of the collection seems to be to expose and excoriate what Lynn calls in the prologue the "host of dubious theories, old and new," which have guided studies of America since the 1960s, for him a decade of unspeakable political error and betrayal. These historical and literary studies by the "professoriat" (the term, like "intelligentsia," fairly reeks of contempt in Lynn's frequent use of it) followed the path of William James and condemned the war in Vietnam as "a wicked sin."

But neither the covering argument that poses the "reality" of the air-line (which we can take as a shorthand symbol for industrial capitalism and its expansive energies) against the "gentility" of professors and intellectuals nor the bravura of name-calling and even red-baiting succeeds in lending the book the substance we might expect from an authority on American culture, one of the professoriat himself. The book is as much an emotional as a political outlet, a venting of revulsion. It is a book of angry judgments, not a reasoned analysis and discourse. A serious conservative critique of recent American scholarship would be welcome as an opportunity for exchange across ideological lines. But this book is entirely lacking in self-reflection upon its ideological stance. Ideology here seems inseparable from that strange amalgam of acrimony, self-righteousness, perhaps envy, which makes many of the pieces such lively if also such exasperating reading—the mean-spirited personal attacks, for example, on the likes of Garry Wills ("shameless pandering to leftist prejudices"), C. Vann Woodward ("his own eagerness to please present-day spokesmen for blacks and women"), Alfred Kazin ("this starry-eyed opportunist"), and many others. Lynn wields a pen dripped in bile.

Is there also a current here of the phenomenon Richard Hofstadter portrayed, the paranoid hatred of what Lynn calls "modern-day intellectuals and their terrible need for radical myths"? A barely suppressed fury seems to well up, for example, against that "crowd of clever writers" who teach *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* as a "condemnation of American life." And the source of this "Dropoutsville" reading of Mark Twain's classic?

> The habitual tendency of American intellectuals to view family life as dreary, repressive, conducive to the sickness, rather than the health, of husbands and wives, parents and children, has also figured in the critical distortion of the novel, as has the anti-Americanism that has been part of campus life ever since the mid-1960s.

Here is backlash with a vengeance, and not a little frightening: *habitual tendency*? The emotion seems to have a constricting effect upon the book's perspective, indeed, upon the issues to which Professor Lynn attaches critical importance: whether or not Emerson married his first wife for her money, whether Whitman thought of homosexuality as "illness," or whether Hemingway's "wound" is really a key to his work. At first it might seem that as a reviewer Lynn is wont to quibble, to pick quarrels, particularly in abusive language. Does anyone believe that Emerson's reason for marrying can matter as much as his theory, say, of self-reliance? Or Whitman's attitude toward his own sexual ambivalence as much as the vision of sexuality in the *Calamus* poems? On the face of it, a number of Lynn's particular discussions seem to trivialize their subjects. But the disjunction between such themes and the apparently larger, more

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substantial ones concerning, say, the interpretation of Jefferson in the review of Wills's *Inventing America*, or the attack on "The Regressive Historians" (Bernard Bailyn, Leo Marx, Eugene Genovese) for permitting their experiences of the 1960s to color their views of the past is only apparent.

Significantly, a preponderant number of essays (9 out of 16) deal with biographies or autobiographies; in addition, the longest, most substantial essay, "The Rebels of Greenwich Village" (its point is to show that they did not fit the stereotype of Midwesterners in flight from a small town) consists of many biographies interwoven skillfully into a collective portrait. This attention to private life itself makes a point, underscored in reviews of biographies of Maxwell Perkins, Frederick Lewis Allen, and Walter Lippmann, that relations to parents, wives, husbands and lovers, and to one's own sexuality, ambition, and frustrations count for more than do the conceptual or ideological explanations typically offered by "post-1960s" historians and biographers. What attracted Maxwell Perkins to the glamorous Scott Fitzgerald had less to do with aesthetic judgment or respect for talent than a kind of vicarious compensation for the editor's own repressed, unhappy existence. Similarly, we learn more about the complexities of Walter Lippmann's mind from his personal life than from the public positions he took, particularly his opposition to the Vietnam war toward the end of his career. Against ideological interpretation as such (itself faintly tinged with "anti-Americanism") Lynn proposes an anti-ideology of private life, a view in which desire, appetite, and self-seeking replace ideas, institutions, political commitments, and historical forces as sources of explanation.

This shifting of the grounds of explanation and interpretation is the most significant feature of Lynn's book, obscured as it might be by the splenetic character of the writing. As the essay on Emerson makes clear, the focus on private life, moreover, serves a distinctly ideological purpose. For Emerson has deceived us, Lynn writes, into believing in the autonomy and self-reliance of ideas, of critical thinking. "Just as Emerson himself denied the inherent worth of sensuous experience and gloried in the vaporousness of an ideal world, so his biographers have traditionally underemphasized his life as a man and overemphasized his life as thinker." This is a remarkable sentence—remarkably misleading or simply obtuse in regard to the high importance of direct sensuous experience in Emerson's theory of language and of mind, but even more remarkable for its anti-intellectualism. In writing about a thinker, how is it possible to overemphasize "his life as a thinker"? Emerson's assertion of an independent life of the mind as the source of critical ideas regarding culture and politics lies at the heart of that tradition of democratic thought in America—radical as well as liberal—Professor Lynn wishes to denounce. Along with Jefferson, Emerson is the figure most often claimed by critical intellectuals as fountainhead and inspiration. (Earlier in the book Lynn performed a similar devastation upon the reputation of Jefferson, charging as "shameless pandering" to a "post-1960s" "cult of equality and 'human rights' " Garry Wills's view of the Declaration of Independence as a document founded in communalism rather than Lockean individualism).

To reduce Emerson's thought to a "dirty little secret" concerning his first wife's wealth (did he marry Ellen Tucker knowing full well the likelihood of her early death and her bequest of a fortune? Lynn seems to know he did) is to challenge the integrity especially of the famous Phi Beta Kappa address of 1837, "The American Scholar," which Lynn describes as calling upon students "to avoid involvement in business, spurn material values, dedicate themselves to the life of the mind." In fact the lecture can be more properly described as doing just the opposite; it urges young scholars to take an active role in practical life, to leave their studies for the street, to "embrace the common," to "explore and sit at the feet of the familiar, the low," not to spurn the marketplace but to learn from it. But we can let that pass as a fine distinction, accuracy of literary interpretation not being one of the higher virtues professed by the book. More to the point is the purpose of this portrayal of Emerson as a deceiver of the young who hid the "dirty little secret" that he enjoyed "a subsidy and that the source of the subsidy was the business fortune of a Boston merchant."

The essay's final paragraph gives away the motive:

> Ever since it was delivered, the "American Scholar" address has been a holy text for American intellectuals who like to believe that they are morally superior beings who have risen above their countrymen's worship of money. They thus have a vested interest in not learning anything about the author of the address that might . . . discredit him. American intellectuals in general, like Emerson's biographers in particular, have never wished to know that the cold young man who successfully sought the hand of Ellen Tucker was in no less hot pursuit of vulgar prosperity than the most barbaric businessman of the age.

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The passage is so eloquent of motive and strategy one hesitates to comment upon it, it is so perfectly itself. Of course, it is obvious that the method of attack is strictly *ad hominem*, laced in sarcasm. What in fact *do* those nameless "intellectuals" have to say about their compatriots' worship of money? We never hear, just as, earlier, the opposition to the Vietnam war is summed up in the ridiculously empty comment, "a wicked sin." There is yet another trick here. In the end the ploy does not so much discredit Emerson—after all, is not the hot pursuit of wealth exactly what the airline to Seattle represents?—as it frees those poor maligned businessmen from the imputation of barbarism. Perhaps the hot pursuit is nothing to be ashamed of in any case.

By such a logic Professor Lynn seems to believe he has cut the ground from under the more credulous among his fellows in the professoriat. It is a polemicist's logic, not that of an analyst, a critic, or a historian. The bristling aggression of Lynn's attacks barely disguises the syllogistic tricks and character assassinations—including the rough McCarthy-like beating to which Malcolm Cowley is treated—just beneath the surface. Nor does it obscure the ideological thrust. There is sleight-of-hand here. Look to the man, not his ideas, the argument goes, in an inversion of D. H. Lawrence's advice to "trust the tale, not the teller." Meanwhile a major ideological proposition insinuates itself: wealth, capitalism, inequality may not be so bad after all, perhaps not even imperialism, particularly if we call it something like "the ebullient spirit of a burgeoning empire." A pity Professor Lynn chose not to address these issues in their own right, the issues of class, war, and democracy that have vexed American society and its intellectual life for at least a century—an open and serious exposition of his views might have resulted in a more usefully contentious book. □

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Ron H. Feldman

Pictures from the Other Israel

IN THE LAND OF ISRAEL, by Amos Oz. Translated by Maurie Goldberg-Bartura. San Diego and New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 257 pp. $12.95.

In October and November 1982, following the most controversial military campaign in Israeli history, Amos Oz set out to take the pulse of his country by talking to people from different walks of life. The result, *In the Land of Israel*, is a report of this journey through the human landscape of "The Land."

The essays in this volume had already attracted a great deal of interest when they appeared as a series in *Davar*, the newspaper of the Histadrut, Israel's labor federation. Oz uses his literary skills to create highly polished portraits of the people who live in this land of harsh landscapes and brilliant light. The picture presented is both troubling and unforgettable.

It may seem strange that Oz, who is one of Israel's foremost literary figures, would need to rediscover his own country. He could hardly be more "Israeli": not merely a native and an author, Oz is a kibbutz member, a frequent spokesman for Peace Now, and well-known as a standard-bearer of the labor Zionist movement that has led the country to independence. But Israel has changed after 15 years of occupying the West Bank and Gaza, six years of rule by the Likud and, finally, the war in Lebanon. Not only is it no longer the place it used to be, but Israelis like Oz have seen the Israel they tried to build unravel.

OZ BEGINS HIS JOURNEY in Jerusalem. In the neighborhood where he grew up he encounters the rebirth of the Diaspora in the heart of the Jewish state. "The Kingdom of *Yiddishkeit*" spreads out from the ultra-Orthodox enclave of Mea Shearim. "Yiddish is the language of the street. Zionism was here once and was repelled." Anti-Zionist sentiment is strong in these neighborhoods, despite the destruction of the Holocaust, for these people believe that Jews should piously await the Messiah's arrival. The local graffiti read: "There is no Kingdom but the Kingdom of the Messiah" and, next to a Swastika, "Death to the Zionist Hitlerites." Oz

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concludes that "only Hitler and the Messiah are alive and well here, burning like twin pillars of fire."

Not only in Mea Shearim, it seems, but elsewhere as well. In what is probably the book's most shocking essay, Oz encounters a self-described "Judeo-Nazi" in one of the old and well-established agricultural villages. Full of hatred for "Zhids"—Jews like Oz who are "tender and delicate"—this "Judeo-Nazi" believes that "a people that let itself be slaughtered and destroyed . . . is a worse criminal than its tormentors. Worse than the Nazis." And that man is pleased with the war in Lebanon, not only because Israel has further expanded its borders—"the dirty work of Zionism isn't finished yet"—but because it has produced a "bonus" of increased anti-Semitism, which will force Jews to leave the Diaspora for Israel. Oz is horrified and dumbfounded by this man and can only wonder whether "Hitler not only killed the Jews but also infected them with his poison."

While Hitler is alive for the "Judeo-Nazi," the Messiah's footsteps are heard by members of Gush Emunim (the "Bloc of the Faithful"), the movement that spearheaded the settlement drive in the West Bank. Oz is a known opponent, yet they openly speak with him in their villages perched on the rocky hills of Judea and Samaria.

• Gush Emunim has attracted the support of many young Israelis, particularly those educated in the religious public schools. "The Land of Israel" was promised to the Jewish people by God, they tell Oz, and "what the Lord, Blessed be He, gave us we may not give away as a gift." The redemption of the People of Israel is tied to the redemption of the Land of Israel; therefore, "the war over the Land of Israel is a war over life and death, and it is still very far from over." The Arabs who live in the land do so not by right but by the mercy of its Jewish owners. Not unlike Khomeini, Gush Emunim rejects modern Western culture as foreign to the Jews, disdaining secular Israelis for their decadence.

Precisely because they are ideologically motivated, Gush Emunim poses a serious threat to Oz's Zionism. While his views are implicit in the book, Oz presents them explicitly in only one essay, "An Argument on Life and Death." This is the political and philosophical climax of the volume, after which the angry tone abates.

In an impassioned polemic delivered in a West Bank settlement, Oz defends the principles and actions of the labor movement, which created the kibbutzim and founded the country. He advocates a cultural pluralism based on the encounter between Jews and Western humanism that will result in an open, creative, just, and progressive society. Oz uses religious terminology to attack the cults of militarism, statism, power, and "the integrity of the Land of Israel": "The conversion of statehood and its trappings from a means to an end, to an object of ritual and worship was, as far as I am concerned, idolatry."

Oz warns that territorial compromise with the Arabs is essential to Israel's future. "You people are convinced that to relinquish Judea and Samaria would endanger the existence of the State of Israel. I think that annexation of these regions endangers the existence of the State of Israel." For Oz this is no mere difference of opinion, but "a controversy over the nature of Zionism and even the meaning of Jewish destiny." He is worried that "if my hosts succeed in their cause, they may drag both me and my children with them, to kill and die in a perpetual and unnecessary war, or perhaps turn Israel into a monster like Belfast, Rhodesia, or South Africa." He therefore concludes with the question that he repeatedly asks in his interviews: "If the price of a Greater Land of Israel is to tear this nation apart and create a life-and-death issue, is it worth this price?"

• While the ideological right wing poses the most serious threat to Oz's vision of Israel, the Oriental (Sephardic) Jews provided the mass support that put the Likud in power. The conflict between Ashkenazim and Sephardim may not be ideological, but it constitutes one of Israel's most explosive social problems and the labor movement's most critical failure. Not surprisingly, one of Oz's most depressing visits is paid to Beit Shemesh, a town in the Jerusalem foothills, not far from his kibbutz. Most of Beit Shemesh's inhabitants are Jews who immigrated from Arab countries. Here hatred for the Labor party, the kibbutzim, and the Ashkenazic establishment runs deep. This anger and its causes are given vent: the people of Beit Shemesh remember with bitterness how they were housed in slums and shantytowns when they arrived, were treated as second-class citizens and were left no option but to do menial labor, and how their self-respect was torn away.

"You love the Arabs as much as you hate the Oriental Jews," they tell Oz. However unideological for many Oriental Jews, this perspective results in a strong motivation to hold onto the West Bank and Gaza: "If they give back the territories, the Arabs will stop coming to work, and then and there you'll put us back into the dead-end jobs, like

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before. If for no other reason, we won't let you give back those territories."

• If the Oriental Jews feel they have been treated as second-class citizens, then the Arabs who live in the Land of Israel might feel they're third-class, or worse. Nevertheless, the Palestinians with whom Oz speaks are moderate in comparison to many right-wing Jews.

The views of the Palestinian intelligentsia are expressed by the staff of the East Jerusalem newspaper *Al-Fajr*. Oz finds these Arab journalists prepared to accept territorial compromise and coexistence with Israel. *Al-Fajr's* literary editor claims, "My hatred is dead. Now I have only bitterness and anger, but no more hatred. There's nothing we can do about it: here in this land we are welded together, Jews and Arabs, forever."

Meanwhile, the sentiments of the Palestinian working class are expressed by two young men Oz meets in a Ramallah café.

> Everyone in the West Bank wants peace—the big shots and the little people. Write: They're sick of wars. Why should they die? Write that the Arabs deserve a piece [of land], too. Don't write "the Arabs." Write "the Palestinians"; that's more correct.

The final word belongs to an old Arab farmer:

> Write that the land doesn't belong to the Jews or to the Arabs. The land is God's. Whoever finds favor in His eyes will receive His land. God alone decides. And whoever does evil will pay the price: God will pass over him and forget him.

• God also figures in the perspective of Father Dubois, a long-time Jerusalem resident who teaches philosophy at the Hebrew University. Calm and compassionate, Father Dubois believes that throughout Israel, but particularly in Jerusalem, a deep struggle between good and evil is taking place, "perhaps the central battle of our time, in universal terms." He suggests that the Jews are being tested, and that the primary struggle is among the Jews themselves.

> Every person who has the Spirit of God in him loves the People of Israel and prays for its triumph in the struggle—for its triumph over itself. There is great hope, and perhaps that is why the Devil is angry and interferes in almost everything here. But in the place where the Devil is at work the Spirit of God can be found. Surely the Lord is in this place.

OZ DOES NOT FINISH his pilgrimage in Jerusalem, but in two rather unlikely locales that embody his vision of a "sane" Zionism: the quaint farming village of Bat Shlomo and the new port city of Ashdod. Through his discussion with an elderly couple in Bat Shlomo, Oz portrays the original Zionist dream of Jews returning to the land, becoming farmers, and living honestly by the sweat of their brow. This, of course, is in sharp contrast to the Israel of today, where the stock market is a national obsession, Arabs do the menial work, and an artificial prosperity has been contrived through a ballooning foreign debt.

The labor Zionist dream symbolized by Bat Shlomo has been realized and abandoned; like the town itself, those who still believe in it seem like museum pieces. But Oz finds a new vision of Israel's future in the development town of Ashdod,

> a small Mediterranean city, a pleasant city, unpretentious, with a port and a lighthouse, and a power station and factories and many landscaped avenues. . . . Ashdod is what there is. And she is not quite the grandiose fulfillment of the vision of the Prophets and of the dream of generations; not quite a world premier, but simply a city on a human scale.

In the Land of Israel claims neither to be comprehensive nor representative: there are certainly more moderate Israelis and more extreme Palestinians than Oz has portrayed here. But his aim is to reveal what has changed in the last few years; he explores the extremes in order to define the dimensions of the political, ideological, and social conflicts afflicting the people who live in "The Land" today.

One may wonder why Oz lent the power of his pen to ultra-Orthodox anti-Zionists, "Judeo-Nazis," messianic fundamentalists, Palestinian nationalists, and angry Sephardim—who all are his opponents.

Oz's decision to first publish these essays in *Davar* provides a clue. During the 1930s and 1940s—the golden age of the labor movement—*Davar* played a decisive role in shaping the culture of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in the Land of Israel). Oz clearly sees himself as the heir to this tradition, within which literature was "mobilized" in an ideological struggle to mold the culture and politics of the Jewish homeland. Today, when the ideological conflict is greater than at any time since 1948, Oz's side is on the defensive. These essays are directed first and foremost at his own constituency—the kibbutzniks and Labor party functionaries who are virtually the only people who read *Davar* today. The riveting portrayals of their sworn opponents are meant to awaken them to this new Israel, to show them exactly what they are up against, to shake them from passive resignation into action.

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The question Oz leaves in doubt is whether his modest and reasonable vision of Ashdod stands a chance against passionate fanatics who put their faith in guns, believe God is on their side, and are certain that the Messiah is at the gate. □

Richard William Krouse

Liberal Socialism

THE REAL WORLD OF LIBERALISM, by David Spitz. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 232 pp. $20.00.

This book is a posthumous collection of essays and reviews, most of them originally appearing in *Dissent*, by a leading contemporary political theorist. While ranging far and wide, *The Real World of Liberalism* is unified by a consistent concern: to rescue what Spitz sees as the authentic liberal tradition from its enemies on left and right. His book offers a powerful and persuasive defense of the liberal egalitarian perspective, pointing the way to a reconciliation of liberalism and democratic socialism.

The essence of liberalism, for Spitz, is its commitment to two sometimes complementary, sometimes competing values: liberty and equality. Liberty and equality stand best when they stand together. But the true liberal must, according to Spitz, esteem liberty above all other values—even, in circumstances where they conflict, equality.

Why is liberty the overriding liberal good? Here Spitz is an unreconstructed follower of John Stuart Mill. Liberty is a necessary condition for the exercise of *choice*. And the exercise of choice in turn is a necessary condition for the development of those powers and capacities—above all, reason and individuality—that define us as essentially human.

Freedom of choice is secured by the liberal value of tolerance. Spitz, following Mill, derives the imperative of tolerance in part from the fact of human fallibility. A sense of one's own fallibility, a spirit of intellectual openness and humility, is the frame of mind most appropriate to liberalism. "To have doubted one's own first principles," he quotes Justice Holmes approvingly, "is the mark of a civilized man." But Spitz also demonstrates clearly that there is no necessary connection between liberal tolerance and moral skepticism. A liberal can believe confidently in certain objective truths yet still favor tolerance of competing untruths. For if individuals develop their powers and capacities only through the exercise of choice, then no conception of truth, however infallible, can simply be imposed *ex cathedra*; individuals must be free to choose between competing conceptions, through the exercise of autonomous deliberation, if they are to grasp the grounds of truth.

Like Isaiah Berlin and others, Spitz distinguishes between "negative" and "positive" liberty. While recognizing that these notions form a continuum, not a dichotomy, Spitz emerges as an outspoken proponent of the "negative" conception: liberty as the absence of external impediments to motion, in the Hobbesian formulation that he prefers. He is properly critical of the perverted, totalitarian conception of positive liberty according to which a supraindividual agency—a Platonic elite or Leninist vanguard—comes to embody the "true" needs of our "higher" selves, which it then imposes over and against the actual wants of our poor, benighted, naked and shivering "lower" selves. But Spitz fails to take account of the sense in which Kantian notions of individual self-determination and (though he is rightly critical of Rousseau on other grounds) Rousseauean notions of collective self-determination are also doctrines of positive liberty. This is a serious omission, because it fails to acknowledge the important sense in which the Millian liberalism that he affirms conceives of human self-development in just these terms—as the exercise of individual and collective self-determination, as private and public self-legislation. Insofar as he identifies the value of (negative) liberty with the value of a field of choice, Spitz's, too, is a doctrine of "positive" liberty.

WHEN SPITZ TURNS to two complex sets of interrelationships—between liberty and law, and between liberty and equality—these essays are most consistently powerful and rewarding.

• *Liberty and Law.* Spitz adamantly opposes, as a form of newspeak, the Platonic-cum-Hegelian doctrine according to which submission to externally imposed law is freedom; a restraint may be justified, he argues (following Bentham), but it is still a restraint. Nevertheless, Spitz also effectively demolishes that version of the doctrine of negative liberty according to which there is an inverse, or

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zero-sum, relationship between liberty and law: according to which, as Hobbes puts it, the liberty of the subject consists in the silence of the laws. While any given legal restraint may, in this view, be warranted (on grounds, for instance, of security or welfare), it comes of necessity at the expense of liberty.

There is a logical fallacy in this argument. Any given law does, of necessity, involve restraint of some particular liberty; but from this it does not follow that it need necessarily involve a net diminution in the overall system of liberty. Liberty, Spitz argues, is always a complex system of particular liberties and concomitant restraints; the expansion of liberty in some directions always requires concomitant restraint (over the liberty to invade that liberty) in others. And government, through law, is clearly not the only possible source of restraint upon liberty; a wide variety of private or nonpolitical factors can equally restrain it. Thus law—by "restraining restraints" or "hindering hindrances" that have their origin in social or economic life (here Spitz follows T. H. Green)—can promote a net enhancement in the aggregate system of liberty. (Note that Spitz derives this conclusion, not by shifting to a "positive" conception of liberty, but simply by clear reasoning about the internal requirements of negative liberty itself.)

• *Liberty and Equality.* Spitz's discussions of the relationships between liberty and equality run interestingly and importantly parallel to his discussion of liberty and law. The authentic liberal, again, is committed not just to liberty but also to equality —above all, to an equal distribution of liberty itself. Now liberty and equality are not the same thing, and the two are sometimes in tension: certain equalities can be purchased only at the expense of a net diminution in liberty (a price that might or might not be worth paying in any given case). But it does not follow that the two values always stand in this antithetical relationship. The reduction of inequalities of power, of hierarchy and domination in economy and society, while of necessity involving restriction of a (nontrivial) range of particular freedoms (such as certain liberties of property, contract, and employment), may nonetheless significantly enhance what might be called "equality-in-freedom from dependence upon the will of others"—thereby strengthening the overall system of liberty.

The close relationship with the discussion of liberty and law should now be apparent: by restraining the restraints imposed by severe socioeconomic inequality, the liberal-democratic welfare state can enhance liberty on balance. It employs, or at least can employ, an egalitarian form of power to negate those negations of freedom caused by unequal socioeconomic power.

Spitz, it need hardly be emphasized, does not advocate absolute equality of material condition—no plausible egalitarianism does. Justice, he agrees with Aristotle, is treating equal cases equally and unequal cases unequally. One need not deny all relevant difference in order to affirm, as does Spitz, a greater commonality. Not a regime of "simple equality": merely the "tolerable range" that theorists as diverse as Aristotle and Rousseau have seen as essential to democracy. And *liberal* egalitarianism: Spitz is, quite properly, wary of those radical extensions of equality—such as the absolute equality of background condition, including suppression of the family, that would be essential to achieve perfect equality of opportunity—which would entail a prohibitive loss of liberal freedom.

Still, Spitz's commitment to an equal distribution of liberal freedom—or, more broadly, to the formally equal civil and political rights to which liberalism is centrally committed—drives him to consider the material preconditions necessary for equal *effective* exercise of liberal freedom or rights. Like a number of other contemporary liberal theorists, Spitz distinguishes between liberty and the material preconditions, or powers, essential to its effective exercise. But, more than most, he recognizes that without these material preconditions liberal freedom is a hollow shell—preferable to illiberal unfreedom, to be sure, but no less fraudulent. This recognition moves his liberalism, inexorably, beyond considerations of formal equality of civil and political rights to considerations of material equality of social and economic power.

David Spitz does not shrink from the egalitarian implications of his argument, and this is most evident in his discussion of property. Liberals, he argues, ought not to disparage the value of property both as a bulwark of liberty and a basis of human personality. But while broadly dispersed ownership of property may affirm these values (as a wide variety of theorists have taught), severe class inequality in control of productive resources negates them. Here the right to property becomes a species of sovereignty, more a right over liberty than one in the service of liberty. It divides the world into the dependent and the independent, the dominant and the submissive, master and (formally free) servant; it permits some to treat others as mere means. Liberalism, Spitz argues, opposes this rule of oligarchy in economic no less than in political life.

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Liberalism is not necessarily committed to private ownership of the means of production or, still less, to the transmission of concentrated wealth from one generation to the next. A properly egalitarian liberalism, that is to say, may find itself not just permitted but required to press for fundamental alterations in the property regime of capitalism—in Spitz's vision, for democratic socialism.

One defect of these essays is that they lack a proper sense of political economy. Their tone is predominantly sanguine regarding the capacity of the liberal-democratic welfare state to carry through the egalitarian extension of liberalism to which Spitz was committed. That the capacity of the liberal-democratic state further to reduce the inequalities inherent in capitalist society might, beyond a certain point, be systematically constrained by the imperatives of the economy within which it is embedded is a possibility never considered by Spitz. Which is understandable enough, since hard reflection upon this dilemma can lead to the despairing conclusion that we are imprisoned within our existing institutions with no way out—and despair as a frame of mind was alien to Spitz's temperament. But it is an important omission nonetheless.

THESE ESSAYS, which have been ably edited by Elaine Spitz, stand as a fitting remembrance to David Spitz. Just as liberty and equality are the two chief virtues of social institutions, so do liberalism and democratic socialism form the joint means to their full realization: they, too, stand best when they stand together. That is the deepest message of David Spitz's liberal socialism, and it is our great loss that he will no longer be with us to affirm that vision. □

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Murray Seeger

Russia Seen Deeply

RUSSIA: BROKEN IDOLS, SOLEMN DREAMS, by David Shipler. New York: Times Books. 404 pp. $17.95.

In 1890, Thomas Stevens, an American journalist, set off from Moscow for the Crimea, riding a horse he had purchased from a traveling Wild West show. Earlier, he had written a book about his travels in East Africa, and a second volume with the marvelous title *Around the World on a Bicycle.* Little should have surprised this experienced traveler as he made his way through Southern Russia and the Ukraine. Yet he records his surprise as he encountered conflict, suspicion, xenophobia and corruption, interspersed with bursts of kindness and generosity.

I reread Stevens's Russian adventure after finishing David Shipler's new book, *Russia*, the latest in a long line of correspondents' books about Russia and the Soviet Union. A reader sent me Stevens's book ten years ago, after she and her husband had completed a guided tour of major Soviet cities. She had also read many of my stories and concluded that little had changed since Stevens's visit.

Shipler's fine book confirms that conclusion. His evidence is of a kind that can only be developed by a hard-working, sensitive, and skilled reporter covering this vast land and society. American journalists have released a stream of books on Russia, varying in quality. Potboilers were concocted by trotter types who became instant experts during two-week visits. Fellow-traveling utopians did their gushing after a keyhole view of the workers' paradise in the naive 1930s. And there have been reminiscences by the few reporters who witnessed the grim realities of Stalin's final days.

The quality of these books turned upward in the 1970s when détente made it easier for resident correspondents to travel outside the city of Moscow and meet a greater variety of Soviet citizens. While many of these new sources were eccentric in their protests and opinions, they did offer hitherto unavailable insights into the everyday functioning of Soviet life.

Hedrick Smith, one of Shipler's predecessors as *New York Times* Bureau Chief in Moscow, set the standard for all correspondents' books with his

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monumental *The Russians*, published in 1976 and recently revised. Shipler inherited a vital list of local contacts when he arrived in Moscow in 1975, an advantage shared by all *Times* correspondents, good and bad, in a foreign post. But Shipler made his own way too, cutting paths through the dense snow that covers most of the Soviet reality. He also had an advantage supplied by his wise employers—time to develop a facility in the Russian language and some academic background in history and political science before taking on this assignment.

An ancient rule among American correspondents decrees that a new arrival in Moscow needs at least six months to become effective, and that maximum competence is reached after 18 months' experience. Then one tries to keep the momentum going as the ideological and meteorological grayness of Moscow erodes enthusiasm. Aided by his wife who shared his interest in the assignment, Shipler perceived some of the mysteries of Moscow sooner than most new American correspondents. Thus his book, while similar in some ways to Smith's, stands by itself as an important contribution to an understanding of the uniqueness of Soviet society, its weaknesses and strengths, and its seeming permanence.

Like most of the correspondents who have lived among the Russians, Shipler learned that there is little evidence to support the notion of "convergence," that Soviet and Western societies are growing more and more alike. The fact is that they are not "just like us": the principal trend in the history of the Soviet Union is continuity. On this point, accounts written by foreign travelers as far back as the 16th century bear remarkable resemblance to contemporary reports. As Shipler notes:

> Nothing in Communist rule has diminished the old instincts of insularity that thrived under the czars; nothing in the scientific futurist doctrine of Marxism-Leninism has reduced the distaste for introspection and the compulsion to mask unpleasantness, which were abiding features of Russian culture long before the Bolsheviks took power in 1917.

SHIPLER WAS ABLE to accomplish a goal that most Moscow correspondents never achieve. He had serious discussions with Soviet citizens who were neither mental robots programmed by the Central Committee nor harassed, frightened, or disillusioned individuals waiting for their chance to flee. These contacts augmented Shipler's curiosity and helped him penetrate some areas of Soviet society that few other Americans have seen.

A large portion of the book relates Shipler's visits to schools, where the Soviet men and women of the future are first exposed to political indoctrination, to the overwhelming power of the "collective" that dominates all of Soviet life, and to the oppressive air of patriotism that requires constant vigilance and an immense defense budget. Here young boys are given basic training in handling rifles. Shipler documents, better than most writers, the odd detachment of Soviet youth, growing up with little to believe in. There is, for example, the intense fascination with superficial aspects of Western society—printed tee-shirts, blue jeans, rock music, chewing gum.

Many young people explore the rituals of the Russian Orthodox Church, passing through surveillance lines of police and party hacks to attend services. Privately, youngsters talk about religion; crucifixes are prized possessions along with pictures of Christ and miniature ikons. How much of this tendency is a true religious response and how much a reaction to the drabness of everyday Soviet life is an open question. The church itself is permeated with informers and secret police. Historically, orthodoxy has usually compromised with temporal authority. The rare priests willing to challenge authority, like Dmitri Dudko, whom Shipler discusses, are silenced.

Shipler's method combines his anecdotal experience with a historic perspective. Having read the best of the academic literature, he applied its lessons to what he saw during his four years in Moscow. Typically, he opens a chapter by describing a visit to a Soviet institution such as Detsky Mir, the huge store for children's needs that stands on the same immense central Moscow square as the Lubyanka, the headquarters of the ubiquitous Committee on State Security—the KGB. "To get to the Lubyanka, you must begin at Detsky Mir (Children's World)," he points out. From a description of this toy and clothing store, Shipler proceeds to Detsky Sod 104 (a kindergarten) and a thorough discussion of "The Collective and the Individual." The same method is used to explore the entire philosophical structure of modern Soviet society in prose other journalists might well envy.

SHIPLER NOTES in his foreword that he felt a "driving need to write in a more . . . durable manner on the themes of Soviet life, on the values that shaped the society as it entered the last quarter of the twentieth century." His conclusions, not surprisingly, are as depressing as most Western analyses of Soviet society. Soviet citizens have seen their fondest dreams dissolve, their few heroes proved misguided at best and psychotic killers at the worst, and their greatest minds consumed by the

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society that created them. Even the modest improvements in living standards that generated some optimism in the 1960s and 1970s have ended. National policy still emphasizes heavy industry and defense at the expense of consumer goods and, most important, farm policy.

No matter all the propaganda and self-deception —the Soviet Union remains a state that cannot decently feed its own people and destroys its most creative citizens.

For someone who once endured the Moscow experience, there is a sense of *déjà vu* in Shipler's book. Many of the jokes of a decade ago are still told; the same rituals for taking correspondents to outstanding pig farms and shirt factories are followed; the same miasma of the long Russian fall and winter in drab Moscow prevails.

Yes, there has been some modest progress. It is hardly trivial that the modern Soviet rulers send Sakharov off to vegetate in Gorky and Solzhenitsyn to Vermont. In the all-too-recent past they would have been murdered. Yet I found one element in the book troubling, namely, Shipler's reaction to Andrei Sakharov and his wife, Yelena Bonner. After noting the disheartening tendency of Soviet dissidents to disparage each other, and singling out a handful of intellectuals who seemed to understand Western values, Shipler writes:

> I wish I could also count Andrei Sakharov among them, but it pains me to say that his towering courage and devotion to speaking for humaneness, which entitles him to all the immense respect he receives, did little to revise his Soviet-made impulses and preconceptions, which often proved more powerful than his contact with Western ideals.

Ten years have passed since Sakharov first met with Western reporters. Those of us who watched him join a silent demonstration for civil rights on a snowy December night in Pushkin Square, when no other "name" intellectuals appeared, have to find this criticism unwarranted. What Shipler saw in Sakharov, before he was dispatched into exile, was probably the effect of years of official condemnation, psychological pressure, and physical abuse.

Washington policy-makers seeking inside information on Soviet goals, or clues to the endless maneuvering among Kremlin leaders, will find little guidance in this book. Those, on the other hand, who have plunged Soviet-American relations to their lowest point since the darkest days of the Cold War would be well advised to study Shipler's investigation of Soviet society. We might get better policy-planning, even from a right-wing White House, if more of its occupants read books like this one. □

John A. Glusman

Betrayed by History

REBELS IN BOHEMIA: THE RADICALS OF *THE MASSES*, 1911–1917, by Leslie Fishbein. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 270 pp. $24.50.

It was the most radical periodical of its time. The intellectual successor to the dry socialist *Comrade*, the *Masses* was a magazine of "free expression" that embraced Marxists and Freudians, socialists, atheists, Wobblies, women's suffragists, feminists, free love advocates, rebels, and bohemians. Its contributors included Sherwood Anderson, Stuart Davis, Max Eastman, Walter Lippmann, John Reed, Carl Sandburg, Upton Sinclair, John Sloan, and Lincoln Steffens. The first parts of *Winesburg, Ohio* originally appeared in it, and the last issue contained a letter from John Reed, written en route to Halifax to report on the revolution in Russia, which was, the back-cover ad boasted, bound to be "an event in the world's literature." Frank, irreverent, colorful, and arrogant, the *Masses* was the voice of the prewar Village, and young leftists, like Joseph Freeman and Mike Gold, drank up every word.

Founded in 1911 by Piet Vlag, a Dutchman who ran a cooperative restaurant in the basement of the Rand School of Social Science, the *Masses* was launched as "a general ILLUSTRATED magazine of art, literature, politics, and science" under the editorship of Thomas Selzer, who gave the magazine its name. It fared poorly during its first year of operation. When another editor, Horatio Winslow, failed to increase circulation by the summer of 1912, Art Young, John Sloan, Louis Untermeyer, and others took control. For editor, Young recommended Max Eastman, a philosophy professor recently discharged from Columbia University for his unconventional views. Sloan and Untermeyer summoned Eastman: "You are elected Editor of *The Masses*. No pay." Eastman couldn't resist. Floyd Dell, of the *Chicago Evening Post Literary Supplement*, was named managing editor; Louis Untermeyer handled poetry, and John Sloan took care of the art.

The first issue under the new regime appeared in December 1912. The earlier, cumbersome design was changed to allow greater freedom for artists

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such as Charles Winter, Frank Walts, and Stuart Davis; a three-color cover was introduced, and Young was given an unprecedented two-page spread for his cartoon, "The Freedom of the Press." Eastman began a series of political commentaries, "Knowledge and Revolution," vowing to make the *Masses* "a *popular* Socialist magazine of pictures and lively writing" that would be open to "free and spirited expressions of every kind," but no longer associated with the "dogmatic spirit" and "factional disputes" of the Socialist party. "Our appeal," Eastman concluded, "will be to the masses, both Socialist and non-Socialist, with entertainment, education, and the livelier kinds of propaganda."

In January 1913 an editorial note appeared that redefined the aim and scope of the *Masses*, henceforth carried on the masthead of each issue. Drafted by John Reed and toned down by Eastman, the statement proclaimed the *Masses* "a revolutionary and not a reform magazine," one that would search for "the true causes," stand opposed to convention, and publish what the capitalist press couldn't print. Its final policy was to do as it pleased, conciliating nobody, "not even its readers." Eastman admired the tough talk and tactics of the Wobblies, and closely followed their industrial and legal battles. "Palgrave was Beauty; Marx was Justice," Joseph Freeman wrote, and "*The Masses* was both."

FISHBEIN'S BOOK is the most comprehensive work to date on the magazine, supplementing what others have written about it, including Albert Parry in *Garrets and Pretenders*, Granville Hicks in his biography of John Reed, Theodore Draper in *The Roots of American Communism*, and Daniel Aaron in *Writers on the Left*. But Fishbein's approach is curiously at odds with her subject.

Fishbein, speaking from the left, finds that the radicals of the *Masses* were more concerned with eclectic individualism than sustaining collective action. Lacking the revolutionary heritage of their European comrades and the commitment to "a narrow political ideal," they sought to transform society by changing themselves instead and effecting a cultural rebellion. They were blind to their own class biases and claimed to be leading a revolt of the masses, which was, in fact, a rebellion of an elite. Confusing desire and idea, they mistook the personal for the political, and their lack of "intellectual rigor" prevented them from discriminating between conflicting ideologies. Fishbein argues that their failure to articulate a socialist critique of everyday life prevented them from shaping sound policies and from surviving the divisive effects of the First World War.

To be sure, the ideas put forward by the radicals of the *Masses* often contradicted one another. Floyd Dell, for instance, one of the first Americans to popularize psychoanalysis, seemed untroubled by the discrepancy between a Marxian and a Freudian point of view. Freud was simply too useful in lifting the Victorian taboo on sex to be dismissed on theoretical grounds, even if he was incompatible with Marx's materialism. Dell, Eastman, and Hutchins Hapgood could speak out in favor of free love without weighing its effects on the working class and the burden it placed upon women.

So, too, ardent feminists weakened their cause by betraying Victorian stereotypes and domestic attachments. Women, suffragists argued, were morally superior, pacifists by nature, and acted with their hearts, whereas men had fewer scruples, were naturally aggressive, but somehow more intellectually inclined. Isadora Duncan could say, "My life has known but two motives—Love and Art," and even a hardened political rebel such as Emma Goldman expressed similar sentiments recollecting her love for Alexander Berkman. Fishbein rebukes them: "There was no concerted effort to view sex and family life in political terms."

Fishbein criticizes the radicals for their lack of discipline, ideological unity, and theoretical sophistication, which Lenin had insisted on in *What Is To Be Done?* But the radicals of the *Masses* weren't professional revolutionaries, and prewar America wasn't prerevolutionary Russia. Though Eastman professed his own brand of "scientific socialism," the *Masses* never made any claim to consistency. In fact, the opposite was true. As Reed stated in his draft of Eastman's policy statement:

> The broad purpose of *The Masses* is a social one. . . . We intend to be arrogant, impertinent, in bad taste, but not vulgar. We will be bound by no one creed or theory of social reform, but will express them all, providing they be radical. . . . Sensitive to all new winds that blow, never rigid in a single . . . phase of life, such is our ideal for *The Masses*. And if we change our minds about it, well—why shouldn't we?

Fishbein acknowledges these intentions only to pass judgment on those who lived up to them. Whatever her intention, she is unsympathetic to the aims of the *Masses*, which was united not by ideology, but in its diversity, the true source of its spirit, color, and life.

Moreover, Fishbein's "leftist" critique runs only skin-deep. Instead of analyzing the economic and

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historical conditions that shattered the revolutionary dream in America, she delves into Freudian psychology. Thus she criticizes the radicals for mixing Marx with Freud, but at the same time explains their attraction to Marx by borrowing from Freud: paternal failures led to socialism; strong maternal figures nurtured feminism; free-thinking parents fostered religious latitude; and close family environments, like those of Eastman, Dell, and Bourne, cultivated the seeds of rebellion.

BY HIGHLIGHTING personal factors as the source of political inconsistency, Fishbein underplays the real importance of the magazine and its contributors. She virtually overlooks, for example, the superb reportage the *Masses* featured on the domestic class struggle—such as John Reed's "War in Paterson" on the silk workers' strike of 1913; Eastman's "Class War in Colorado" and "The Nice Ladies of Trinidad," a harrowing account with follow-up of the 1914 "Ludlow massacre"; and Frank Bohn's story of the Youngstown steel workers' strike, "Fire in the Steel Trust." If the *Masses* was ideologically handicapped in its analysis of the capitalist class, its coverage of the major industrial strikes was brilliant: sensitive, chilling in its effect, calling out for action.

Under the Espionage Act of 1917 the Post Office succeeded in banning the *Masses'* August issue, revoking the magazine's second-class mailing privileges, and forcing it to shut down by the end of the year. To appease the Post Office, the editorial staff reorganized as the *Liberator* in 1918. But compared to the *Masses*, Eastman wistfully admitted, the *Liberator* lacked "a good deal of the dramatic beauty," and "the glamour of the abstract moral principle" was gone.

Insensitive to its aims, Fishbein fails to capture the spirit of the *Masses*—its rambunctiousness, self-mockery, and use of humor as an effective political weapon. She is particularly unsatisfactory in her discussion of the *Masses*' art work, which first attracted public attention, and its fiction, perhaps the magazine's most distinguished feature. She accuses the radicals of a lack of aesthetic discipline, of failing to articulate the role of the artist, and of being unable to achieve a synthesis between art and politics. But since the *Masses* group was committed to free expression—artistic and literary decisions being made at open, often anarchic editorial meetings—the demand for ideological coherence would have amounted to a contradiction in terms.

As it was, the authority Eastman exerted came to be resented. At one point, the artists staged their own revolt against the writers, demanding freedom from Eastman's editorial policy, equal division of responsibilities, the abolition of titles, objecting specifically to the editors' practice of putting captions under their drawings. Eastman tendered his resignation, renouncing his belief in "the principle of co-operative editing," but was reinstated by majority vote, whereupon John Sloan, Stuart Davis, Glenn Coleman, and Robert Carleton Brown quit. Nor would adherence to a party line have helped; quite the contrary. As Reed once put it, "This class struggle plays hell with your poetry."

Fishbein then wonders why the writers and artists of the *Masses* weren't more technically innovative or more attuned to the modernist movement. Eastman and Dell may have resisted cubism and futurism, and clung to more conventional forms of verse, but John Sloan helped arrange the revolutionary Armory Show of 1913. Eastman was certainly conservative and behind the times in poetic taste to the end of his life, but for the magazine's artists, child abuse, unemployment, destitution, prostitution, jingoism, and racism were subjects for dissection, not literary experimentation. A fault perhaps and certainly not "modernist." Art was seen as an instrument of social influence, but content and form were left to the creativity of the artist.

Unwilling to subordinate their art to politics, the radicals of the *Masses* were incapable of submitting to party ideology and control. Because of the subjective nature of their revolt and the weakness of their vision, Fishbein concludes, "the left shattered after World War I into bohemians and radicals who could neither communicate nor cooperate in the interests of social change." And it is here that the conflict between Fishbein's method and material comes to a head. In focusing on individual tempers and personal idiosyncrasies, she reveals her own historical nearsightedness. She is guilty of the same subjectivity that she claims proved the radicals' undoing. For it was not simply ideological incompatibilities and an absence of intellectual discipline, which also characterized the Socialist party, that divided radicals at the time. It was the conflict of desire and fact, idea and reality—the failure, as William L. O'Neill pointed out in his excellent anthology, *Echoes of Revolt: The Masses, 1911–1917*, "of the revolutionary ideal."

It was history, not personality, that betrayed the radicals of the *Masses*. The belief in a socialist future would be upheld by a new generation, instilled with fresh hope, only to face disillusionment, as Theodore Draper observed, "in its own way, and yet the same way," as the generation before. □

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James B. Rule

Nativist Demagogues

THE OLD CHRISTIAN RIGHT: THE PROTESTANT FAR RIGHT FROM THE GREAT DEPRESSION TO THE COLD WAR, by Leo P. Ribuffo. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 369 pp. $29.95.

The pattern repeats itself every generation or so in America. Things go wrong, at home or abroad, and an explanation is demanded. For some, it is inconceivable that the source of the difficulties might lie within the American system itself. The cause has to be something quintessentially alien. This something may be unassimilated immigrant groups, racial or ethnic minorities, communism, the papacy, international bankers, Jewish conspiracies, progressive education—or, more likely, some eclectic combination of these things. The solution is always simple: a return to the alleged old-time virtues of authentic Americanism. These are supposedly manifest in anything from primitive Protestant fundamentalism and curtailment of central government to outright persecution of vulnerable groups. Sometimes these ugly impulses are orchestrated from the top, as under the current Administration. Sometimes they boil up from below, as in the '30s and '50s, and furnish ammunition for ambitious political entrepreneurs to attack entrenched political elites.

The Old Christian Right chronicles the surge of right-wing nativism that crested in the mid- and late '30s. More than half the book is devoted to capsule biographies of three figures particularly identified with the movement—William Dudley Pelley, Gerald Winrod, and Gerald L. K. Smith. Much of the author's attention to the early lives and personal idiosyncrasies of these figures is excessive. With the possible exception of Smith, none was interesting enough as a personality or weighty enough in historical importance to warrant such detailed treatment. But their public appeals, and what these appeals can tell us about American politics, command serious interest.

PELLEY, WINROD, AND SMITH are remembered as three of a type—one-time fundamentalist preachers transformed into home-grown fascists, using religious rhetoric as a lever for virulent anti-Semitism. Yet we can learn something important from the differences among the three, and here Ribuffo's book is most useful.

Smith came to prominence as a follower—one might almost say a worshipper—of Louisiana's Huey Long and as an administrator of Long's Share Our Wealth movement. He remained a strident critic of Roosevelt, and a self-proclaimed isolationist for years after Long's assassination in 1935.

Pelley, though also a fundamentalist preacher, had been a writer of sentimental novels and Hollywood screenplays before a mystical experience convinced him of his true destiny in politics. Following this revelation he drew inspiration from Christian Science, theosophy, and spiritualism, deriving from them highly idiosyncratic analyses of the world situation. He imagined Joseph Stalin to be the reincarnation of Genghis Khan, and suggested that President Hoover was "manipulated by agents of the 'International Shylock.' " His "Silver Shirts" were a bizarre mixture of abstracted spiritualists and Nazi-like thugs.

Winrod, who maintained closer ties with the mainstream of Protestant fundamentalism, denounced precisely the sort of religious syncretism favored by Pelley. He regarded Mussolini as the Antichrist and the Federal Reserve system as a " 'diabolical scheme' that allowed bankers to 'enslave' millions of citizens." His biblically inspired analysis of the world situation at first put Hitler in an unfavorable light, but Winrod took a more favorable view of the Nazi regime as its anti-Semitism became more pronounced.

All three figures gained influence as the '30s wore on, grouping around themselves diverse opponents of New Deal foreign and domestic policies. Pelley was perhaps the most menacing in pretentions but least consequential in political impact. His Silver Shirt movement apparently peaked in 1934 at about 15,000 loosely organized adherents; while they preached violence, they seem to have been as often its victims as perpetrators. Winrod's greatest influence was through his publication, the *Defender*, which by 1938 reached some 110,000 subscribers. That year he mounted a campaign in the Republican primary for U.S. Senator, "hoping to use the office as a 'sounding board for the gospel of Jesus Christ.' " He laced his appeal with condemnation of "foreign" ideas and ethnic groups, but his 53,000 votes left him in third place. Smith may have reached the high point of public attention when he preached to 150,000 mourners at Huey Long's funeral in 1935, but he continued to

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attract crowds to his anti-Semitic diatribes even in the 1940s.

Given the ugliness of their "mature" ideas, one would wish to conclude that none of these three figures was capable of a decent or progressive impulse. But this was not the case, as Ribuffo carefully shows. Early in his career, Smith participated in organizing for the American Federation of Labor; he actively opposed the Ku Klux Klan in Indiana at a time when it wielded great influence. Similarly Pelley, though ultimately embracing some of the most mean-spirited doctrines imaginable, also claimed to draw inspiration from the cooperative utopia portrayed in Bellamy's *Looking Backwards*.

More important, the currents of public opinion from which the three drew their support evidently shared the same contradictory potentials. Smith's hero Huey Long, after all; built a national following partly by criticizing Roosevelt for insufficient zeal against big business; Long's authoritarian tendencies and other unsavory qualities shared the stage with his pleas for more equal distribution of national wealth. Populist movements in America have often demonstrated such Janus-faced appeals: toward more authentic democracy and more far-reaching equality on the one hand; toward narrow nativism and persecution of the powerless, on the other.

Thus the direction taken by grass-roots movements in America may depend on such adventitious matters as the leadership or alliances that happen to present themselves at a particular moment. "If Smith, for instance, had encountered Senator George Norris instead of Huey Long during the early 1930's," Ribuffo writes, "he could have become . . . dean of the social gospel instead of the dean of anti-Semitism." What one might observe about individual leaders might also be said about their movements more broadly.

The war years were the undoing of this phase of American nativism. While the shift to internationalism in public opinion undercut its ideological appeal, the final blow came from overt repression by the Roosevelt administration. Like its actions against the powerless Japanese Americans, the Administration's attack on these admittedly unsavory personalities showed a darker side to centrist liberalism.

Despite misgivings on civil-liberties grounds from Attorney General Francis Biddle, the Justice Department obtained in 1942 an indictment known as *United States v. Winrod*. This was later expanded to embrace some 30 defendants—a heterogeneous lot of right-wingers—including Winrod and Pelley, but not Smith. The lengthy prosecution did the government no credit. The 30 certainly had many things to answer for, but participating in a "worldwide Nazi movement," Ribuffo concludes, was not one of them.

After many months, the bizarre and acrimonious trial ended without a verdict. Yet the trial and the antisubversive activities leading up to it left some important repercussions, none of them heartening. In his efforts to crush his right-wing critics, Ribuffo argues, Roosevelt reinforced both theory and practice of mobilizing state power against internal dissent. Part of this process was the politicization of the FBI under J. Edgar Hoover. Liberals and leftists during this period were not always solicitous of the rights of dissent invoked by the American right, the author observes. The net effect of what Ribuffo calls "the Brown Scare" was to ease the way for similar actions against leftists during the McCarthy and Vietnam periods.

THE LESSONS to be drawn from all this are not altogether new, but they are worth reiterating. Grass-roots movements for democracy or equality do not necessarily embody sensitivity to rights of minorities or support for liberties of expression and thought. Attacks on "the system" may unfortunately bring with them efforts to persecute the weak, as well as efforts to dismantle entrenched power.

What authentic democrats seek, of course, are programs in which protections for the rights of the vulnerable and the innovative are considered conditions for more equal distribution of power and other scarce resources. Ribuffo's book should remind us that this important juxtaposition, while by no means unattainable, cannot be taken for granted.□

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LETTERS

On Housing in America

Editors:

Richard Appelbaum, Peter Dreier, and Michael Harrington ("A Faded Dream: Housing in America," *Dissent*, Winter 1984) rightly argue that the free market cannot solve America's housing problem, but their proposed solutions neglect an important consideration: most Americans don't want to live in any kind of public housing. Most people want to live in detached, single-family homes, and they want to own their homes individually rather than collectively. Consequently, government housing policies should focus on making *private* homeownership as widespread as possible. This means scrapping—or at least severely limiting—the authors' plans for "limited equity cooperatives" and "public utility housing."

An alternative public-housing policy would take popular aspirations more actively into account. For example, why not implement a massive WPA-type countercyclical program to build single-family houses? These houses could be homesteaded to lower-income families. Each participating family could receive title to their house after living in it for a specified number of years and paying a nominal sum. Such a program would create millions of socially useful jobs, reduce the price of housing by expanding the supply, and—most important—give people homes of their own.

Being a good socialist, I advocate social ownership of the basic means of production and distribution. I do not, however, see any point in being doctrinaire about housing. If people want to own the houses they live in, why not structure public policy accordingly? A house is not a steel mill.

Mark Koerner
Portland, Oregon □

"Democracy in the Workplace"

Editors:

Robert A. Dahl's "Democracy in the Workplace," in the Winter 1984 issue, might have made a stronger argument for his case, I thought reading it, by making the point that democracy, in the workplace, the government, the home, must have the consent of the governed. The antithesis of democracy is not monarchy or oligarchy (*pace* Michels) or even "Communism" (*pace* Reagan), as such, but tyranny, as the patriots of 1776 knew. And tyranny exists wherever there is "domination of some over others, whoever the some and the others may be," to quote a phrase by Albert Memmi from the Summer 1981 issue of *Dissent*.

Madison, in the 10th Federalist paper, shows that there is a *place* for something like oligarchy, where "pure," face-to-face democracy is impractical. Whatever the outward form of governance, the crucial question is, "How are the governors chosen, democratically or not?"

The task of the legislator-politician, of management, of the parent, of the would-be group leader is to demonstrate convincingly the superior cogency of what he or she proposes and so to *earn* the grant of authority to carry it out. It is in this way that a government will derive its just authority from the consent of the governed. For an authentic democracy requires that interpersonal relations be persuasive, never coercive, that those called to rule be freely chosen on the strength of a demonstrated competence.

Equality, it seems to me, is at issue only as far as individual rights are concerned. The classic rights named in the Declaration would not be "unalienable" unless they were also equal.

Obviously, if what is said here of democracy is true, it is an an ideal yet to be realized, one that deserves to be approximated as rapidly as possible. And a nation that calls itself a "democracy" is only justified in so doing if it aspires to realize that ideal.

R. A. Athearn
Friday Harbor, Wash. □

The Vietnam Memorial

Editors:

Nicolaus Mills finishes his article "Architectural Politics: The Vietnam Memorial" in the Winter 1984 issue of *Dissent* with a question that may well be finally becoming, as Mills describes it, an "immediate and human question: Are we prepared to honor those soldiers who survived Vietnam while refusing to honor the war they fought?" This ex-soldier who survived Vietnam can best be honored by absolutely refusing to honor the war he fought in. Honor those who survived as well as those who died there, but never ever honor that war, or any war anymore.

The Veterans' Administration labels some survivors of the war in Vietnam with PVS, Post Vietnam Syndrome. I believe that America has PVS, and it is well that it does. Let us hope that it will mature from the experience. The greatest way to honor the survivors of Vietnam, those who died there as well as those who experienced that war on the streets of this country and in front of their television tubes, would be to make it the last one, the last war.

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An important step in that process is to begin to change the way we educate our children concerning the "honor of war." Unfortunately, Frederick Hart's sculpture is a step in the wrong direction. It reminds me of childhood-type memories of soldiers and war, but my vision has changed with the experience. Must we all experience the same thing to learn?

Maya Lin's memorial has concentrated the power of those men whose names it holds, and that power overwhelms me whenever I am there. Maya Lin has done much to honor the memory of those who died in Vietnam, as Mills notes, and her sculpture, by doing that, also honors those who came home from Vietnam. It is impossible to be in the presence of Maya Lin's sculpture without feeling the overwhelming presence of the 57,939 Americans who gave their lives for this country.

The war there was lost, but the lives are not necessarily lost in vain. In the past, men honored their soldiers for fighting and winning. Let us begin to honor our soldiers for fighting to end the institution of war. War no more. Sculptures like Frederick Hart's no more . . .

JOHN RHODES
Dunstable, Mass. □

Grenada

Editors:

Hooray for Irving Howe! ("Grenada: 'Twas a Famous Victory," Winter 1984.) He is the first leftist critic I've read who recognizes that Grenada might be more reasonably compared to the Cambodian invasion by Vietnam than to the invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S.S.R. Unfortunately, he only sees that as "might," not "is."

Grenada resembles the Cambodian invasion (and perhaps also Tanzania's invasion of Uganda) in that it was not done out of humanitarian concern for the local population; in that it was generally condemned as violating international standards and commitments made by virtue of membership in international bodies; and in that its net benefit was clearly positive and human (despite the original motives).

I regret that Howe doesn't feel that the plight of the Grenadians represented an extreme enough case to support the invasion based on its net effects (rather than its alleged motivation). . . .

It was based on a questionable policy, hypocritically defended—but the results were beneficial to the Grenadians. . . . Besides showing that the U.S. "has the military strength" to intervene in situations like Grenada, it also showed it will occasionally *use* that strength. This too is part of the lesson of Grenada.

Howe clearly has more insight than most leftist commentators and is to be applauded for it. But, to paraphrase his retort to Stephen Soiffer in the Letters section of the Winter 1984 issue, what would he propose as an alternative to the invasion—an indefinite period of rhetorical criticism of the Coard-Austin group?

ROBERT BLAIR
Arlington, Va. □

Discrimination in Baseball

Editors:

Liked the Spring '84 issue of *Dissent*—a bit heavy in spots but, overall, nicely balanced. However, one minor complaint. As a fan who transferred allegiance to Ebbets Field when Jackie Robinson joined the Dodger line-up without benefit of reading the *Daily Worker*, I'm a little put off by Lester Rodney's review in that issue of *Baseball's Great Experiment* by Jules Tygiel. Rodney has every right to be proud of what he wrote, but to make his "intervention" (and, *somewhat* more plausibly, that of the Negro press) the centerpiece of his review seems far-fetched. Whatever motivated Branch Rickey in his strange mixture of greed, foresight, and religiosity, it can hardly be argued that he gave a damn one way or the other about what the *Daily Worker* said.

BEN WALKER
New York □

Proposals for Discussion

Editors:

I am glad to renew my subscription to *Dissent*, having found the articles both of high quality and consistent with my principles. There are three areas that I would like to see you explore or at least comment upon in the next year or so.

First, an analysis of the British newsmagazine the *Economist*. It is probably the best news weekly in the world, and insinuates its conservative, probusiness propaganda so persuasively that I find myself being influenced by it. They have been campaigning for lower wages as the only way to get stalled economies moving again, and I would like to see their sophisticated arguments answered and refuted.

Second, the issue of free enterprise. I do not see free enterprise as synonymous with capitalism. It works well within its own sphere, but at most has a marginal influence on the actions of large corporations and multinationals. Yet Communist nations which have suppressed free enterprise in the name of "socialism" have suffered adverse consequences. I feel that free

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enterprise is at least as consistent with a socialist system as it is with capitalism. (In neither case can it be universally applied, nor universally suppressed.) I would be interested in the thoughts of Lester Thurow or Robert Heilbroner on this issue.

Third, comment on socialist governments. Ideally socialism will distribute wealth on the basis of need, or of justice. Yet this can only be done where there's enough to go around. As . . . the world has not yet reached that point, socialist governments can only implement nonsocialist programs. One could argue that socialist parties should stay in opposition, even refuse to govern, until capitalism has increased wealth to that point of abundance. . . . I would argue for a modified version of that theory. When socialists, as in France, achieve power, they can implement reforms such as shorter work weeks, better vacations, medical programs, decentralization, but cannot control the economy unless they compromise their principles. Progressive and socialist movements should be a short term in power made possible by an increase of wealth in the last couple of decades, and institute certain reforms so popular as to be irreversible—and then follows another generation in the political wilderness. The alternative is for socialists to cling to power while applying "austerity," and let their disillusioned followers drift back to the Communists or other extremists. I would expect leftist governments in a democratic society to hold power only about 20 percent of the time.

PETER B. DENISON
Somerset, Mass. □

What a Sinn Fein Member Has to Say

Editors:

As you have been carrying, over the years, some articles on conditions and problems in Ireland, you and your readers may be interested to know that Martha McClelland, a leading member of Sinn Fein, recently visited America and spoke here about the conflict in Northern Ireland, and what she had to say. She asserts that the American media receives most of its information regarding Northern Ireland from British sources. Moreover, the U.S. State Department, in an apparent violation of the right to free speech, denies visas to Irish Republicans. The pro-British bias in the media and government censorship of Republicans operate to distort American understanding of "the troubles."

Sinn Fein's primary objective is the reunification of Ireland. It seeks self-determination for the Irish people through an all-Ireland election. In Martha's view, partition is and always has been illegitimate. In 1918, shortly before partition, the vast majority of the Irish voted in a nationwide referendum for freedom and independence for *all* of Ireland. But the British and Protestants rejected the results, arrested officials of Sinn Fein, which had won 73 of 105 seats for a proposed national parliament, and created Northern Ireland. The boundaries were drawn so as to ensure a Protestant majority in the North. Subsequent opinion polls repeatedly show that most Irish people favor reunification. Sinn Fein is confident that an all-Ireland election would result in reunification, if only the British would permit such an election and abide by the result.

Sinn Fein is active as both a social and political organization. Its "advice centers" disseminate legal information and help the nationalist people organize to solve community problems. Despite government harassment and repression, Sinn Fein received 42 percent of the Catholic vote in the June 1983 national election.

Martha regrets the violence in the North, but she believes that IRA operations are a legitimate response to the injustice of partition and British and Protestant discrimination and violence. She hopes that Sinn Fein's electoral gains, IRA activities, and international pressure will achieve reunification.

KEVIN GLEASON □

A Word on Neoliberalism

Editors:

The growth of neoliberalism certainly warrants discussion by democratic socialists. But Jim Sleeper's "Neoliberalism's Hesitation Dance" (*Dissent*, Spring 1984) is distressingly superficial—long on rhetoric and short on serious analysis of the neoliberal program and its ideological underpinnings. Moreover, Sleeper's venture into cocktail-party sociology is annoying—for example, "He's a young writer of fairly typical neoliberal pedigree: prep school, the chilly Harvard College of the 1970s, then on to the precocious circle at the *Washington Monthly*, and finally to glossy, 'responsible' national journalism." I have no idea what "chilly" means in this context, but the attempt to pin part of the blame for neoliberalism on "the 'rationalistic' elites at such places as Harvard" is pretty far-fetched. (Sleeper might be surprised to learn that Harvard in the mid-to-late '70s had a fairly sizable contingent of socialist and other progressive activists—probably one of the largest campus lefts in the country).

The point is that the educational and social backgrounds of the neoliberals are of minor importance. Neoliberalism poses a challenge to conventional liberals and democratic socialists alike; it requires a vigorous and detailed response, one devoid of the chatty and irrelevant asides that mar Sleeper's article

LOUIS F. COOPER
Bethesda, MD □

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

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

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